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Abstract 
Introduction  
Hospital acquired infections (HAI) are a significant and increasing issue in 
contemporary healthcare. Outbreaks of HAI are not uncommon in hospitals settings 
and various pathogens can be responsible. The prevention and control of HAI requires 
the implementation of a number of infection control interventions.  
Background and significance 
HAIs have a large effect on patient morbidity, mortality, and cost to the 
healthcare system. The issue of HAIs in Australian public hospitals warrants thorough 
examination into the occurrence of outbreaks and the implementation of effective 
strategies to reduce transmission rates. Historically hand hygiene has been considered 
key in the reduction of the rate of HAIs; however, other infection control interventions 
also have merit. A combination of infection control interventions should be used in 
order to have a significant impact on HAIs. The identification of outbreaks and their 
associated pathogen is currently warranted in order to establish which HAIs are 
particularly problematic across Australia and to allow for a targeted approach. 
Currently, no study has addressed the issue of identifying which outbreaks of HAIs are 
occurring in Australian public hospitals, or identifying which infection control 
interventions (other than hand hygiene) are being implemented with the aim of 
reducing HAIs. 
Aim   
The study had three aims. First, to explore infection control clinical nurse 
consultants’ perceptions of outbreaks of HAI and consequent infection control practices. 
Second the study examined events that occurred in infection control in Australian public 
hospitals over the seven year period from January 2005 to December 2011. In particular, 
outbreaks of HAIs and infection control interventions aimed at reducing the rate of 
HAIs. Finally, the study identified interventions (other than hand hygiene) and 
examined their impact on the rate of HAIs.  
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Method 
The study utilised an exploratory, sequential, mixed methods design to allow for 
the development of a survey designed to collect data on outbreaks of HAIs and the 
implementation of infection control interventions across Australia. The developed 
survey tool was piloted in a single state and then rolled out nationally. Data were 
collected in 35 Australian public hospitals in September 2012. The findings of this 
study were analysed through descriptive statistics in order to answer the research 
questions and the null hypothesis was then tested by Poisson regression analysis. 
Results 
Results from Phase 1 identified two themes: the power of outbreaks and 
empowering solutions. These were used to inform the development of a survey tool 
used in Phase 2 Part A and Part B. Results from Phase 2 showed that in the study 
timeframe 100% (6/6) of participants in the pilot survey had experienced at least one 
outbreak of HAI and 96.9% (28/29) in the national survey. Norovirus (50%, 5/6) was 
the most frequently reported pathogen, identified for the most serious outbreaks of 
HAI followed by Vancomycin-resistant Enterococci (VRE) (33.3%, 2/6) in the pilot 
state. The results were similar for the national survey, with Norovirus (41.1% 12/29) 
most frequently identified for the most serious outbreak, followed by VRE (24.1% 
7/9). The most frequently implemented infection control interventions in the study 
timeframe were patient screening/surveillance, environmental cleaning and cleaning 
audits (100%, 6/6) in the pilot state and visitor dispensers (93.1%, 27/29) in the 
national survey. 
Rates of HAI appeared to be effected by the implementation of infection control 
interventions, with mean rates of Staphylococcus aureus blood stream infection (SAB) 
being reduced for blood stream infection (BSI) intervention (-0.19, 95% CI -0.29, -
0.09), cleaning (-0.43, 95% CI -0.69, -0.10), and isolation (-0.14, 95% CI -0.20, -0.08). 
Mean Rates of Methicillin sensitive Staphylococcus aureus (MSSA) were reduced for 
cleaning (-0.71, 95% CI -1.07, -0.16). Mean rates of central line associated blood 
stream infection (CLABSI) were increased with BSI intervention (2.55, 95% CI 0.52, 
6.70) and cleaning (0.66, 95% CI 0.05, 2.03). Lastly, mean rates of surgical site 
infection (SSI) were also increased with cleaning intervention (1.19, 95% CI 0.27, 
2.45), but decreased with BSI intervention (-0.72 95%, CI -1.12, -0.12). 
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Conclusion  
This study indicated that an outbreak during the study timeframe had occurred 
in the majority of hospitals and that Norovirus and VRE were two pathogens 
frequently identified as being responsible for outbreaks. A wide variety of infection 
control interventions were implemented during the timeframe and there did not appear 
to be any standardised approach, with varying results of implementation across 
participants. Rates of HAI did appear to be affected by the implementation of an 
infection control interventions, either by reducing or increasing mean infection rates. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 BACKGROUND 
Hospital acquired infections (HAIs) are an increasingly problematic issue in 
Australian hospitals (Hand Hygiene Australia, 2011). They often result in increased 
patient morbidity, mortality, length of stay, and lead to massive financial burden; thus, 
prevention is paramount (Agnes, Lomotan, McGrail, Morgan, & Roghmann, 2010; 
Graves, Halton, Paterson, & Whitby, 2009; Mitchell, Hall, MacBeth, Gardner, & 
Halton, 2015). Research has indicated that effective hand hygiene by healthcare 
workers is pivotal in preventing HAIs and may even be the single most important 
factor (Barnett et al., 2012). In light of the significant impact HAIs have on patient 
outcomes, HAIs have been nominated as a priority area by the Australian Commission 
on Safety and Quality in Health Care (ACSQHC, 2011). In an overall effort to reduce 
HAIs in Australia, a national program called the National Hand Hygiene Initiative 
(NHHI) was developed by Hand Hygiene Australia, based on the World Health 
Organization’s 2009 campaign “Save Lives: Clean Your Hands” (Hand Hygiene 
Australia, 2011; Grayson et al., 2011). This program was the first national infection 
control initiative of its kind to be implemented; it commenced in 2009 with the aim to 
develop “… a national approach to improving hand hygiene and monitor its 
effectiveness.” (Hand Hygiene Australia, 2011). This Australian initiative was 
developed with the aim of increasing hand hygiene compliance rates and sustaining 
these improvements. This was to be achieved by utilising education, compliance 
auditing (specifically using the “5 moments” program) and standardising the 
surveillance of Staphylococcus aureus bacteraemia (SAB) blood stream infection 
rates (Hand Hygiene Australia, 2011; Grayson et al., 2011). The rollout of this national 
initiative aimed to engage every hospital in Australia (Barnett et al., 2014). 
The topic of HAIs and infection control interventions is particularly broad, 
requiring in depth exploration. When dealing with HAIs, hand hygiene is often 
considered “key” to reducing rates; however, the transmission of HAIs is complex. 
HAIs can be spread by diverse routes, including surfaces, air, water, intravenous 
routes, and surgery (Curtis, 2008). Infection control strategies aimed at reducing the 
number of patients inadvertently colonised with HAIs must go beyond hand hygiene 
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in isolation by using a variety of tactics to reduce and manage HAIs (Fairclough, 
2006).  
In October 2009, a project to undertake an economic evaluation of the Australian 
NHHI was funded by the National Health and Medical Research Council (NHMRC), 
this was the National Hand Hygiene Initiative Evaluation Project (NHHIEP). The 
project was led by a steering group, which included the chief investigators and 
representatives from each state and territory. The project’s aim was to evaluate the 
NHHI to measure how effectively the program worked, what factors were important 
to its success, and whether the program was efficacious in terms of value for money 
(Graves et al., 2012). The effectiveness of the NHHI was explored by examining 
whether the initiative’s implementation was associated with a reduction in state by 
state SAB infection rates. The NHHIEP utilised a before and after quasi-experimental 
design based on monthly state SAB rates by comparing infection rates in each hospital 
before and after the implementation of the NHHI, while controlling for other potential 
changes over time. The hypothesis for the NHHIEP stated that there was a change in 
monthly infection rates as a result of the implementation of the NHHI; this hypothesis 
was two sided, and thus did not specify any direction for change. Participating 
hospitals included five of the largest public hospitals across Victoria, New South 
Wales, Queensland, Western Australia, and South Australia; three of the largest public 
hospitals in Tasmania; and the main public hospital in the Northern Territory and the 
Australian Capital Territory. Consequently, 30 hospitals were recruited. Another 20 
public hospitals were invited to participate in the study, and included the next 20 
largest hospitals in Australia, to total 50 hospitals. Monthly infection rate data was 
requested from the 50 hospitals. Data on multiple infection types was available; 
however, the steering group determined that  only infections caused by SAB would be 
examined, as SAB had the most consistent data collection protocol and robust 
definition as endorsed by the ACSQHC in 2009 (Mitchell, Gardner, Collignon, 
Stewart, & Cruickshank, 2011). SAB infections were also routinely collected by 
Australian hospitals and were reported both nationally, and to their respective state or 
territory health authority. Data quality was checked and infection definition verified. 
The study had human ethical approval for each state and territory, and ethics was also 
approved by the Queensland University of Technology (Barnett et al., 2014). Data 
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analysis was run separately for each state; as the NHHI was implemented on a state-
by-state basis. 
 
Figure 1.1 Graphic depicting the nine projects specific to the NHHIEP 
 
In response to the research aims, and to test the null hypothesis, the NHHIEP 
developed nine specific research projects (see Figure 1.1). These projects included: the 
prospective healthcare worker survey, hand hygiene compliance and infection rates, 
the infection control practitioner survey, other infection control, extra length of stay 
and death risk from HAI, hospital characteristics, the cost of the NHHI survey, the 
value of a bed day, and the prospective survey ward manager. The “other infection 
control” component highlighted in dark green, represents this current study and Figure 
1.1 depicts how it fits into the parent study. A number of publications resulted from 
the NHHIEP and included: 
1. Page, K., Barnett, A. G., Campbell, M., Brain, D., Martin, E., Fulop, N., & 
Graves, N. (2014). Costing the Australian National Hand Hygiene Initiative. 
Journal of Hospital Infection. 88 (3), 141-148. 
2. Graves, N., Barnett, A., White, K., Jimmieson, N., Page, K., Campbell, M., 
Stevens, E., Rashleigh-Rolls, R., Grayson, L. & Paterson, D. (2012). 
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Evaluating the economics of the Australian National Hand Hygiene 
Initiative. Healthcare Infection, 17(1), pp.5-10. 
3. Barnett, A. G., Page, K., Campbell, M., Brain, D., Martin, E., Rashleigh-
Rolls, R., ... & Paterson, D. (2014). Changes in Healthcare-Associated 
Staphylococcus aureus Bloodstream Infections after the Introduction of a 
National Hand Hygiene Initiative. Infection Control and Hospital 
Epidemiology, 35(8):1029-1036. 
4. Barnett, A. G., Page, K., Campbell, M., Martin, E., Rashleigh-Rolls, R., 
Halton, K., & Graves, N. (2013). The increased risks of death and extra 
lengths of hospital and ICU stay from hospital-acquired bloodstream 
infections: a case–control study. BMJ open, 3(10), e003587. 
5. Graves, N., Page, K., Martin, E., Brain, D., Hall, L., Campbell, M., Fulop, 
N., Jimmeison, N., White, K., Paterson, D., & Barnett, A. G. (2016). Cost-
Effectiveness of a National Initiative to Improve Hand Hygiene Compliance 
Using the Outcome of Healthcare Associated Staphylococcus aureus 
Bacteraemia. PloS one, 11(2), e0148190. 
6. Graves, N., Barnett, A., White, K., Jimmieson, N., Page, K., Campbell, M., 
Stevens, E., Rashleigh-Rolls, R., Grayson, L., Paterson, D. (2012) 
Evaluating the economics of the Australian National Hand Hygiene 
Initiative. Healthcare Infection. 2 Apr 26;17(1):5-10. 
This current study was known as the “Other Infection Control Survey” and was 
developed as part of the larger parent project, the NHHIEP, with the purpose of 
identifying and producing a timeline of outbreaks of HAIs and the implementation of 
infection control interventions related to the identification of the dates of occurrence 
of outbreaks and the dates of implementation of infection control interventions within 
the parent study timeframe; January 2005–December 2011. This current study 
explored infection control clinical nurse consultants’ perceptions of outbreaks of HAIs 
and consequent infection control practices that may have effected rates of HAI, 
excluding hand hygiene. These infection control factors involved two categories: 
outbreaks of HAIs and interventions (other than the practice of hand hygiene) aimed 
at reducing the rate of HAIs. This was achieved through exploring experts’ perceptions 
of HAIs, identification of occurrences of HAI outbreaks and what infection control 
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interventions, aimed at reducing HAIs, had been implemented throughout Australian 
public hospitals. Furthermore, the study explored whether three identified infection 
control interventions had an effect on the rate of HAIs.  
1.2  SIGNIFICANCE 
HAIs are a major problem for hospitals worldwide. The World Health 
Organization (WHO) estimated 1.4 million people in developed and developing 
countries are affected at any one time (World Health Organization, 2009). The issue 
of HAIs in Australian public hospitals warrants thorough investigation into the 
occurrence of outbreaks and the implementation of effective strategies to reduce 
transmission rates, as HAIs have a large effect on patient morbidity, mortality, and 
cost to the healthcare system (Graves et al., 2009; Mitchell et al., 2015; Curtis, 2008). 
Graves et al., (2009) predicted 175, 153 estimated cases of HAI in Australian hospitals 
annually, resulting in significant cost to the Australian healthcare system with extra 
length of stay in hospital; attributing to 854, 289 lost bed days due to HAI. Historically, 
hand hygiene has been considered key to the reduction of HAIs; however, Hossein and 
Sajjad (2009) argued that it is difficult to attribute a direct reduction in HAIs 
exclusively to improved hand hygiene practice. Hand hygiene may be just one 
multifactorial component in reducing HAIs (Hossein & Sajjad, 2009). This proposition 
is also supported in a systematic review by Aboelela, Larson, and Stone (2007) who 
suggested that a number of effective practices should be used in combination in order 
to have a significant impact on HAIs. 
A review of the literature revealed only two studies by Bardsley, Cookson, 
Devine, Mears, and Phillips (2009) and Hoffer, Krein, Kowalski, and Saint (2011) that 
addressed the implementation of multiple infection control interventions to address the 
issue of HAIs on a national level. Both of these studies were significant in the 
literature, as they directly examined the effectiveness of multiple infection control 
practices; an area of research that appeared to be lacking. Bardsley et al. (2009) utilised 
a descriptive design aimed at ascertaining what processes and policies employed by 
health service trusts in the United Kingdom (UK) were associated with a reduction in 
the rate of HAIs between May-June 2006. The study by Bardsley et al. (2009) appeared 
to be seminal in the UK, as it was the first to examine multiple infection control 
practices nationally and their effect on rates of HAI through the utilisation of a purpose 
designed questionnaire based on expert opinion. Hofer et al. (2007) also appeared to 
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be the only national study in the United States (US) that looked at multiple practices 
by using a longitudinal survey covering 600 US hospitals. Despite both of these studies 
addressing the implementation of infection control interventions on a national level, 
and attempting to assess potential effectiveness, they did not detail the prevalence of 
outbreaks. In addition, Bardsley (2009) added managerial components to the study 
analysis, and Hoffer et al. (2011) looked at HAI subgroups, as opposed to pathogen 
specific HAIs. Neither of these factors were relevant to the current study, and therefore 
these studies were unable to guide the current study’s method, making it the first study 
of its kind. 
During the study timeframe (January 2005-December 2011), other than the 
National Hand Hygiene Initiative, there was no mandated nationally coordinated 
approach to the implementation of infection control interventions aimed at the 
prevention and management of HAIs in Australia. The NHMRC (2010) developed the 
Australian Guidelines for the Prevention and Control of Infection in Healthcare; 
however, guidelines are not policy and are not mandatory, which posed the question: 
“What interventions, other than the mandated hand hygiene initiative, are public 
hospitals’ infection control divisions implementing in an overall effort to reduce 
transmission of HAIs in patients?” Following this, the Australian Commission on 
Safety and Quality in Health Care (2011) published the National Safety and Quality 
Health Service Standards (NSQHSS). Standard Three relates to the prevention and 
control of healthcare associated infections. This standard aims to improve the rate of 
HAIs by providing a set of criteria for healthcare facilities to action to prevent patients 
from acquiring preventable HAIs. Despite these two documents, there has not been an 
“overall” exploration or identification of specific HAI outbreaks or infection control 
interventions (aimed at reducing HAIs) implemented in hospitals across Australia; this 
study is the first to establish a picture of infection control in public hospitals across 
Australia. This study had access to the NHHIEP database, which details the rates of 
HAIs for participating hospitals.  
1.3 STUDY AIM 
The study was informed by three aims; one qualitative aim for the first phase of 
the study, and two quantitative aims for the second phase:  
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1. To explore infection control clinical nurse consultants’ perceptions of 
outbreaks of HAI and consequent infection control practices. 
2. To examine events that occurred in infection control in Australian public 
hospitals over a seven year period from January 2005 to December 2011. 
In particular, outbreaks of HAIs and the interventions aimed at reducing 
the rate of HAIs. 
3. To identify interventions (other than hand hygiene) and examine their 
impact on the rate of HAIs.  
1.4 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The three research questions that underpinned the study were: 
Question 1: How do infection control clinical nurse consultants perceive 
outbreaks of HAI and the practices used to control HAIs? 
Question 2: What outbreaks of HAIs occurred in Australian public 
hospitals over the seven year period from January 2005–December 2011? 
Question 3:  What infection control interventions aimed at reducing HAIs 
were implemented in Australian public hospitals over the seven year 
period from January 2005–December 2011? 
1.5 STUDY HYPOTHESES  
The hypotheses that underpinned the study were: 
Null Hypothesis: The rate of HAIs is not affected by the implementation 
of an infection control intervention aimed at reducing the rate of HAIs. 
Alternative Hypothesis: The rate of HAIs is affected by the 
implementation of an infection control intervention aimed at reducing the 
rate of HAIs. 
1.6 STUDY DEFINITIONS 
Throughout this thesis a number of terms are used repeatedly. Consequently, 
descriptors or definitions are provided below to afford clarity.  
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Antibiotic Stewardship 
Is a practice employed by a health care service to improve patient outcomes by 
reducing the adverse effect of antibiotic use including antibiotic resistance. (ACSQHC, 
2011). 
Hospital Acquired Infection 
A hospital acquired infection (HAI), also known as a nosocomial infection, is an 
infection acquired by a patient during their hospital stay. The infection was not present 
on admission or incubating at the time of admission. HAIs can be caused by many 
different bacteria, viruses, fungi, and parasites. The infections may be caused by cross 
infection (e.g. from person to person) or may be caused by the patient’s own flora. 
Common causes of HAI are urinary tract infections, bloodstream infections, 
pneumonia, and wound infections. Patients may develop HAIs due to procedures or 
the environment around them. Patients who acquire a HAI can become unwell, remain 
in hospital longer, take longer to recover, and HAIs can also lead to death (Hand 
Hygiene Australia, 2015; WHO, 2002). 
Multi-resistant organisms (MROs) 
MROs are HAI bacteria that have developed resistance to the antibiotics used to 
treat them (Hand Hygiene Australia, 2015). 
Outbreak 
An outbreak refers to the emergence of unusual or unexpected increases in cases 
of a known HAI within the hospital setting (WHO, 2002). 
Colonisation 
Colonisation refers the presence of a HAI on or in a patient’s body, without the 
patient exhibiting symptoms of being unwell (Hand Hygiene Australia, 2015). 
Infection 
Infection refers to the presence of a HAI on or in the body, where the patient is 
exhibiting symptoms of being unwell (Hand Hygiene Australia, 2015). 
Infection Control 
Infection control refers to the clinical practice discipline concerned with 
preventing HAIs within a hospital setting (NHMRC, 2010). 
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Infection Control Intervention 
An infection control intervention is any intervention that aims to prevent the 
transmission of a HAI. The intervention can include tasks, precautions, processes, 
policy, procedure, or guidelines (WHO, 2002).  
Hospital Acquired Staphylococcus aureus bacteraemia (SAB) 
“A patient-episode of Staphylococcus aureus bacteraemia (SAB) is a 
positive blood culture for Staphylococcus aureus”.  (ACSQHC, 2015). 
Hospital acquired Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) 
MRSA is a pathogen, specifically Staphylococcus aureus bacteria (normally 
located on the skin) that has caused infection and is resistant to the antibiotics used to 
treat it. (CDC, 2015). 
Hospital acquired Vancomycin resistant enterococci (VRE) 
Enterococci are pathogens, specifically bacteria (normally located in the gut) that 
has caused infection. It is specifically resistant to vancomycin; the antibiotic 
commonly used to treat it. (CDC, 2015). 
Surveillance/Screening 
Surveillance of HAI identifies HAI occurrence and therefore aids in minimising 
harm caused by outbreaks and increases knowledge regarding what factors may 
contribute to spread. (ACSQCH, 2011). 
1.7 STUDY OVERVIEW 
This thesis contains six chapters. Each chapter focuses on a step of the research 
process. 
Chapter 1 introduced the background and significance of the research. The study 
aims, research questions and hypothesis were identified, terminology defined and a 
layout for the thesis was presented. 
Chapter 2 provides a review of the literature on the topic of HAIs. It also presents 
the conceptual framework developed through two seminal documents from the 
National Health and Medical Research Council (2010) and the Australian Commission 
for Safety and Quality in Health Care (2011). The conceptual framework presents a 
framework for exploring the topic of HAIs. The framework involves major constructs: 
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HAIs, scope/prevalence, surveillance/audits, outbreaks, transmission, and 
interventions. The theoretical and empirical literature surrounding the constructs 
detailed in the framework are then presented. 
Chapter 3 presents a discussion on the methodological approach used to 
investigate and answer the three research questions and test the null hypothesis. It also 
explains the research aims and study design, as mixed methods. The chapter provides 
a definition of mixed methods research, a background of mixed methods research, a 
discussion of the strengths of mixed methods research, discusses different mixed 
methods study designs, and then introduces the particular mixed methods design used 
in the study: a sequential exploratory study design comprising of Phase 1, Phase 2 Part 
A, and Phase 2 Part B. Ethical considerations are also presented.  
The chapter then presents Phase 1 of the study and outlines the methods used in 
this phase. The chapter describes the study setting, participants, method of data 
collection, interview schedule, procedure, data management and analysis, and the 
development of the survey instrument for Phase 2. Phase 2 Part A and B: the pilot 
survey and National Survey are outlined, along with the methods used in these phases, 
including the study setting, participants, method of data collection, procedure, data 
management, and analysis. 
Chapter 4 presents the results for Phase 1, with a short discussion and the results 
of Phase 2 Part A, along with subsequent amendments to the National survey in Phase 
2 Part B. The results for Phase 2 Part B are then presented.  
 Chapter 5 presents a discussion of the results of the research, including the 
discussion of the results for Phase 2 Part A and Part B. This chapter firstly discusses 
the rationale for the selection of participants and then discusses the results for the two 
research questions (applicable to the survey) and the testing of the null hypothesis. The 
study’s strengths and limitations are also presented in this chapter. 
Chapter 6 presents the conclusion to this thesis. It provides a reflection on the 
results arising from this study and recommendations for nursing practice, education, 
and future research are presented. 
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1.8 CONCLUSION 
Hospital acquired infections are one of the leading causes of preventable illness 
in contemporary healthcare. Many pathogens can cause HAIs and there are multiple 
means of transmission (WHO, 2002). The issue of HAIs in Australian hospitals has 
been made a priority issue in Australian healthcare (Health Hygiene Australia, 2011). 
It appears however, that no recent study in Australia has investigated clinician’s 
perceptions of which outbreaks of HAIs are occurring in our hospitals. Furthermore, 
there also does not appear to have been an overall investigation into which infection 
control interventions have been implemented in an effort to reduce HAIs. The aim of 
the current study is to answer which outbreaks have occurred and which interventions 
have been implemented, along with the examination of the effect some interventions 
have on the rate of HAIs. 
This chapter introduced the clinical problem at hand, reported the study aims and 
research questions, and identified and defined key terms that governed this study and 
are reported in this paper. An outline for the thesis was also presented. Chapter 2 
presents the con review of the literature and conceptual framework that underpin the 
study’s research aims. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
This research is novel in the Australian context, as most previous research has 
focused on specific outbreaks and interventions, rather than providing a more holistic, 
comparative approach. HAI outbreaks and interventions are complex; consequently, it 
is difficult to address these issues collectively, for example, there are a multiplicity of 
single site studies and pathogen specific studies addressing outbreaks that are too 
numerous to review individually. This chapter provides a synthesis of the infection 
control literature in order to provide a contextual basis and rationale for this study. 
Five distinct, yet interrelated topics are discussed: HAIs, the prevalence and scope of 
HAIs, transmission of HAIs, outbreaks of HAIs, and interventions aimed at reducing 
HAIs. Behavioural influences pertaining to HAIs have not been examined in the 
literature, as it was not the intent of this thesis to examine behavioural influences. 
2.2 SEARCH STRATEGY 
This review focuses on infection control literature from 2000–2013. This 
timeframe was deemed appropriate to provide a contemporaneous review of the HAI 
problem. Infection control research deemed outside the scope of the present study 
included staff prevention strategies, such as occupational health and safety programs, 
interventions relating to the reporting of HAIs (excluding surveillance), quality 
improvement activities/interventions, hand hygiene programs, and immunisation.  
Literature was sourced from databases including Cinahl, PubMed, Web of 
Science, and Clinical Knowledge Network (CKN). Government and healthcare body 
websites were also sourced. The key words were “hospital-acquired infection”, 
“nosocomial infection”, “health care associated infection”, “infection control”, 
“interventions”, “policy”, “environmental cleaning”, “cohorting”, “precautions”, 
“bathing”, “chlorhexidine”, “patient surveillance”, “resistant”, “non-resistant”, “multi-
resistant organisms”, “community acquired”, and “outbreaks”. 
Two seminal documents: the National Safety and Quality Health Service 
Standards (NSQHSS): Standard Three, Preventing and Controlling Healthcare 
Associated Infections (ACSQHC, 2011) and the Australian Guidelines for Prevention 
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and Control of Infection in Healthcare (NHMRC, 2010) helped guide the review of the 
literature and were consequently used as a base for the conceptual framework (which 
is introduced in Section 2.9 of this chapter). The two documents utilised applicable 
criteria and recommendations relating to infection control prevention strategies. 
Figures 2.1 and 2.2 display the key areas from these seminal documents.  
 
 
Figure 2.1 The ACSQHC National Standards: Standard Three Criteria 
Adapted from The Australian Commission for Safety and Quality in Health Care, 2011. 
 
 14 Chapter 2: Literature Review 
 
Figure 2.2 The Australian Guidelines for the Prevention and Control of Infection in Health Care 
applied to this study. 
Adapted from The National Health and Medical Research Council, 2010. 
 
The National Safety and Quality Health Standards, as detailed in Figure 2.1, 
were developed by ACSQHC. The standards were created by the Commission to 
ensure national consistency in the implementation of safety and quality systems to 
improve the standard of healthcare in Australia. The standards provide evidence-based 
improvement strategies and a framework for the application of strategies over a wide 
range of health services (ACSQHC, 2011) by addressing broad areas from governance 
for safety and quality in health service organisations to partnering with consumers and 
preventing harm (ACSQHC, 2011). However, Standard Three: Preventing and 
Controlling Healthcare Associated Infections, is the National Standard applicable to 
this review. This standard was developed to prevent and manage HAIs (ACSQHC, 
2011).  Not all of the criteria from the ACSQHC National Standards, Standard Three 
(2011) were applicable to this study. Figure 2.1 identifies the six criteria relevant to 
Standard Three; the blue boxes indicate use in the conceptual framework and grey 
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boxes indicate exclusion. The only criterion not included was “Communicating with 
patients and carers”. While the importance of the provision of information and 
engagement with patients and carers on the topic of HAIs is acknowledged, it was not 
within the scope of this study to explore this topic; the focus of this study was HAIs 
and the implementation of infection control interventions at an institutional and 
healthcare worker level. In addition to this exclusion, the criteria “Governance and 
systems for infection prevention, control, and surveillance” was not used in its 
entirety. Surveillance as a standalone intervention was utilised in the conceptual 
framework; however, governance and systems was not explored. The examination of 
structures and processes surrounding the implementation of interventions or the 
evaluation of their effectiveness is a significant undertaking and beyond the scope of 
this study.  
It was noted by the ACSQHC (2011) that systems for infection prevention, 
control, and surveillance must be consistent with relevant national documents, 
specifically, the Australian Guidelines for the Prevention and Control of Infections in 
Health Care (NHMRC, 2010); which was used to inform ACSQHC Standard Three. 
As such, this document was also used to guide the review as it underpinned Standard 
Three. The guidelines were also developed to provide a coordinated approach to the 
prevention and management of HAIs in Australia. This was achieved through the 
development of key recommendations summarised into three main sections: standard 
precautions, transmission-based precautions, and management of multi-resistant 
organisms.  
Figure 2.2 represents the recommendations from the NHMRC Guidelines (2010) 
for the prevention and control of infection used in the conceptual framework. The 
guidelines provided a “summary of recommendations”, which are designed to detail 
the significant components of infection control. These particular recommendations 
were broken into key areas including Section B1: Standard Precautions, Section B2: 
Transmission Based Precautions, and Section B3: Management of Multi-Resistant 
Organisms. All three of these key areas were used to inform the conceptual framework. 
This research explores these key constructs in order to facilitate a deeper 
understanding of HAIs in Australian public hospitals and factors that influence their 
development. The six components of the conceptual framework are specifically 
addressed and discussed in Sections 2.4 – 2.10 of this literature review. 
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2.3 HOSPITAL ACQUIRED INFECTIONS  
A hospital acquired infection (HAI), also known as nosocomial infection, is an 
infection that has been transmitted to a patient during their hospital stay. HAIs are 
defined by the World Health Organization (WHO) as:  
“…Infections acquired during hospital care, which are not present or incubating 
at admission. Infections occurring more than 48 hours after admission are usually 
considered nosocomial.”  (WHO, 2002, p. 4). 
HAIs are a significant problem for the healthcare system; they are a leading 
cause of preventable illness and have adverse effects on both patient outcomes and 
institutional efficiencies, resulting in impacts that include prolonged hospital stays, 
long-term disability, increased resistance of microorganisms, significant financial 
burden (both patient and institution), and excess mortality (Allegranzi et al., 2009). 
HAIs are a worldwide problem that no one institution or country has been able to solve 
(WHO, 2009). The WHO (2009) describes HAIs as the most frequent adverse event 
in healthcare delivery worldwide. HAIs are insidious and do not discriminate; they are 
highly prevalent in both developed and developing countries. The WHO (2009) 
estimates that of every 100 hospitalised patients at any one time, seven will acquire at 
least one HAI; thus, 1.4 million people in developed and developing countries are 
affected at any one time, creating a significant healthcare problem.  
HAIs lead to strain on both healthcare facility resources and finances (Allegranzi 
et al., 2009). The WHO (2009) estimate that HAIs in Europe cost seven billion Euros 
annually, and in the United States of America (US) six and a half billion dollars per 
annum. Further to cost impact, economic algorithms have been used to predict the 
effects of HAIs in Australian acute care hospitals (Graves et al., 2009).  Large costs 
have been attributed to lost bed days from HAIs by identifying 175,153 cases of HAIs 
annually, which resulted in increased length of hospital stay, accounting for 854,289 
lost bed days. These lost bed days result in a significant economic impact upon the 
Australian Healthcare System (Graves et al. 2009).  
Mortality from HAIs is also a significant problem. The Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention (CDC) have estimated that in the US alone, HAIs are 
responsible for 99,000 deaths annually (Agnes et al., 2010; WHO, 2009). This figure 
is more than double of that estimated in Europe, where HAIs accounted for 37, 000 
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attributable deaths annually (WHO, 2009). However, it is possible that mortality 
figures attributed to HAI may be underestimated. Agnes et al. (2010) conducted a 
review of medical records of in-hospital patient mortality over a four-year period in 
the US and highlighted that it may be difficult to distinguish mortality as a result of 
HAIs, due to inaccurate documentation of “cause of death”, with medical staff failing 
to identify complications from HAIs as the primary cause of death over other 
diagnoses. Thus, global mortality figures could be much higher than previously 
determined, due to failure to accurately identify HAIs as the cause of death 
2.4 THE PREVALENCE AND SCOPE OF HAIS 
HAIs appear to be a frequent event globally (Graves et al. 2009; Hand Hygiene 
Australia, 2011; NHMRC, 2010). A prevalence survey conducted by the WHO (2009) 
across 55 hospitals in 14 countries found 8.7% of patients had contracted HAIs. 
Furthermore, a systematic review of the global impact of HAIs between 1995-2010 
indicates that in high income countries the prevalence of hospitalised patients who 
acquired at least one HAI ranged from 3.5-12%. Pooled HAI prevalence obtained 
through meta-analysis in mixed patient populations was 7.6 episodes per 100 patients 
(WHO, 2011).  
In Australia, there are approximately 200,000 incidences of HAIs across acute 
care hospitals annually (NHMRC, 2010), making HAIs the most common 
complication experienced by patients during their hospital stay (WHO, 2011). 
However, there does not appear to be an estimated mortality rate from HAIs in 
Australia. As such, while the impact of HAIs nationally is reflected in increased length 
of stay, economic burden, and morbidity, the severe impact of HAIs in Australia may 
not be truly reflected.  
Due to the prevalence of HAIs in Australian hospitals and their negative impact 
on patients’ outcomes, the ACSQHC nominated HAIs as a priority issue for Australian 
healthcare delivery (Hand Hygiene Australia, 2011), implementing a National 
Standard for preventing and controlling healthcare associated infections in 2011 in an 
effort to standardise and address the issue of HAIs in Australian hospitals (ACSQHC, 
2011).  
In Australia Staphylococcus aureus bacteraemia (SAB) has been a HAI of 
particular concern (Hand Hygiene Australia, 2009; National Health Performance 
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Authority, 2015). SAB is a pathogen commonly found on the skin of healthy people 
that is often inadvertently transmitted into the bloodstream during a hospital stay, 
resulting in increased patient morbidity and mortality (National Health Performance 
Authority, 2015). Recently, 1,448 cases of HAI from SAB were reported from over 
115 large public hospitals in Australia, representing 90% of the 1,621 cases reported 
nationally (National Health Performance Authority, 2015). Thus, the magnitude of 
HAIs, and specifically SAB, is a significant issue in Australian healthcare. 
The CDC (2012) and WHO (2002) classify HAIs into five major categories: 
1. Central line-associated blood steam infections (nosocomial bacteraemia); 
2. Catheter associated urinary tract infections (urinary infections); 
3. Ventilator associated pneumonia (nosocomial pneumonia); 
4. Surgical site infections; 
5. Other. 
Of these categories, some appear to be more problematic than others. According 
to the CDC (2012) in the United States, HAI associated central line-associated blood 
stream infections, catheter associated urinary tract infections, and ventilator associated 
pneumonia account for approximately two-thirds of all HAIs. Other infections include 
skin and soft tissue infections, sinusitis, endometritis and other infections following 
childbirth, and gastroenteritis, which is commonly caused by the pathogen Clostridium 
difficile (CDC, 2012; WHO, 2002). Comparable to the CDCs most prevalent 
categories, hospital acquired urinary tract infection, lower respiratory tract infection, 
and surgical site infection proved to be the three most prevalent HAI categories in 
Norway (Aavitsland, Eriksen & Iversen, 2004). Norway is an affluent country with a 
high standard of living; however, despite this, HAIs still appear to be an area of 
concern. The national prevalence of four HAI categories varied between 5.1-5.4%, and 
individual facility prevalence ranged from 0-16.7%. Over a two-year timeframe, HAIs 
were most frequently located in the urinary tract (34%), followed by the lower 
respiratory tract (29%), SSI 28%, and BSI 8%. The Norwegian review also noted that 
80% of reported HAIs were relevant to current hospital admission; further supporting 
that HAIs are a problem for contemporary healthcare despite a country’s high income 
status. Based on the reported prevalence data indicated in the review by Aavitsland et 
al. (2004) and data from the CDC (2012), it appears that in almost a whole decade, 
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hospital acquired urinary tract infections still prove to be one of the leading categories 
of HAIs. It should be noted, however, that the CDC (2012) did not indicate 
surveillance techniques used to collect the data specific to the results. No Australian 
study was found that detailed prevalence relating to HAI categories. 
Many different pathogens cause HAIs, and the organisms responsible vary 
across countries, patient populations, and healthcare facilities. Bacteria, viruses, and 
fungi are all organisms responsible for producing HAIs; however, bacteria tend to be 
the most common causative organism of HAIs (WHO, 2002). It is important to 
distinguish between “commensal” bacteria (found in normal flora) and “pathogenic” 
bacteria. Commensal bacteria can be problematic if the patient becomes inadvertently 
infected by these “normal” bacteria, due to compromised immunity or translocation of 
bacteria caused by, for example, poor technique during invasive line insertion. 
Pathogenic bacteria on the other hand, are not a part of normal flora and can infect 
patients regardless of their immunity, and include both gram-positive and gram-
negative bacteria (WHO, 2002). Some of the bacteria, viruses, and fungi that 
commonly cause HAIs, as indicated by both the CDC (2012) and WHO (2002), 
include Acinetobacter, Clostridium difficile, Enterobacteriaceae (carbapenem-
resistant), Klebsiella, methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus, Pseudomonas 
aeruginosa, Staphylococcus aureus, vancomycin-resistant Enterococci, Influenza, 
Norovirus, Tuberculosis, and Aspergillus. 
A number of HAIs have developed resistance to the drugs used to treat them, 
these are multi-drug resistant organisms (MROs). MROs are largely bacteria that have 
become resistant to numerous antimicrobial agents, which have inadvertently led to 
increased morbidity and mortality from HAIs (NHMRC, 2010). Specifically, 
methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus and vancomycin-resistant enterococci are 
virulent and problematic HAIs in Australia (ACSQHC, 2011). Globally, methicillin-
resistant Staphylococcus aureus and multi-resistant gram negative bacteria are 
described as problematic MROs (WHO, 2015). A large proportion of HAIs are caused 
by MROs; however, specific numbers have not been identified or provided (WHO, 
2015). 
The impact of MROs on patient outcomes is significant. While the prevalence 
of HAI may be increasing over time, it has been suggested that the mortality risk has 
not changed. This was demonstrated by Edwards, Gaynes and Klevens’ (2008) 
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retrospective comparative audit of over 200 US healthcare facilities surveillance data, 
extracted from the National Nosocomial Infections Surveillance System. This study 
examined the impact of MROs on mortality from 2000-2004 compared to 1990-1994 
in the US. The authors evaluated the proportion of infections with MROs and the 
relative risk of death associated with particular resistant organisms: Pseudomonas 
aeruginosa pneumonitis, Staphylococcus aureus blood stream infection (BSI), and 
Escherichia coli urinary tract infection. Results showed that the proportion of 
infections due to the investigated MROs was higher in the period of 2000-2004 than 
1990-1994. In particular, the proportion of Staphylococcus aureus BSI increased 
significantly from 27% in 1990-1994 to 54.1% in 2000-2004 (p =<0.002). While there 
was an increase in the proportion of MROs, there was no change in the relative risk of 
death. The study did not evaluate specific reasons as to the lack of improvement in 
mortality.  However, a positive note of the study was that mortality did not increase, 
despite significant increases in MRO rates. This could be attributed to an increased 
standard of healthcare and improved mortality over the decade studied.  
Factors that affect the development and spread of MROs are complex. In 
particular, it has been suggested that treatment of HAI, specifically, antibiotic use, has 
been the major causative agent in resistance (Edwards et al. 2008; Campbell, Crofts, 
Davey, & Pulcini, 2007). Campbell et al. (2007) examined antimicrobial resistance 
and the impact of education as a strategy to combat resistance and suggested that an 
inability to implement basic infection control practices and the excessive use of 
antibiotics were the main causes of the problem. This finding was also supported by 
Edwards et al. (2008) who suggested that containing antimicrobial resistance requires 
a balance of good infection control practices and discriminating antimicrobial use. 
However, both of these studies had relatively small sample sizes and did not have the 
required scope to adequately prove causation. 
In Queensland, Australia, some multi-resistant HAIs require particular attention 
due to their prevalence, evolution of the organism, difficulty in treatment, and 
ultimately, their impact on both the patient and healthcare facility. These include: 
1. Clostridium difficile (C.Diff); 
2. Methicillin resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA); 
3. Vancomycin resistant enterococci (VRE); 
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4. Extended-spectrum beta-lactamase (ESBL) producing Klebsiella 
pneumonia; 
5. Extended-spectrum beta-lactamase (ESBL) producing Escherichia coli;  
6. Carbapenem-resistant Acinetobacter and Enterobacteriaceae species 
(CHRISP, 2012). 
 
The management and prevention of these MROs require consideration.  All 
HAIs can be difficult to control; however, MROs are more difficult to treat, and thus 
pose a greater threat (CHRISP, 2012; Page et al., 2014). The MROs that have been 
identified as problematic in Queensland (CHRISP, 2012), have also been considered 
a particular challenge by infection control practitioners nationally (Page et al., 2014). 
In particular, Carbapenem-resistant Enterobacteriaceae and Clostridium difficile are 
detailed in a national infection control survey as the top two MROs requiring priority 
in Australia, in terms of management and prevention. Interestingly, in the same survey, 
MRSA was detailed as being the most understood MRO compared to Clostridium 
difficile, which was identified as the least understood (Page et al., 2014). 
In summary, HAIs are a prevalent issue worldwide, and specifically in Australia, 
with 200,000 incidences per year. HAIs are classified into five major categories and 
are caused by a number of different pathogens. MROs in particular, are sub categories 
of HAIs that are becoming increasingly prevalent and a concerning problem in 
contemporary healthcare.   
2.5 TRANSMISSION OF HOSPITAL ACQUIRED INFECTION  
The transmission of HAI requires three chief components: an infectious source 
(e.g. infected patient), a mode of transmission (e.g. contaminated hands of healthcare 
worker), and a susceptible host (e.g. immunocompromised patient) (NHMRC, 2010). 
The most common and widely discussed mode of transmission of HAIs usually 
involves the spread of bacteria on contaminated hands from staff, other patients, or 
even visitors (Daschner et al., 2000).  
However, the spread of HAIs is complex, and there are many modes of 
transmission. The primary avenues for transmission of HAIs are contact, droplet, 
airborne, and common vehicle (WHO, 2002). These modes of transmission can be 
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spread by both direct and indirect means. Contact transmission, the most common 
transmission, can occur from direct contact between patients (e.g. through hands, 
droplets, saliva, or other body fluids), and can also be spread via staff contaminated 
through patient care (e.g. on hands, clothes, nose, or throat). Contaminated staff 
members transmit bacteria through direct patient care with the host. Droplet and 
airborne transmission arises due to contaminated droplets or air currents that are 
inadvertently inhaled by patients (WHO, 2002).  
Eames, Li, Tang, and Wilson (2009) explored the transmission of airborne 
disease in hospitals, describing the hospital environment and reviewing contributions 
from microbiologists, mechanical and civil engineers, and mathematicians. The 
authors indicated that pathogens in the air are spread by particles or droplets. Solid 
matter in the air may originate from the skin, while droplets may be generated from 
the upper respiratory tract, mouth, nose, vomiting, contaminated dripping taps, and 
diarrhoea. However, a number of questions arising from this study need to be 
addressed when attempting to reduce the transmission of airborne pathogens, 
including: how does the pathogen release and evaporate, and how do pathogens 
interact with room airflow, body airflow, and inhalation/exhalation flow?   
Another mode of transmission, common vehicle transmission, occurs due to 
patients being exposed to contaminated items, for example equipment (WHO, 2002). 
Thus, the healthcare environment can also contribute to the transmission of HAIs, for 
example, Pseudomonas aeruginosa thrives in water and damp areas, and outbreaks 
have been linked to hospital taps (Engelhart et al., 2002). 
The spread/transmission of HAIs is also influenced by patient susceptibility and 
environmental risk factors (WHO, 2002). Patient susceptibility factors include 
malnutrition, injury to skin or mucous membranes (e.g. burns and pressure injury), 
diagnostic and therapeutic procedures (e.g. surgery, central venous or urinary 
catheterisation, and mechanical ventilation), and compromised immunity (e.g. 
oncology and intensive care patients) (Cristina et al., 2011; Jarrat & Miller, 2013; 
WHO, 2002;). Environmental factors that increase the risk of transmission of HAIs 
include crowded conditions, frequent transfers of patients from one unit or hospital to 
another, and the concentration of susceptible patients, for example, burns and intensive 
care patients (WHO, 2002). 
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The transmission of HAIs of multi resistance is an area of particular concern in 
contemporary healthcare. While infections caused by MROs may present with similar 
symptoms to other HAIs, the problem of treatment is much more complex, as there are 
limitations to effective antibiotic treatment, which can effectively result in an inability 
to treat the infection (Campbell et al., 2007; Edwards et al., 2008; Jarrat & Miller, 
2013). As such, it is important to understand the factors that may influence the 
transmission of MROs specifically.  
The development and transmission of MROs may be influenced by specific 
patient risk factors, including the presence of indwelling devices and underlying 
patient conditions. In particular, a case control study in South Australia identified the 
presence of an indwelling urinary catheter (OR 1.96 CI 1.27-3.05, p=<0.001) and renal 
disease (OR 3.8 CI 2.34-6.09, p=<0.001) as factors that could increase the risk of 
contracting a MRO. The study also suggested that those patients who developed a 
MRO HAI spent longer in hospital compared to controls (14 median bed days 
compared to 9 median bed days).  These results, however, are not generalisable to the 
national population, as the results are only reflective of one private South Australian 
hospital, further research on a national level pertaining to risk factors relating to MROs 
is needed to further explore this issue (Jarrat & Miller, 2013). 
 In summary, it is evident that HAIs are transmitted via various means, 
including air, droplets, hands, bodily fluids, and common vehicle means (Eames et al., 
2009; Engelhart et al., 2002; WHO, 2002). Patient and environmental risk factors are 
also important components with the transmission of HAIs (Cristina et al., 2011; WHO, 
2002). In particular, the transmission of MROs are problematic and the development 
of an MRO may be more prevalent in susceptible patients with specific risk factors, 
such as those with indwelling devices and renal disease (Jarrat & Miller, 2013). 
2.6 OUTBREAKS 
Outbreaks are defined as:  
“An unusual or unexpected increase of cases of a known nosocomial infection 
or the emergence of cases of a new infection”. (WHO, 2002, p. 26).  
It is imperative that outbreaks are quickly sourced and investigated due to their 
potentially disastrous effects on institution costs, and patient morbidity and mortality 
(WHO, 2002). However, Barret, Metzger, Vanhems, and Voirin (2009) argued that 
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identifying the source of a HAI is difficult, and sometimes even unknown. This may 
be due to the fact that the potential source of the infection could come from a variety 
of potential transmission points; from any single patient, visitor, or healthcare worker, 
as they are all capable of transmission (Barret et al., 2009; Eames et al., 2009; 
Engelhart et al., 2002; WHO, 2002). Gastmeier and Vonberg (2006) also identified 
that common vehicle means, such as pathogen reservoirs, can be responsible for the 
transmission of HAIs and fuel potential outbreaks. These can include medical drugs 
(Gastmeier & Vonberg, 2006) and even other fluids used for patient care, such as 
contaminated water caused by contaminated taps (Engelhart et al., 2002). 
Outbreak prevalence and incidence studies do not address all institutions and 
pathogens in Australia. It appears that there has been no study addressing the totality 
of types of outbreaks of HAIs occurring across Australian hospitals or across hospitals 
in other developed countries. Furthermore, while it is important to note specific 
pathogens responsible for outbreaks, it is not the pathogens themselves that are key to 
the development of an outbreak; it is the transmission of that pathogen and factors 
making the transmission possible that is of key importance in understanding why 
outbreaks occur (Barret et al., 2009; Jarrat & Miller, 2013).  
Wide arrays of pathogens are responsible for HAI outbreaks (Barret et al., 2009; 
WHO, 2002; WHO, 2009). The occurrence of an outbreak is traditionally attributed to 
issues relating to pathogen transmission; specifically based on contact between people 
and surfaces (Barret et al., 2009; WHO, 2002). The development of an outbreak, 
however, is multifaceted and consequently, patient risk factors are a predominant 
influence in outbreak development (Jarrat & Miller, 2013; Abarca-Gomez et al., 2012). 
An outbreak of Clostridium difficile was explored in a non-matched case control study 
by Abarca-Gomez et al. (2012), who identified diabetes as a significant risk factor to 
developing the pathogen. The outbreak occurred in a 563 bed Costa Rican hospital 
between December 2009–April 2010. During this time, 85 laboratory confirmed cases 
were identified and incidence rates went from 0.3 - 0.6 cases per 10,000 bed days to 
2.4 cases per 10,000 bed days. Confirmed Clostridium difficile cases and controls were 
from the same services and time period. The mean age of cases and controls were 62.3 
and 55.3 respectively with more female than males confirmed as Clostridium difficile 
cases. The adjusted attributable risk factors associated with the outbreak were diabetes 
(OR 3.4, 95%CI 1.5-7.7), chronic renal failure (OR 9.0 95% CI 1.5-53), prescribing 
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Ceftazidime (OR 33.3 95% CI 2.9-385.5), and prescribing Cefotaxime (OR 20.4 95% 
CI 6.9 – 60.3). While all odds ratios were significant for the attributable risk factors, 
the CIs for chronic renal failure and prescribing of antibiotics were wide; suggesting 
poor significance. A major limitation to the study was the laboratory test used to 
confirm a positive Clostridium difficile result was not the most sensitive method; 
however, it was the only test available for this facility. To mitigate the risk of false 
negatives in the control group, all participants who had previously experienced 
diarrhoea were excluded. Results of this study contribute to knowledge of outbreaks 
by identifying that patient risk factors can potentially pre-dispose patients to the 
development of a HAI, and therefore potentially influence transmission. Similar to 
Jarret and Miller et al. (2013), the results from Abarca-Gomez et al. (2012) identified 
an underlying patient condition as a significant risk factor. The prescribing of 
antibiotics did not appear to be significant, which is unusual considering the 
development of Clostridium difficile is often attributed to antibiotic use (CHRISP, 
2012). Further limitations to this study include that surveillance methods were not 
adequately detailed. 
 In addition to describing the outbreak of hospital acquired Clostridium difficile 
and identifying contributing risk factors, Abarca-Gomez et al. (2012) also detailed 
interventions implemented to control the outbreak. These interventions involved 
control measures, including hand hygiene, deep disinfection of hospital surfaces, 
isolation of colonised patients, the use of personal protective equipment (PPE), and 
restriction of antibiotic use. The authors concluded that the implementation of these 
interventions resulted in the reduction of transmission, and ultimately, in the successful 
control of the outbreak. However, they did not test the individual effectiveness of these 
interventions.   
The implementation of clustered interventions to control an outbreak was 
common in literature relating to outbreaks, with a number of studies attributing 
successful control of an outbreak based on the implementation of a bundle of 
interventions at the same time to target a specific pathogen (Abarca-Gomez et al., 
2012; Patterson, 2009; Astruc et al., 2013; Cristina et al., 2011; Engelhart et al., 2002). 
However, while these studies describe a reduction in rates of infection, no study 
actually tested for a linear relationship between any individual intervention and a 
reduction in rates of colonisation/infection.   
 26 Chapter 2: Literature Review 
Successful control of outbreaks has been reported. Studies reviewing outbreaks 
caused by MRSA, Acinetobacter baumanni, Pseudomonas aeruginosa and 
Clostridium difficile all concluded that outbreak control was obtained (Abarca-Gomez 
et al., 2012; Patterson, 2009; Astruc et al., 2013; Cristina et al., 2011; Engelhart et al., 
2002) suggesting that outbreaks can be brought under control despite the pathogen. 
While the pathogens responsible for an outbreak differed across these studies, the 
course to control the outbreaks were all similar, involving identifying the pathogen and 
its prevalence, implementing infection control interventions specifically targeted to 
deal with the outbreak, observing and evaluating the success of these interventions 
based on rate of transmission, and re-evaluating strategies if necessary (Abarca-Gomez 
et al., 2012; Patterson, 2009; Astruc et al., 2013; Cristina et al., 2011; Engelhart et al., 
2002). While no two outbreaks were dealt with in the same way, these key factors of: 
identification of the pathogen, implementation of infection control interventions, 
observing and evaluating success, and re-evaluation, appear guide the successful 
control of each outbreak. 
 Outbreaks of MRSA in two studies attributed their successful control to the 
implementation of clustered interventions, and both identified staff education as an 
important intervention to obtain outbreak control (Patterson, 2009; Astruc et al. 2013). 
Patterson (2009) conducted a retrospective review on an outbreak of MRSA in a 
Arizona hospital in 2008, relating to surgical site infections. At this point in time, rates 
averaged 3.73% when the national average in the US was 1.6%. The author discussed 
the strategies and interventions implemented to bring rates back to zero in October of 
that year. These included education, fixing ventilation in the operating theatre from 
negative pressure to positive pressure, reviewing environmental cleaning strategies, 
pre-operative patient washing with chlorhexidine gluconate, and reinforcing aseptic 
technique. Astruc et al. (2013) in comparison, conducted a before and after study (over 
two consecutive 18 month periods) to examine an MRSA outbreak involving 30 cases 
of newborns in the neonatal intensive care unit with the implementation of an outbreak 
management strategy. This strategy included education, continuous hand hygiene 
training, and MRSA colonisation surveillance. Post implementation of the strategy the 
rate of MRSA infections fell from 3.5 to 0.7 cases per 1000 patient-days (p=0.0005). 
While both authors described an outbreak of MRSA, identified that a number of 
infection control interventions had been implemented, and postulated they were 
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successful in reducing the rate (to zero for Patterson et al. (2009), and from 3.5 to 0.7 
cases per 1000 patient days for Astruc et al. (2013)), no statistical analyses were 
performed to determine if there was a relationship between the interventions and the 
eradication of the outbreak of MRSA, or furthermore, which element in the bundle of 
interventions contributed to the reduction. It is also possible that the reduction in 
infection rates may have resulted from the outbreaks having simply run their course. 
The implementation of outbreak control methods was also supported in the 
control of an outbreak of multi-resistant Acinetobacter baumanni and Pseudomonas 
aeruginosa (Cristina et al., 2011; Engelhart et al., 2002), however, both of these studies 
also identified other risk factors that required consideration in obtaining effective 
control. Cristina et al. (2011) described patient specific risk factors, stating that 
Acinetobacter baumanni was typically found in immunocompromised patients and 
Engelhart et al. (2002) described risk factors in more detail. This study involved an 
outbreak of six cases of Pseudomonas aeruginosa, in an adult haematology oncology 
unit at a tertiary care centre. During the outbreak, the incidence rates of HAI rose from 
29.4 – 62.3 infections per 1000 patient days at risk (for example neutropaenic days) (p 
= < 0.05). As a result of the outbreak, a “systemic outbreak system” was actioned and 
an outbreaks management team was formed; the outbreaks management team included 
clinicians, hand hygienists, and microbiologists. The authors discussed the importance 
of identifying risk factors associated with an outbreak, which included the retirement 
of the hand hygiene nurse (without an appropriate replacement) and utilisation of an 
inappropriate cleaning solution (which did not have antimicrobial properties) to 
decontaminate the patients’ immediate environment. As a result of risk factor 
identification, the “systemic outbreak system” reinstated a hand hygiene nurse and the 
application of disinfectants to decontaminate the immediate environment. Importantly, 
findings from this study highlight that outbreaks are linked to pathogen specific risk 
factors (Engelhart et al., 2002). For example, Pseudomonas aeruginosa was linked to 
contaminated tap water or medical devices, including bronchoscopes and suction 
tubes.  
In summary, data on the prevalence of outbreaks is locally kept and controlled 
and not obtainable in national/international reports; therefore, it is not possible to give 
an overall indication of the outbreaks that have occurred in Australia. However, it is 
important to source and control outbreaks quickly (Barret, 2009). While the pathogen 
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responsible for an outbreak is often the primary focus, it is the various modes of 
transmission that need to be addressed in order to control and cease an outbreak. This 
is often achieved through the use of prompt outbreak control methods, which include 
the execution of a number of infection control interventions to target an outbreak 
(Abarca-Gomez, 2012; Astruc et al., 2013; Cristina, 2011; Patterson, 2009). In 
addition to identifying an outbreak, its potential transmission routes and strategies to 
control it, patient risk factors that predispose patients to HAI also need to be 
considered; these include patient co-morbidities and the use of antimicrobials (Abarca-
Gomez et al., 2012; Cristina et al., 2011; Jarret & Miller, 2013;).  
2.7 INTERVENTIONS TO REDUCE HAI 
2.7.1 Infection Prevention and Control Strategies 
HAIs are a grave problem, resulting in morbidity and the death of patients and  
are a significant financial burden (Agnes et al., 2010). The use of concurrent multiple 
infection control interventions is supported in the literature by a number of studies 
(Abarca-Gomez et al., 2012; Patterson, 2009; Astruc et al., 2013; Cristina et al., 2011; 
Engelhart et al., 2002), including a systematic review by Aboelela and colleagues 
(2007) who identified that a number of effective practices should be used in 
combination in order to have a significant impact on HAIs. This finding was also 
supported by an evaluation of a national hand hygiene intuitive campaign in England 
and Wales, where the authors highlighted the importance of major events in infection 
control contributing to decreased rates of infection by adding large scale infection 
control events into their statistical model as confounders (Charlett et al., 2012). The 
prevention of HAIs can be managed, as indicated by the ACSQHC (2011) and 
NHMRC (2010), by the use of standard precautions; these standard precautions (as 
indicated by the NHMRC, 2010) include a set of evidence based interventions that are 
applied to all patients, regardless of whether they are colonised with HAIs or not, in 
an effort to reduce the potential spread of HAIs. Standard precautions include the use 
of personal protective equipment, handling and disposal of sharps, environmental 
controls, reprocessing of reusable equipment, respiratory and cough etiquette, aseptic 
non-touch technique, and appropriate handling of linen. Not all of these precautions 
were reviewed for this study, as some crossover into the domain of workplace health 
and safety, for example, handling and disposal of sharps and handling of linen.  
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It is difficult to establish a single “gold standard” infection control intervention 
for the prevention of HAIs. Many factors influence the development of HAIs and as 
such, there are a multitude of factors to consider, including patient case mix, patterns 
of healthcare delivery, the environment, patient treatment and diagnostic interventions 
that may place patients at risk, antimicrobial stewardship, and the pathogens 
themselves (Bardsley et al., 2009). A systematic review of the utilisation of non-
pharmacological interventions to reduce HAIs identified that a number of categories 
of interventions were recognised as possibly being effective infection control strategies 
to control HAIs (Curtis, 2008). These interventions were hand washing, gowning and 
personal items, cleaning, surveillance, preventing central venous line and 
haemodialysis infections, air filtration and treatment, preventing waterborne hospital 
infections, and avoiding ventilator associated pneumonia (Curtis, 2008). Based on the 
findings of the systematic review and documented successful control of outbreaks 
through the utilisation of multiple infection control interventions (Curtis, 2008; 
Abarca-Gomez et al., 2012; Patterson, 2009; Astruc et al., 2013; Cristina et al., 2011; 
Engelhart et al., 2002), the use of multiple infection control interventions in the fight 
against HAIs is warranted, due to their complex nature. 
The use of multiple infection control interventions to control an outbreak of a 
HAI have been evident in the literature, however, these have been restricted to small 
scale studies looking at individual institutions (Abarca-Gomez, 2012; Astruc et al., 
2013; Cristina et al., 2011; Patterson, 2009). Representation of infection control 
practices on a larger scale is quite limited, with only two studies addressing the issue 
of preventing HAIs through the implementation of multiple infection control 
interventions on a national scale in the UK and USA respectively (Bardsley et al., 
2009; Hoffer et al., 2011). Both studies utilised quantitative methods and collected 
data on infection control strategies via “purpose designed” surveys consequently 
detailing infection control interventions implemented on a national level. However, 
the UK study claimed the utilisation of varied infection control interventions lead to a 
reduction in HAI infection rates by testing against specific pathogens; MRSA and 
Clostridium difficile (Bardsley et al., 2009)  
Bardsley and colleagues (2009) extended the examination of infection control 
interventions by also exploring managerial aspects to ascertain what processes and 
policies employed by health service trusts in the UK were associated with a reduction 
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in rates of HAIs. Results highlighted that lower rates of MRSA were correlated to hand 
hygiene practices (r = 0.263-0.334, p<0.001 for all correlations) and isolation of 
colonised patients (r=0.324, p<0.034). In comparison, lower rates of Clostridium 
difficile were correlated to cleanliness (ranging from 0.201 - 0.277, ranging from 
p<0.016 - 0.001), good antimicrobial prescribing (r=0.191, p<0.027), and surveillance 
(r=0.164, p<0.031). While some interventions/processes were associated with 
decreases in infection rates, others were associated with an increase in rates, these 
included bed management, training and appraisal, and professional development of 
staff; however, statistical results were presented in support of these statements. 
Overall, Bardsley et al.’s (2009) findings suggest that a range of infection control 
interventions may be effective in reducing the rates of HAI, and interestingly, these 
results suggest that different pathogens are more susceptible to different interventions. 
The study is limited by inadequate descriptions of multiple variables for some 
interventions, for example, “cleanliness”, with no identified definition to define 
“cleanliness”. In addition, the authors noted that they had attempted to conduct 
regression analyses; however, they were unable to achieve a useable model, which is 
likely due to the multiple variables for one intervention. This may explain the unusual 
result of managerial interventions, such as bed management, resulting in an increase 
in infection rates, thus, potentially making the results of the study questionable.  
Hoffer and colleagues (2011) conducted a longitudinal survey to examine the 
use of infection prevention practices in US hospitals, however, the study did not 
investigate managerial processes or infection prevention practices like Bardsley et al. 
(2009). During two timeframes, a survey was distributed to 600 US hospitals, 
including non-federal hospitals and all Veterans Affairs hospitals. Infection control 
interventions were investigated relating to strategies specific to HAI subgroups 
including: central line associated bloodstream infection (CLABSI), ventilator 
associated pneumonia (VAP), and catheter associated urinary tract infection (CAUTI).  
Findings highlighted that for CLABSI prevention, hospitals had increased the use of 
prevention strategies; specifically, the use of barrier precautions and chlorhexidine 
gluconate during central venous line insertions, and the use of chlorhexidine 
impregnated dressings. The use of antimicrobial central venous line insertions was 
noted; however, its use had not increased from 2005 to 2009. VAP prevention 
strategies had also increased from 2005 to 2009, including the use of semi-recumbent 
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positioning, antimicrobial mouthwash, subglottic secretions drainage, and selective 
digestive tract decontamination. Lastly, for the prevention of CAUTI, practices had 
also increased and these included the use of bladder ultrasound, catheter reminders or 
“stop” order, and the use of antimicrobial IDC. The identification of various infection 
control prevention strategies by Bardsley et al. (2009) and Hoffer et al. (2011) 
highlight that across two high income nations (the UK and the US) a number of 
infection control interventions are considered important in the fight against HAI as 
opposed to one “gold-standard” intervention. Furthermore, it appears that multiple 
infection control interventions may be more effective if they are implemented 
concurrently or overlaid together. 
HAI prevention and management has become a priority issue in Australian 
hospitals, as indicated by the introduction of Standard Three: Preventing and 
Controlling Healthcare Associated Infections by the ACSQHC. The Commission, 
along with the NHMRC, has provided a number of criteria and guidelines (as 
previously discussed) in relation to intervention/practices recommended for the 
prevention of HAIs. These two governing bodies have highlighted specific 
interventions, including environmental cleaning, antibiotic stewardship, and other 
interventions, which may fall under the banner of prevention strategies and 
interventions that manage patients with HAI infection/colonisation (ACSQHC, 2011; 
NHMRC, 2010). Transmission based precautions have been detailed in the NHMRC 
Australian Guidelines for the prevention and control of infection in healthcare (2010). 
These transmission based precautions include contact precautions, droplet precautions, 
airborne precautions, cohorting of colonised patients, and environmental cleaning.  
While the literature supports the use of a number of infection control 
interventions to prevent and control the spread of HAIs, over the last ten years there 
has been growing evidence that environmental contamination is a major trigger for 
HAI transmission, in particular some pathogens appear to be more virulent, including: 
Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA), Vancomycin-resistant 
enterococcus (VRE), Norovirus, Acinetobacter species and Clostridium difficile  
(Rutala & Weber 2011). This may be due to the fact that many HAIs, such as 
Clostridium difficile, are able to survive for long periods of time in the environment 
without a human host (Rutala & Weber, 2011; Dancer 2009). Consequently, 
environmental cleaning is an imperative infection control intervention (Rutala & 
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Weber 2011; Dancer, 2009; Robertson & White, 2007). Environmental cleaning as a 
stand-alone intervention may have as much merit in HAI prevention as hand hygiene; 
however, lack of scientific standards for environmental cleaning makes this 
intervention controversial as a “stand-alone activity” (Dancer, 2009). It has been 
suggested that the cleaning and disinfection of contaminated surfaces, particularly with 
hypochlorite solutions, resulted in a decreased incidence of the spread of HAIs (Rutala 
& Weber 2011; Dancer, 2009; Robertson & White, 200). A review by Dancer (2009) 
also supported the importance of environmental cleaning in the control of HAIs. 
Dancer (2009) indicated that HAIs can be found on many general surface areas and 
believed that there was some evidence that cleaning removes HAIs, thus playing a 
significant role in the termination of outbreaks.  
Environmental cleaning as an intervention has many aspects that may affect HAI 
transmission within the one intervention, including solution type and specific cleaning 
practices. While choice of cleaning solution is a very important component of 
environmental cleaning, cleaning methods may differ across different institutions. The 
question “what is the best cleaning method” has been explored in the literature with 
surprising results. While it has been suggested that particular cleaning methods may 
be more effective in reducing microbial load (Rutula & Weber, 2011) a quasi-
experimental study by Dancer, Robertson and White (2007) conducted in a university-
affiliated 900 bed hospital evaluated hospital cleaning methods and found no 
significant difference in the efficiency of three different cleaning methods. A 
standardised microbiological screening method was used to sample the environment 
before and after cleaning to quantify microbial counts. The cleaning methods tested in 
the study included daily mop and vacuum, spray clean three times a week, and twice 
a year wet scrub. Results showed that all three methods reduced bacterial load, with 
the mop and vacuum reducing microbial load from 63% to 27%, spray cleaning 
reducing microbial load from 80%-40%, and wet scrub cleaning reducing microbial 
load from 55% to 10%. All cleaning methods used the same detergent solution and hot 
water, which may suggest that it was the cleaning solution that was of relevance and 
not the cleaning method. Despite evidence supporting the role of environmental 
cleaning in the control of HAIs, it is often only in response to an outbreak (Dancer, 
2009) and lack of scientific standards makes the evaluation of its effectiveness 
difficult. 
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In summary, the use of multiple infection control practices to prevent and control 
HAIs is supported by the literature, as opposed to one “gold standard” intervention 
(Aboelela et al., 2007; Charlett et al., 2012; Curtis, 2008). Some of the infection control 
interventions described in the literature included gowning, environmental cleaning, 
patient screening/surveillance of HAIs, strategies to prevent catheter related blood 
stream infection, air and water filtration, antimicrobial management, and hand 
hygiene. Environmental cleaning in particular was described as being a very important 
component to the reduction of HAIs; however, it was also suggested that different 
cleaning methods did not differ in terms of their effectiveness (Dancer et al., 2007). In 
addition to specific infection control interventions, the literature also highlighted 
management strategies, including bed management, staff development, and “large 
events” in infection control to be of importance in preventing and controlling HAIs 
(Bardsley, 2009; Charlett et al., 2012). 
2.7.2 Managing Patients with Infections or Colonisations 
Prevention of HAI is a priority issue for contemporary healthcare; however, this 
has proved to be a complex task that requires multiple approaches to be successful. In 
order to prevent the spread of HAI, managing those colonised is a crucial component 
to prevention and management. Transmission of HAIs not only occurs from direct 
contact with those colonised; contaminated environments and equipment can also 
result in the transmission of pathogens (Cristina et al., 2011; WHO, 2002; Rutala & 
Weber 2011; Dancer, 2009; Robertson & White, 2007). Due to the ability of various 
HAI pathogens to survive on fomites for significant periods of time (Rutala & Weber, 
2011; Dancer 2009), surrounding surfaces, entire rooms and equipment can become 
colonised. It has been highlighted that contaminated patient rooms may play an 
important role in the transmission of HAIs. A retrospective cohort study by Arndt et 
al. (2011) examined the ability for Clostridium difficile spores to persevere in the 
environment and evaluated whether a room previously occupied by a patient with 
Clostridium difficile increased the risk of transmission. Of the 1,770 patients analysed, 
134 cases were identified. Of those, 4.6% of cases had not been in a room with a prior 
occupant colonised with Clostridium difficile, compared to 11% who had (p=.002). 
The authors concluded that quarantining of colonised patients and rooms might be of 
benefit in reducing the spread of HAIs.  
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Contaminated medical equipment may also contribute to the spread of HAI, and 
as such, appropriate cleaning of medical equipment used on colonised patients is 
necessary (Gould, Halvosa, Metha, & Steinberg, 2010; Brennan, Mulla, O’Byrne, 
Smyth, & Walls, 2009). Common vehicle means of transmission has been highlighted 
by the WHO (2002) as a major mode of transmission. Often general equipment that is 
frequently used between patients, such as stethoscopes, tourniquets and 
exsanguinators, can be inadvertently colonised. This was reflected in two studies that 
highlighted the importance of cleaning general equipment (Gould et al. 2010; Brennan 
et al., 2009). Contamination of stethoscopes was explored in a quasi-experimental 
study by Gould et al. (2010). The authors claimed that stethoscopes are commonly 
contaminated with Staphylococcus aureas. Results showed that a single cleaning 
episode with alcohol resulted in a 90% reduction in contamination of Staphylococcus 
aureas (p<.001) of stethoscopes. However, this study was only of a very small sample 
size. The importance of equipment cleaning was also supported by a post intervention 
experimental study by Brennan et al. (2009) who investigated the contamination of 
tourniquets and exsanguinators as a potential source of infection in the orthopaedic 
operating theatre. This multicentre study took swabs from tourniquets exsanguinators 
from three different hospitals. Results showed that bacteria, including Staphylococcus 
aureas, staphylococci, Proteus sup, resistant Acinetobacter and Candida, had been 
present on the devices. Exsanguinators were determined to be the most heavily 
contaminated devices. Results for decontamination showed that following 
decontamination from non-alcohol based wipes, no colony forming units were 
detected. For alcohol based wipes, one swab (1/28) produced a positive culture and 
eight (8/28) swabs decontaminated with soap and water were contaminated with a 
positive culture. In conclusion, these results show that medical devices are a potential 
source of HAI transmission. Unfortunately, the composition of these devices makes 
sterilisation an unviable option. However, results did indicate that some cleaning 
methods may be effective in removing bacteria. Similar to the findings of Gould et al. 
(2010), despite this being a multicentre study, the sample size was too small to be able 
to generalise these results. Additionally, a potential confounder not considered could 
be the manual cleaning technique used; as technique could potentially be just as 
important as the type of wipes used. 
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The management of HAI contaminated surfaces and equipment is supported in 
the literature; however, it is important to also decontaminate the source. 
Decontaminating colonised patients through the use of chlorhexidine gluconate (CHG) 
bathing appears to be supported in the literature. A review of the literature by Sievert, 
Armol and Halm (2011) examined the effects of CHG bathing in reducing HAIs. The 
authors reviewed randomised control trails, quasi-experimental, prospective, and 
retrospective cohort studies and meta-analysis. In total, 18 studies were reviewed and 
broken into sub categories, including general decolonisation for MRO prevention, 
CLABSI, and SSI. Findings from the literature review indicated that CHG was an 
effective intervention for reducing HAI sub categories, with the exception of SSI, 
which had mixed results. However, the authors did indicate that strong evidence from 
RCTs was lacking, thus making this an area for future research. 
  The effectiveness of chlorhexidine patient bathing for reducing VRE was 
explored in two studies by Jefferson, Kassakian, Machan, Mermel, and Parenteau 
(2011) and Vernon et al. (2006). Both studies produced results suggesting that the use 
of this intervention was successful in reducing colonisation, particularly VRE 
colonisation. Using a quasi-experimental study design, Jefferson et al. (2011) 
evaluated the effectiveness of daily CHG bathing in general medical patients to reduce 
MRSA and VRE compared to soap and water. It was concluded that daily bathing with 
CHG resulted in a 64% reduced risk of developing MRSA and VRE HAIs (95 %CI, 
0.2-0.8; p = 0.01). However, the lack of a concurrent control group and adequate VRE 
screening compliance may make these results questionable.  
The use of CHG bathing to reduce VRE contamination of patients’ skin, 
environment, and healthcare workers’ hands was also explored in a prospective 
sequential group single arm clinical trial in a 21 bed teaching hospital by Vernon et al. 
(2006). All patients during the study periods were cleansed daily with the procedure 
specific to the study period. Period one utilised soap and water baths, period two 
utilised cleansing with cloths saturated with 2% CHG, and period three utilised cloth 
cleansing without CHG. Results showed that compared with soap and water baths and 
cleansing with non-medicated cloths, CHG impregnated cloths resulted in 2.5 less 
colonies per 1000 patient days of VRE on patients’ skin, less VRE contamination on 
healthcare workers hands (RR 0.6, 95% CI 0.4-.08), and less contamination of 
environmental surfaces (RR 0.3, 95% CI – 0.2-0.5). The incidence of VRE 
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colonisation also decreased from 26 colonisations per 1000 patient days to 9 per 1000 
patient days (RR 0.4, 95% CI 0.1-0.9). While this study produced significant results 
and had a large sample size, a randomised control trail may have produced stronger 
evidence. Furthermore, a different study design, such as a randomised control trial, 
would have been more robust by being conducted over one time period instead of three 
time periods, during which potential confounders, such as changes to other infection 
control practices, could have been made. 
The effectiveness of CHG bathing in reducing CLABSI in ICU patients was 
identified in the literature. Popovich, Hota, Hayes, Weinstein, and Hayden (2009) used 
a quasi-experimental design to investigate the effectiveness of CHG bathing in 
reducing CLABSI in a 21 bed medical ICU. The study identified that CLABSI rates 
were reduced from 6.99-4.1 cases per 1000 patient days. Supporting these results, 
Dixon and Carver (2010) conducted an observational cohort study in a nine bed 
surgical ICU and also concluded that rates of CLABSI had decreased (12.07 per 1000 
central venous line days to 3.17 per 1000 central venous line days). These results by 
Povocich et al. (2009) and Dixon and Carver (2010) may suggest that preventative 
decolonisation through the use of CHG bathing may be a highly effective intervention. 
In order to manage patients colonised with HAI, it is essential to conduct 
surveillance in order to determine who is actually colonised. While surveillance is 
often considered an auditing and reporting method, it is actually an intervention, 
because it is a critical component in reducing the spread of HAIs. Surveillance of 
hospital-acquired infection is a common infection control intervention aimed at 
addressing the issue of HAIs supported by the ACSQHC (2011) and NHMRC (2010). 
Jefferson and colleagues (2011) argued compliance with surveillance programs to be 
essential for HAI prevention. Avicolli et al. (2007) examined the surveillance of 
MRSA and the introduction of contact and droplet precautions in colonised patients 
and found that droplet and contact precautions were more significant interventions in 
reducing the incidence of HAIs, not extensive surveillance. Unfortunately, the authors 
of the study did not specifically analyse the individual benefit of the droplet and 
contact precautions. In Australia the importance of surveillance was previously noted 
during the implementation of the NSQHSS. In particular, a number of studies 
highlighted discrepancies relating to the implementation of surveillance programs 
across the country, along with issues surrounding how particular HAIs are defined. 
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Without consistent definitions for specific HAIs (such as CLABSI), benchmarking and 
monitoring colonisation rates is quite problematic. This issue strongly supports the 
utilisation of the NSQHSS, Standard Three in order to provide a more consistent 
approach, and thus be able to generate an accurate picture of the scope of the problem 
(McBryde et al., 2009; Worth et al., 2009; Bennett et al., 2007). 
However, surveillance of HAIs does not just identify colonisation rates, it also 
has merit in highlighting risk factors to enable targeted interventions (Mintjes-de 
Groot, Hassal, Kann, Verkooyen, & Verbrugh, 2000). Mintjes-de Groot et al. (2000) 
led a longitudinal study in the Netherlands where they conducted active surveillance 
for HAIs in a 270-bed acute-care hospital from 1984-1997. The study found that in 13 
years, 3,545 HAIs occurred (incidence 4.7/100 admissions) and that the type of HAIs 
differed between services. The study determined that hospital wide surveillance of 
HAIs was able to provide targets for interventions, and thus, was able to address the 
specific needs of the hospital (Mintjes-de Groot et al., 2000). 
The management of colonisation often requires the utilisation of “pathogen 
specific” targeted approaches, however, this is often ad hoc. However, a study by Chan 
et al. (2011) investigated the prevention of the transmission of Norovirus by 
implementing specially targeting infection control measures for the pathogen prior to 
outbreak occurrence. The investigators discovered that the intervention group had 
significantly lower rates of colonisation than the control group. The use of strategically 
targeted interventions was also supported in a quasi-experimental study looking at a 
MRSA surveillance and decolonisation prevention program (Arroliga et al., 2010). 
The authors found that there was a decrease in Staphylococcus aureas colonisation 
from 6.28 cases per 1,000 patient days prior to the intervention, to 3.32 cases per 100 
patient days post intervention. Targeted infection control practices may also help 
resolve HAI outbreaks, as indicated in an investigation in Northern Ireland by Aldeyab 
et al. (2011). The study concluded that post the introduction of Clostridium difficile 
targeted interventions (including antimicrobial stewardship, the implementation of an 
action plan, environmental hygiene, and surveillance) the outbreak break ended. Thus, 
the authors argued the cluster of targeted interventions had been effective. 
In summary, the management of patients colonised with HAIs involves the 
utilisation of various interventions. The literature supports the use of isolation and 
quarantining of colonised patients, along with consideration of cleaning of patient 
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equipment, and the utilisation of chlorhexidine gluconate bathing to reduce 
colonisation on patients’ skin (Arndt et al., 2011; Blom et al., 2006; Brennan et al., 
2009; Gould et al., 2010; Jefferson et al., 2011). It is also suggested that in order to 
reduce colonisation spread, pathogen specific targeted interventions be implemented 
(Aldeyab et al., 2011; Arroliga et al., 2010; F. Chan et al., 2011). 
2.8 SUMMARY OF THE EVIDENCE 
This literature review has demonstrated that HAIs are a very broad and complex 
problem. HAIs are prevalent in the US, Europe, and Australia, and their presence has 
a significant impact on institution costs and patient outcomes.  
HAIs are spread by various routes and means, thus making preventing and 
managing them a complex issue. Outbreaks appear to be largely affected by 
transmission and patient risk factors. What appears to be lacking in the literature is an 
overview of which outbreaks are occurring in Australian hospitals as a whole. This is 
required in order to establish which particular HAIs are a problem, which will then 
allow for specifically targeted strategies to prevent and control them. 
The use of HAI targeted strategies appears to be supported, albeit by small scale 
studies. The utilisation and implementation of interventions to address the issue of 
HAIs are described in the literature in isolation, and again are restricted to specific 
institutions. Research in relation to which interventions are being implemented as a 
whole in Australia is required to determine what exactly is being done to prevent HAIs 
and manage patients that are colonised, in an effort to reduce spread and prevent the 
development of outbreaks. 
2.9 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
The conceptual framework informing this study is drawn from two seminal 
documents: the National Safety and Quality Health Service Standards: Standard Three, 
Preventing and Controlling Health Care Associated Infections (ACSQHC, 2011) and 
the Australian Guidelines for Prevention and Control of Infection in Healthcare 
(NHMRC, 2010). The conceptual framework (see Figure 2.3) is based on empirical 
constructs from these documents, including the relationships between HAIs and 
prevalence/scope, surveillance, outbreaks, transmission, and interventions.  
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In Figure 2.3, HAIs are represented as the central construct by a green circle in 
the middle of the framework. Linking arrows represent relationships between the 
central construct and key components of the framework. The framework shows that a 
HAI’s existence is directly linked to prevalence/scope and surveillance (represented 
by black and orange circles), which is all influenced by relationships between 
transmission (represented by a purple circle), outbreaks (represented by a red circle), 
and interventions aimed at reducing HAIs (represented by an aqua oval). The 
management of multi-resistant organisms is also directly linked to outbreaks and 
transmission. The overarching intervention is education, as education is required for 
all interventions to be implemented. Education enables practitioners to understand how 
and why they are to do something, which is essential for ensuring the successful 
execution and implementation of an intervention (Campbell et al., 2007). While 
education is noted to be of importance, this study does not focus on education 
strategies. The interventions component breaks off into four main groups, based on the 
guidance of the two seminal publications (indicated by blue circles), and these include 
environmental cleaning, antibiotic stewardship, infection prevention and control 
strategies, and management of patients with infection or colonisations.  
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Figure 2.3 Conceptual Framework 
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2.10 CONCLUSION 
The issue of HAIs is a contemporary healthcare problem that affects patient care 
in both developed and developing countries. The review of the literature has 
highlighted the prevalence and wide scope of HAIs in the developed world, and 
ultimately exposed a healthcare problem, which at first glance appears to be relatively 
straight forward, to be incredibly complex and multi-faceted.   
HAIs are transmitted with relative ease, facilitated by various routes of 
transmission, including direct contact, droplet, air, and common vehicle means. Patient 
risk factors can also contribute to the development of a nosocomial infection and many 
pathogens can be responsible. Of particular concern is the development of MROs, 
which further make the treatment of HAIs difficult, and thus, affect patient outcomes. 
Outbreaks of HAI are unfortunately a problem that is being faced by many healthcare 
facilities, these outbreaks are also often exacerbated by transmission based issues and 
patient risk factors. There did not appear to be any study that addressed the prevalence 
of outbreaks as a “standalone” issue in the developed world; however, there were 
studies that detailed pathogen specific outbreaks. It appeared in the literature that 
outbreaks were commonly addressed and brought under control with the utilisation of 
multiple infection control interventions, which often took a targeted pathogen specific 
approach. 
Interventions being implemented to address the issue of HAIs are vast. Both the 
literature and key governing bodies support the use of strategies, including 
environmental cleaning, antibiotic stewardship, and surveillance of HAIs. Other 
interventions that may have merit in reducing HAIs as indicated in the literature 
include isolation/cohorting of colonised patients and patient bathing in antimicrobial 
solution. The literature appears to support the use of a number of infection control 
interventions to help reduce HAIs. However, evidence into these interventions is often 
limited to small-scale studies and in isolation. 
The issue of outbreaks of HAIs and interventions implemented to reduce them 
is broad, while also being incredibly intricate and complex. A broader overview is 
needed to investigate which outbreaks of HAIs are occurring in Australian public 
 42 Chapter 2: Literature Review 
hospitals and what infection control interventions are being implemented “as a whole” 
to reduce HAIs.  
An exploration of the literature, guided by two seminal documents, allowed for 
the creation of the conceptual framework, which was used to guide this study’s 
research questions and methods, and consequently informed the data collection and 
data analysis of all phases of this study. While the ACSQH document was published 
in 2011, it should be noted that this document was available before data collection in 
Phase 2 of this study. 
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Chapter 3: Methods 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
A mixed methods approach was used for this study. The research aims, questions, 
and hypotheses were outlined in Chapter 1. This chapter details the mixed methods 
research design, including definition, background, design strengths and challenges; and 
introduces a two-phase sequential exploratory design as the selected study design. Each 
phase is individually detailed into: Phase 1, Phase 2 part A, and Phase 2 Part B. Ethical 
considerations pertaining to the study are also presented. 
3.2 MIXED METHODS  
Mixed methods research is one of the three major research paradigms: 
quantitative research, qualitative research, and mixed methods research. It is commonly 
known for its pragmatic worldview, drawing on multiple forms of data, which originate 
from both qualitative and quantitative data sources. Mixed methods incorporates pre-
determined and emerging methods, uses both open ended and closed ended questions, 
draws upon multiple forms of data, and utilises both statistical and text analyses 
(Creswell, 2014).  Over the last 50 years the mixed methods paradigm has been given 
many names, including blended research, integrative research, multi-method research, 
multiple methods, triangulated studies, ethnographic residual analysis, hybrid research, 
and mixed research. The most modern and prevalent term to describe this paradigm is 
“mixed methods research” (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2011; Johnson, Onwuegbuzie, & 
Turner, 2007). 
During the evolution of mixed methods research, leaders in the field such as 
Creswell (2014) and Tashakkori and Teddlie (2003), identified this research design as 
having a number of strengths. Mixed methods research enables a researcher to answer 
a research question that cannot be answered through qualitative or quantitative research 
alone. This method is therefore able to answer questions that other methodologies 
cannot, by asking both exploratory and confirmatory questions (Creswell & Plano 
Clark, 2011). The ability to ask both exploratory and confirmatory questions was 
pivotal to this study; the exploratory questions enabled the researcher to address the 
qualitative aim, and the confirmatory questions enabled the research to address the 
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quantitative aims. Mixed methods research has other advantages, including the ability 
to make better inferences by removing disadvantages that some methodologies have in 
isolation. For example, mixed methods research can lead to the representation of a more 
diverse view by comparing the different perspectives from both qualitative and 
quantitative data, and this paradigm can develop better measurement instruments by 
collecting data and making inferences at the end of one phase, which then leads to the 
development of questions for the second phase of a study (Creswell & Plano Clark, 
2011; Creswell, 2014; Tashakkori & Teddlie, 2003). Creswell (2014) indicated that the 
major advantage of mixed methods research was the ability of this method to gain a 
“complete” understanding of a research problem through the combination of qualitative 
and quantitative methods, rather than each method in isolation. 
The mixed methods approach appears to be gaining recognition, particularly in 
nursing research (Bonner, Douglas, & Hayes, 2013).  Bonner and colleagues (2013) 
suggested that mixed methods is particularly useful in nursing research as the approach 
is able to be tailored to assess nursing interventions in regards to their outcomes and 
effect, and to comprehend behaviour to allow for the development of nursing 
interventions. It is highly recognised that randomised control trails (RCT) are the gold 
standard for clinical research; however, an RCT design is not always achievable or 
appropriate depending on the research question, clinical setting, or ethical 
considerations. Mixed methods researchers have the advantage of being able to utilise 
both qualitative and quantitative approaches, and therefore provide a much richer and 
broader approach by examining perception and value (Bonner et al., 2013). 
3.2.1 Definition of Mixed Methods Research 
Johnson et al. (2007) suggested that as there was no perfect definition to describe 
mixed methods research, the concept of the method had been defined in a number of 
different ways. In an effort to provide a contemporary and workable definition, seminal 
work by Johnson et al. (2007) conducted a cross case analysis by investigating how 
nineteen leaders in this paradigm defined mixed methods research and how it was 
conceptualised by indicating criteria they considered in coming to this definition. Based 
on their analysis, Johnson et al. (2007) offered the following general definition: 
Mixed methods research is the type of research in which the researcher or team 
of researchers combines elements of qualitative and quantitative research 
approaches (e.g. use of qualitative and quantitative viewpoints, data collection, 
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analysis, inference techniques) for the broad purpose of breadth and depth of 
understanding and corroboration. (pp. 123.) 
This definition applies to this study in terms of the qualitative view point from 
the perception of infection control clinical nurse consultants (CNCs) being used to 
guide the development of a quantitative survey tool, which could be distributed 
nationally in order to address the quantitative research questions and test the null 
hypothesis. 
3.2.2 Background of Mixed Methods Research  
Mixed methods research itself is not new. It was used in the work of cultural 
anthropologists in the early 20th century; however, the “label” of mixed methods 
research was not used until much later (Johnson et al., 2007). The history and evolution 
of mixed methods research has involved five major periods since the 1950s.  Seminal 
work by Campbell and Fiske (1959) has been viewed as formalising the practice of 
multiple research methods. The authors introduced the idea of “triangulation”, in which 
two or more methods are used to verify results. It is believed that the utilisation of 
multiple methods increases the level of confidence in the results, as two methods have 
led to the same findings and are therefore the result of what is being studied and not the 
method (Johnson et al., 2007). Campbell and Fiske (1959) were the catalyst for the 
“formative period” that saw the introduction of using more than one method in a study 
(Creswell & Plano Clark, 2011). The formative period continued into the 1980s, and 
then merged into the “paradigm debate period” that essentially involved qualitative and 
quantitative researchers debating whether these two forms of data could be combined. 
Greene, Caracelli, and Graham (1989) suggested that mixed methods researchers had 
moved past the paradigm debate. Supporting this, the 1980s and 1990s saw the 
progression of the “procedural development period”. During this time, experts in mixed 
methods identified a system to classify the different types of mixed methods research 
designs, developed a notation system, addressed reasons for combining qualitative and 
quantitative research, identified three types of mixed methods designs, and developed 
a typology in order to determine which design to use when conducting research. The 
early 21st century progressed into the “advocacy and expansion period”, where it was 
advocated for mixed methods research to be regarded as a separate method. This 
paradigm effectively expanded into many disciplines such as sociology, evaluation, 
nursing, and education in many countries. Finally, over the last 8-10 years we have 
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entered into the “reflective period”, which involves current assessment in the field, 
foresight into the future, and constructive criticism of the method (Creswell & Plano 
Clark, 2011).  As such, mixed methods research as its own paradigm is a relatively new 
movement, which has developed and evolved over the last fifty years.   
3.2.3 Mixed Methods Research Designs 
During the procedural development period, mixed methods researchers identified 
the classification systems of mixed methods research designs (Greene et al., 1989). 
Creswell (2014) identified three major designs: convergent parallel mixed methods 
design, explanatory sequential mixed methods design, and exploratory sequential 
mixed methods design. These designs are outlined in Table 3.1. 
 
Table 3.1 The Three Major Mixed Methods Research Designs  
 
Adapted from Creswell, 2014. 
Mixed methods research uses the three major designs (Table 3.1) in order to 
address research questions, and each of these designs differ in relation to three major 
aspects: implementation, priority, and integration (Bonner et al., 2013). Implementation 
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refers to the sequence of data collection. Data can be gathered in a sequential approach 
(for example, qualitative and then quantitative) or in simultaneous approach. Priority 
relates to the importance or dominance of each method (qualitative or quantitative) in 
the mixed methods design; this is based upon the research question and overall study 
aim. Integration relates to the merging of the qualitative and quantitative data, and can 
occur during data collection, analysis, and/or in the discussion (Bonner et al., 2013; 
Creswell, 2014). 
The research design choice is based upon which design best fits the research 
question and the rationale for mixing the qualitative and quantitative data. (Creswell & 
Plano Clark, 2011). Convergent parallel design (see Table 3.1) involves a single phase 
that uses both quantitative and qualitative methods concurrently. In this design, priority 
can be given to either method. The qualitative and quantitative data are integrated by 
combining results from both methods into one result, which is then interpreted. 
Convergent parallel mixed methods design provides the researcher with the ability to 
validate results from each method via evidence gathered from each method. Historically 
convergent parallel design is the most familiar to mixed methods researchers and 
involves a shorter data collection period (Bonner et al., 2013). While data collection in 
this design has the advantage of being shorter, it can however, be difficult to explore 
phenomenon in relation to qualitative and quantitative aspects at the same time. 
Furthermore, comparing results concurrently with two separate methods may result in 
discrepancies (Bonner et al., 2013; Creswell, 2014). 
Explanatory sequential mixed methods design (see Table 3.1) consists of the 
collection and analysis of quantitative data in the first phase, followed by the collection 
and analysis of qualitative data in the second phase. The design uses the quantitative 
results to identify areas relating to the research question that require further exploration 
through the qualitative phase; essentially the design is used to pursue an understanding 
of the results from the quantitative phase. Priority is generally given to the quantitative 
phase of the study and the results from each method are integrated during an 
interpretation phase or discussion. The advantages of the sequential explanatory design 
are that it is relatively straightforward and easy to implement; however, it is time 
intensive in terms of having to complete both methods separately (Bonner et al., 2013; 
Creswell, 2014). 
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Exploratory sequential design (see Table 3.1), like explanatory sequential design, 
conducts each method in a linear fashion; however, this is reversed; qualitative data 
collection and analysis is conducted in the first phase, followed by quantitative data 
collection and analysis in the second phase. Priority is often given to the qualitative 
phase, and data from each method are integrated in the interpretation phase or 
discussion. This design is often used to gain exploration into a phenomenon whereby 
items are often generated in order to develop a survey/questionnaire that will be tested 
using quantitative data analysis techniques in the quantitative phase. Sequential 
exploratory design is easy to implement and straightforward; however, this design is 
also labour intensive (Bonner et al., 2013; Creswell, 2014). This study used an 
exploratory sequential mixed methods approach. A rationale and critique of this method 
is provided in the next section. 
3.3 STUDY DESIGN:  EXPLORATORY SEQUENTIAL MIXED METHOD 
This study used an exploratory sequential mixed methods design. This section 
presents the study design in detail. The exploratory sequential design was conducted in 
two phases: a qualitative phase, followed by a quantitative phase. The qualitative phase 
involved exploration into the research problem by generating interpretive qualitative 
data through a qualitative method using semi-structured interviews, which were 
transcribed verbatim. Qualitative data were analysed using thematic analysis, and the 
findings were then used to develop the quantitative phase. Creswell (2014) identified 
that the results from the qualitative data analysis can be used to develop an instrument 
by providing themes, codes, and quotes in exploratory sequential design. Typically, in 
this design, the qualitative sample is smaller than the quantitative sample (Creswell, 
2014). The quantitative phase used a survey for the quantitative method, and data 
analyses for this phase utilised quantitative methods (including descriptive and 
inferential statistics). Qualitative and quantitative data were analysed separately and not 
combined (Bonner et al., 2013; Creswell, 2014; Creswell & Plano Clark, 2011). 
According to Creswell and Plano Clark (2011), there are four key rationales for 
conducting mixed methods research and one relates to instrument fidelity, specifically, 
the ability to create a reliable instrument. Creswell (2014) explicitly identified the 
exploratory sequential design as the most appropriate method to develop a survey 
instrument in order to answer a research question. As the study of the phenomenon of 
 Chapter 3:Methods 49 
HAIs is broad and complex in nature, this required an innovative approach. Mixed 
methods exploratory sequential design was deemed the most appropriate method, as 
firstly, the researcher needed to explore the opinion of experts in the field to determine 
what aspects of outbreaks of HAIs and consequent infection control practices required 
exploration. Secondly, in order to detail a national response, a survey instrument with 
relevant items required generation to allow for examination into the phenomenon. In 
addition, no research instrument or survey tool existed to address the research questions 
informing this study. The best approach due to the scope and magnitude of the problem 
was engagement of experts in the field of infection control. This necessitated a 
qualitative approach; hence, mixed methods research was the most appropriate method. 
Specifically, the exploratory sequential design was the most appropriate design, due to 
its ability to explore a problem and use those data to help build the best possible 
instrument (Creswell, 2014). 
The major advantage of the exploratory sequential design was the ability to use 
expert clinicians’ perceptions to create a survey instrument. This allowed for the 
production of quantitative data; created from rich exploration of infection control 
CNCs’ perceptions of HAI outbreaks and infection control interventions. Integration of 
the qualitative and quantitative data occurred when the qualitative phase informed the 
development of the quantitative instrument (Creswell, 2014). Given that exploratory 
sequential mixed methods research utilises both methodologies, there is the potential 
for issues relating to adequate representation of each quantitative and qualitative 
component, as such, careful sampling needs to be executed to avoid these issues. 
Sampling was guided by the parent study, which allowed for strong representation of 
experts in Phase 1 and then wide dissemination of the survey in Phase 2. (Collins, Jiao, 
& Onwuegbuzie, 2007). Health facilities usually have one or two nursing clinical 
experts in the field of infection control. This study tapped into this rich resource by 
interviewing experts to gather their perceptions of a clinical problem in order to develop 
a survey tool to then generate boarder data. 
Mixed method designs do pose some challenges. In particular, integration of data 
can be an issue due to differing emphasis on the qualitative or quantitative component. 
However, this issue can be overcome by using samples that aid researchers in making 
meta inferences, while still allowing a particular emphasis to be placed (Collins et al., 
2007). According to Bonner et al. (2013), in exploratory sequential mixed methods, 
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data is analysed separately and then integrated in the discussion phase of the study. 
Creswell (2014), however, suggested that the merging of the data occurs when the 
qualitative findings are used to develop a quantitative tool (see Figure 3.1); this 
approach was taken in this study. The overall challenge relates to combining qualitative 
and quantitative data. In essence, this is the core of mixed methods research, and while 
combing two major paradigms assists in providing a better understanding of a research 
problem, this can be very time consuming and complex. Furthermore, advanced 
research skills are required, as the researcher must be familiar with both qualitative and 
quantitative research (Creswell, 2014). 
In line with the exploratory sequential mixed methods design, the study consisted 
of two phases (Figure 3.1). Phase 1 consisted of the qualitative component: semi-
structured interviews designed to explore the perception of experts in the field of 
infection control. These data were analysed and then used to build a survey instrument 
for Phase 2. Phase 2 consisted of two parts: Phase 2 part A and Phase 2 Part B. Phase 2 
part A consisted of the execution of the developed pilot survey instrument across the 
pilot state, and refinement of the pilot survey. Phase 2 Part B consisted of the rollout of 
the national survey across the remaining states, and finally, analysis of the quantitative 
data. 
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Figure 3.1 Research Design: Exploratory Sequential Mixed Methods
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3.4 PHASE 1 METHOD  
3.4.1 INTRODUCTION 
This section outlines the methods used in Phase 1, including the study setting, 
participants, method of data collection, interview schedule, procedure, data 
management and analysis, and survey instrument development.  
Phase 1 utilised a qualitative research approach consisting of three stages, 1) semi-
structured interviews, 2) qualitative data analysis, and 3) the development of a 
quantitative survey (see Figure 3.2).  The opinions and perceptions of four expert 
infection control clinical nurse consultants (CNCs) were sought through interviews to 
answer research question 1. Findings from the interviews guided the development of 
a survey for the purpose of Phase 2.  
 
 
Figure 3.2 Phase 1 Research Design. 
 
The research question for this phase was: 
Question 1: How do infection control clinical nurse consultants perceive 
outbreaks of HAIs and the practices used to control HAIs. 
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Phase 1 used a descriptive qualitative design.  Descriptive qualitative design is a 
frequently employed methodological approach, historically based in philosophy, the 
human sciences, and anthropology. This method focuses on how human beings make 
sense of their reality, and in essence has an understanding that experience is as relevant 
as identifying an explanation to phenomena (Holloway & Wheeler, 2010). The goal of 
descriptive qualitative design is to produce a complete and in-depth understanding of 
the phenomenon of interest (Magilvy & Kotzer, 2009). Based on this goal, this method 
was deemed the most appropriate approach for the qualitative component of this study. 
Furthermore, when conducting qualitative descriptive studies the researcher remains 
closer to the data, thus offering a thorough summary of an event in everyday terms, 
while seeking descriptive validity. Descriptive qualitative design is the method of 
choice when a researcher is aiming to obtain a straight description of phenomena. 
Content analysis of data is undertaken, analysing themes and patterns that emerge 
(Sandelowski, 2000). 
3.4.2 Setting  
Australian public hospitals in a single state (Queensland) were selected for Phase 
1. The four public hospitals included two major tertiary referral hospitals and two 
regional hospitals.   
3.4.3 Participants 
There were four participants; one from each of the four public hospitals in 
Queensland participating in the parent study. Participants were all full time infection 
control CNCs, who had at least two years experience in the infection control CNC role. 
3.4.4 Method of Data Collection 
Face-to-face, semi-structured interviews were conducted. Interviews are a 
common data collection method, particularly when aiming to gather information to 
inform the development of a quantitative survey (Creswell, 2014). Face-to-face 
interviews are arguably more successful in increasing the response rate and providing 
better data quality than telephone interviews (Axinn & Pearce, 2006). The design and 
the context of the interview is important, that is, what type of interview will be used 
(e.g. structured, semi-structured, unstructured), the place it is conducted, the people 
who are present, and any information the respondent has been provided about the 
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objective of the interview (Axinn & Pearce, 2006). Therefore, this study used expert 
participants (infection control CNCs) and semi-structured interviews to elicit a rich 
breadth of data. 
Alvesson (2011) indicated that it was possible to combine different design 
elements in terms of interview questions with different degrees of structure, and 
recommended starting with a more open question and then moving to more structured 
questions. In this study, this question combination enabled rich data to provide themes 
for the development of the survey tool for Phase 2. In addition, the data collection 
design using semi-structured interviews facilitated the participants to articulate self-
perceived important information. If purely structured questions relating to specific 
interventions and outbreaks were asked, it may have led to the participant omitting 
important information, as they may have only answered what the researcher thought 
was relevant (Alvesson, 2011). 
The face-to-face interviews required quite in-depth information involving the 
recall of past events. The length of an interview is an important factor; too short and 
the information provided may be very limited, too long and participants may become 
fatigued (Axinn & Pearce, 2006). As such, the interviews were designed to last 
between 60 and 90 minutes. 
3.4.5  Interview Schedule 
The following interview questions were informed by the study’s research 
questions and literature:  
1.  Describe the infection control interventions, policies/guidelines that were 
implemented in the hospital from January 2005–December 2011 with the 
aim of reducing HAIs? 
2. When were these interventions, policies/guidelines implemented 
(month/year)? 
3. Describe the relationship between infection control practices and outbreaks. 
4. Describe any outbreaks of HAIs in the hospital from January 2005–
December 2011. 
5. When did these outbreaks occur (month/year)? 
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6. Describe the most significant event to happen in infection control in the 
hospital from January 2005–December 2011.  
7. Open-ended questions relating to infection control interventions, their 
effectiveness, plans for the future, the most important interventions. 
3.4.6  Procedure 
Following ethical approval, the identified infection control CNCs were contacted 
via telephone to request their participation in a face-to-face interview with the 
researcher. During the telephone conversation, the researcher outlined the study aims 
and objectives. It was also explained that this study was undertaken to fulfill the 
requirements of higher degree research and was embedded in the NHHIEP, a study 
that participants were currently participating in. Following verbal consent, an 
appropriate date, time, and meeting place for the interview was scheduled. The venue 
was the participant’s hospital campus, in a quiet, private meeting room with available 
table space for an A4 piece of cardboard (for construction of the visual timeline).  
Participants were informed that a confirmation email would be sent. If the CNC did 
not agree to participate, they were thanked for their time and no further contact was 
made. 
Following verbal telephone consent, participants were sent a confirmation email 
(see Appendix 2) stating that they had agreed to the interview at the set date, time, and 
place previously arranged. A brief paragraph on key information the researcher sought 
(such as interventions and the dates of their implementation) was also included in the 
email, in order for the participants to have time to prepare prior to interview if they felt 
it was necessary. A copy of the participant information sheet (PIS) was included (see 
Appendix 3). 
Four interviews were conducted in the pilot state, each conducted on a separate 
hospital campus relevant to the participant’s specific hospital. It was important to the 
researcher that the setting, date, and time of the interview were at the convenience of 
the participant in order to make participation easier, and therefore increase the 
likelihood of participation (Axinn & Pearce, 2006). It was determined that it was most 
convenient for the participant that the interview be conducted onsite. 
On the interview day, the researcher and Associate Supervisor met the 
participant at the arranged time and place. Prior to the commencement of the interview 
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the researcher provided the participant with another copy of the PIS and a consent form 
(see Appendix 4). The participant was asked to read the PIS and if they agreed to 
continue, to sign the consent form in the presence of the researcher prior to 
commencement.  
Once consent was obtained the interview was conducted. All interviews were 
recorded. At the beginning of the interview the “visual time-line” concept was 
explained to the participant. Figure 3.3 presents the template used for the timeline. The 
researcher completed the timeline as the participant was being interviewed. The 
timeline was recorded on an A4 piece of cardboard and detailed a timeline in months 
from January 2005 – December 2011. The timeline was divided into two sections:  
1. Outbreaks 
2. Interventions/significant event 

 
Figure 3.3 Hypothetical Example of the Visual Timeline Used in the Interview 
 
The written timeline enabled the researcher to note interventions and outbreaks 
that had occurred next to the corresponding date (month/year) during the interview 
process, while engaging in a collaborative and interactive process between the 
researcher and participant. It also aimed to facilitate the recall of dates through visual 
representation; as it was noted that participant recall bias was a potential issue (Gordis, 
2009). The visual timeline provided an anchor to prompt participants recall and 
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responses. This was a novel data measurement tool designed by the researcher that 
greatly aided in the gathering of vital time-based information. Specifically, it provided 
ongoing feedback to the interviewees and helped facilitate recall of both content and 
dates. This was essential given the nature of the task and the difficulty often associated 
with recalling distant events.  
During the interview process, participants were encouraged to elaborate on 
topics to allow for the engagement in a thorough dialogue relating to HAIs in their 
respective hospitals. Participants were also asked to describe what they thought to be 
the most significant event in infection control in their hospital and given time to talk 
freely about anything else they would like to add to the interview in relation to 
infection control and HAIs.  
3.4.7 Data Management and Analysis 
The four interviews were transcribed verbatim by a professional company into a 
Word document. The researcher cross-checked the veracity of the transcripts with the 
audio-recorded interviews in order to ensure the accuracy of the transcription, and to 
allow the researcher to recapture the content of the interviews. The visual timelines 
(on A4 cardboard) were kept in a locked filing cabinet.  
The data were analysed using qualitative data software Leximancer Pty Ltd 
(2007) to identify concepts and key ideas, and the comparison of responses on the 
timeline was used to generate themes. Leximancer is an electronic qualitative data tool 
used for analysing “natural” language text data by using statistical based algorithms 
and is capable of analysing quite large data sets, including text, PDF, Word documents, 
Excel, HTML, and plain text files. The program advises utilising the “cleanest” 
possible format available, as such, the generated Word documents for each interview 
were uploaded into the Leximancer software program as plain text files for the 
analysis. Leximancer extracts semantic and relational information and produces visual 
outputs, including a concept map, network cloud, and concept thesaurus. It looks to 
extract meaning (the meaning behind the words) and how that meaning connects to 
other sections of text. Advantages of the software include efficiency (as analysis is 
relatively fast), reliability, (as the analysis is free of human bias), it provides concepts, 
not key words, and therefore provides exploration into these concepts. Leximancer 
also provides visual representation of concepts through visual maps (Leximancer, 
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2015). Leximancer is often used in survey analysis, market research, social media 
monitoring, and interview transcripts (Leximancer, 2014).  
The Leximancer Pty Ltd (2007) software was utilised in this study to produce 
concept maps. The program automatically strips out stop words such as “it”, “the”, 
“and” etc. from the maps, as these words appear too frequently and are evenly 
distributed throughout common language. Essentially, when constructing themes and 
connections, the program identifies whether it is above chance that words appear 
together. Concept maps make associations through connections (how words connect 
through proximity). The theme name and concepts are produced from the uploaded 
text. Concepts are created by a group of related words (also known as evidence words), 
and the concept map is built on how these words connect through proximity. Grey 
lines from these concept dots indicate relationships between related concepts (see 
Figures 4.1, 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4). The collection of concepts creates the theme names as 
indicated in the large dots (also known as a theme bubble). The size of the theme 
bubble does not indicate its importance on the map, it merely indicates boundaries. A 
crossover of bubbles indicates a deeper relationship. The number of concepts in a 
theme determines prevalence. A connectivity score shown in the thematic summary 
indicates the importance of the theme in a particular dataset, 100% indicates the most 
important theme. Leximancer software reads two sentence blocks and finds concepts; 
however, concepts can span across multiple sentences. While the software does 
remove stop words, Leximancer does not necessarily pick up all irrelevant words, as 
such the analyst can remove words (Leximancer, 2014). For the purposes of this study 
the following irrelevant words were removed: things, suppose, probably, stuff, look, 
used, laughs, take, sure, remember, whole, are, guess, looking, and done. 
To further explore the perceptions of infection control CNCs (in addition to 
Leximancer analysis) a manual thematic analysis was undertaken by the researcher. 
Qualitative data analysis aims to identify meaning from data, a large task considering 
interview transcripts can be extensive (Polit & Beck, 2014). In this regard, Leximancer 
provides an efficient alternative; however, in this study to assist the researcher to get 
“closer to the data” thematic analysis was also undertaken. Thematic analysis is a 
common form of qualitative data analysis, it is a method that can discover themes and 
concepts from interviews, and thus interpret features of research topics. Ultimately 
thematic analysis identifies, analyses, and reports patterns for recurring themes within 
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a data set; consequently, this method can provide a rich and detailed account of data. 
An advantage of thematic analysis is that it is flexible and not bound by any particular 
theory, therefore the researcher does not need to support any particular theoretical 
framework; enabling this method to be a more accessible form of data analysis. 
Ultimately, it is important that the underlying theoretical framework of a study and 
analysis method complement what the researcher is exploring; (Braun & Clarke, 2006; 
Creswell, 2014).  For the purposes of this study, the thematic analysis utilised an 
essentialist/realist method; this particular method details experience, meaning and 
reality (Braun & Clarke, 2006). 
When conducting thematic analysis, it is important to establish what counts as a 
theme, and does the theme capture an important aspect to the overall research 
questions? However, it should be noted that prevalence does not necessarily equate 
importance (Braun & Clarke, 2006). For the purposes of this study, a rich description 
of the entire data set was warranted, and as such the themes and codes needed to be 
representative of the entire data corpus for the interviews. According to Braun and 
Clarke, (2006) themes generated from analysis can be categorised at the level at which 
they are identified, these include: semantic, latent, or interpretative. For the purposes 
of this study the level of theme identification utilised a semantic approach; where 
themes are identified within the clear meaning of the data. This approach looks beyond 
what has been described by a participant, beyond mere description of patterns and 
moves into interpretation of data (Braun & Clarke, 2006). 
Braun and Clarke (2006) described a six-step process, which should be followed 
when conducting thematic analysis. As such, this study followed this process. Steps 
involved include:  
1. Data emersion: where the transcripts for each data set that make up the 
data corpus are familiarised by reading repeatedly before coding. 
2. The generation of codes: where codes are identified from the data 
manually, along with the identification of extracts from each code. 
3. The generation of themes: codes are analysed and then based on 
patterns, grouped into themes. 
4. Review of themes: themes are scrutinised in relation to codes and 
subsequent extracts. 
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5. Defining of themes: themes are refined and named. 
6. Construction of the report: extracts relevant to the overall research 
question are selected and a report produced. 
3.5 PHASE 2 PART A METHOD 
3.5.1 Introduction 
The second phase of this mixed methods study utilised a quantitative approach 
and was divided into two parts: Phase 2 Part A and Phase 2 Part B. The aim of Phase 
2 Part A (see Figure 3.4) was to pilot the survey developed in Phase 1 in a single state. 
This section outlines the methods used in Phase 2 Part A, including the study setting, 
participants, method of data collection, procedure, data management, and analysis.  
 
Figure 3.4 Research Design Phase 2 Part A 
 
This quantitative phase of the mixed methods study used a non-experimental 
descriptive survey design to address research aims two and three and research 
questions two and three of this study. This design provides a numeric description of 
trends by studying a sample population (Creswell, 2014). In this design, pre-selected 
variables were chosen to be studied and conclusions drawn from the findings of 
statistical tests (Sandelowski, 2000). 
In order to address the phenomenon of HAIs a wide audience was required; a 
survey research design provides an appropriate platform to connect with a large 
audience across numerous settings, thus being more representative (Polit & Beck, 
2014). Surveys provide the ability to obtain quantifiable information pertaining to 
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knowledge, actions, opinions, and attitudes by participants responding to direct 
questions; often this can be from brief responses, for example, “yes/no” answers. Data 
from surveys can be collected through various mediums, including personal 
interviews, telephone interviews, and questionnaires (Creswell, 2014; Polit & Beck, 
2014). Descriptive survey design was determined to be the most appropriate method 
of quantitative data collection due the properties described above, specifically through 
the use of a questionnaire. Unlike interviews, questionnaires are self-administered. The 
benefit of this mode of data collection is that it is economical, can be used for a variety 
of populations, is flexible, able to achieve a broad scope, and can be distributed to a 
large number of participants, particularly as questionnaires can be distributed over the 
Internet. However, it should be noted that questionnaires are not the most appropriate 
method for deep exploration into complex issues such as human behaviour and 
feelings; therefore suggesting that this method is appropriate for extensive, not 
intensive analysis (Polit & Beck, 2014). This limitation was not relevant, as the 
research questions in this study did not warrant in-depth exploration of human 
behaviour (Polit & Beck, 2014). 
3.5.2 Setting 
The setting for this study was the public hospitals chosen on the basis of 
participation in the parent study “The National Hand Hygiene Initiative Evaluation 
project”. The state selected for the interviews in Phase 1 was also selected to be the 
pilot state for Phase 2 Part A, the survey. One participant (the infection control CNC) 
from each individual hospital from the pilot state was invited to participate. The setting 
was the respective public hospitals of the participants.  
3.5.3 Participants 
A total of nine registered nurses (including the four participants from Phase 1) 
were invited to participate, with each participant required to hold the position of 
infection control clinical nurse consultant.  
3.5.4 Instrument  
Based on findings from Phase 1 interviews, the Outbreaks and Infection Control 
Interventions Survey (2005-2011) (see Appendix 6) was developed for the Evaluation 
of the National Hand Hygiene Initiative and for the purposes of this study; hence, the 
questions for the survey were developed from information derived from experts in the 
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field of infection control (the findings of Phase 1), along with an extensive review of 
the literature on HAIs. According to De Vaus (2002) there are five distinct types of 
question content: behaviour, beliefs, knowledge, attitudes, and attributes. Of these 
question types, it was predominantly knowledge that the current study was interested 
in eliciting from participants. As such, the large majority of items developed in the 
survey were designed to extract specific retrospective knowledge in the clearest 
possible way. Data collection was cross-sectional, with the data collected at one point 
in time. However, the information gathered from the survey items was retrospective, 
longitudinal information, which required participants to retrieve information over a 
seven-year period. The survey items were developed based on the findings from the 
interviews in Phase 1.  
The survey instrument also explored participants’ collective opinions on 
outbreaks and how they affected different aspects of infection control. This was 
achieved through the implementation of scale questions, which were established based 
on the content analysis (derived from Leximancer) of the Phase 1 interviews. Table 
3.2 details the scale items which were developed to explore issues pertaining to 
infection control policy, workload and staff; as these issues were noted in each 
Leximancer concept map (figures 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3) for each separate participant; as 
themes were able to be categorised into these issues. Social-psychological scales are 
commonly incorporated into questionnaires to explore opinion; scales assign a 
numerical score to participants’ responses to declarative statements along a continuum, 
thus enabling the ability to quantify statements that express a viewpoint on a topic 
(Polit & Beck, 2014). According to De Vaus (2002), when constructing such a scale it 
is important to ensure the questions relate to the same underlying concept; this requires 
a three step process: constructing a rough scale, selecting the best items, and creating 
the final scale variable. As such, the scale was developed based on this process. The 
scale items were empirically derived from the findings of Phase 1 and a review of the 
literature. 
Opinion based items exploring the association between outbreaks and infection 
control were measured using a seven-point scale, where participants were asked to 
indicate how much they agreed with a statement in which 1 = strongly disagree, 2 = 
disagree, 3 = somewhat disagree, 4 = neither agree nor disagree, 5 = somewhat agree, 
6 = agree, and 7 = strongly agree.  The scale was determined based on the desired level 
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of detail (Polit & Beck, 2014). Scales often range from two to ten, with five or seven 
being the most common. It was determined that the scale required symmetry of 
categories and a neutral midpoint to reduce response bias (De Vaus, 2002); hence, a 
seven-point scale was used. Items included both positively and negatively worded 
statements. The collective individual scores from each participant for each item were 
added together and a mean was then generated in order to give an overall score for 
each scale item. This was done in an effort to give an average score between the 
participants for each item, as the study wished to explore overall opinion amongst the 
experts, and not individual opinion, which would have necessitated the determination 
of each item’s summative score.  
 
Table 3.2 Survey items – Outbreaks and Infection Control Survey. 
Survey Items 
1. There is no relationship between outbreaks and infection control policy. 
2. Outbreaks assist the development of infection control policies.  
3. An outbreak provides a good opportunity to move forward other infection control 
policies. 
4. Outbreaks delay normal day-to-day infection control work. 
5. Most outbreaks make little difference to infection control activities. 
6. My hospital is prepared for an outbreak.  
7. During an outbreak staff work harder to ensure other infection control work gets 
done. 
8. Outbreaks have a negative effect on staff morale. 
9. An outbreak raises the awareness of infection control. 
10. When there is an outbreak I make an extra effort to ensure infection control work 
is completed. 
 
The validity of an instrument is the degree to which it measures what it was 
designed to measure (Creswell, 2014). Face validity of the survey instrument was 
assessed with a final question asking participants to comment in regards to content and 
the difficulty of the survey. Participants were asked to rate how easy/difficult the 
survey was to complete based on a five-point scale where 1 = easy, 2 = difficult, 3 = 
neutral, 4 = somewhat difficult, and 5 = difficult. At the end of the instrument 
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participants were asked to provide more detailed feedback on difficulty and content in 
a free text option. 
The survey was broken into seven sections and totalled 55 items, 14 items in the 
survey were included for the purposes of the parent study. This study will not report 
those items, leaving 41 items for the pilot study. These were: 
x A demographics section comprising of six items relating to the 
participant’s name, contact details, state and hospital, years of experience, 
and area of work. 
x An outbreaks section comprising of three items including indication of 
HAI outbreaks, indication of outbreaks from a list of HAIs, and 
identification of the five most serious HAI outbreaks by month and year. 
To identify indication, participants indicated “yes” or “no”. If participants 
had experienced less than five serious outbreaks for the third outbreak 
item, they were instructed to indicate “N/A” for not applicable. 
x An interventions section with a potential total of 27 items related to 
specific interventions, including patient screening, environmental 
cleaning, environmental surveillance, antibiotic stewardship, hand wash 
solution, utilisation of alcohol based hand rub (ABHR), visitor dispensers, 
sterilisation procedures, PPE, patient surveillance, environmental 
surveillance, quarantining/isolation, cleaning, bundles, intravascular 
devise care (BSI interventions), and state body programs. Participants 
were asked if they had implemented and or changed any of these 
interventions in their hospital by indicating either “yes” or “no” and asked 
to supply the date of implementation, and/or change in month and year. 
When a “yes” response was provided for 13 questions, further stem 
questions were initiated.  
x An outbreaks and epidemics section (where the epidemic section related 
to the parent study only) comprising of two items; one being a seven-point 
scale, with 10 scale items and the other an open comment item. 
x A feedback section with three items comprising of one item rating ease of 
survey completion (on a four-point scale) and two open-ended items. 
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3.5.5 Procedure 
Following ethical approval, the identified infection control CNCs were contacted 
via email in May of 2012 and invited to participate in the survey. The invitation email 
outlined the details of this study and the nesting of this study in the NHHIEP, the parent 
study in which the participants were currently recruited (see Appendix 7). 
Furthermore, the participant information sheet (PIS) was attached to give study 
information (see Appendix 8). Completion of the survey was deemed consent to 
participate. Data were collected by the use of an on-line survey, formatted using on-
line software Key Survey Version 8.2. A web link to the survey (hosted on Key 
Survey) was provided to the participant to enable them to access the site and complete 
the survey electronically. It was outlined to the participant that they could complete 
the survey over multiple sessions; however, they needed to complete these sessions on 
the same computer. Contact details of the researchers were provided to allow for any 
queries to be addressed and a request date for completion was indicated. 
A reminder email (see Appendix 9) was sent to participants after two weeks. If 
there was still no response after another two weeks, a phone call was made to ask if 
the participant still wished to complete the survey and needed more time.  
3.5.6 Data Management and Analysis 
Completed surveys were returned electronically and stored online via Key 
Survey Software. Data held on Key Survey Version 8.2 is stored on a secure server 
within the university and is accessible via a secure username login and password, 
known only to the researcher and secondary supervisor. Surveys were printed out for 
hardcopies, and stored in a locked filing cabinet.  
Data from the surveys were entered into an Excel spreadsheet, guided by a 
coding manual. Accuracy of the Excel spreadsheet data was crosschecked by the 
researcher randomly checking ten percent of responses in the Excel spreadsheet 
against the hard copy original surveys. Data from the Excel spreadsheet were uploaded 
into SPSS version 18.0. All data entered into Excel and SPSS were kept on password-
protected electronic files. For Phase 2 Part A, descriptive statistics were analysed 
through SPSS software and generated a combination of percentages, frequencies, 
means, standard deviations, and ranges. Inferential statistical analysis could not be 
undertaken during this pilot phase due to the small sample size. Validity data was 
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analysed by reviewing responses provided in the difficulty scale item and qualitative 
feedback to the survey.  
3.6 PHASE 2 PART B METHODS 
3.6.1 Introduction 
The aim of Phase 2 Part B (see Figure 3.5) was to roll the refined survey out 
nationally. This section outlines the methods used in Phase 2 Part B, including the 
study setting, participants, method of data collection, procedure, data management, 
and analysis.  
 
Figure 3.5 Research Design Phase 2 Part B  
 
The quantitative phase of the mixed methods study used the same non-
experimental descriptive survey design as used in Phase 2 Part A. A description of this 
method and the rationale for its use were outlined in Section 3.3  
3.6.2 Setting 
The remaining states and territories across the country were surveyed for this 
phase of the study. The setting was the respective public hospitals of the participants. 
The public hospitals were chosen on the basis of participation in the parent study, 
“National Hand Hygiene Initiative Evaluation Project”, with one participant from each 
hospital chosen. 
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3.6.3 Participants 
Forty-one registered nurses were invited to participate, with each participant 
required to hold the position of infection control clinical nurse consultant. 
Additionally, they must have spent at least six months in their current hospital to be 
eligible for the study.  
3.6.4 Instrument  
The instrument was revised based on results and feedback provided by the 
participants in Phase 2 Part A of this study. As such, the National Survey (2005-2011) 
(see Appendix 10) was developed for this phase of the study. 
The overall aim of the survey was to extract the same information as the pilot 
survey. In addition, collective opinions on outbreaks and how they affected different 
aspects of infection control were explored using scale questions. These scale questions 
were identical to those in the pilot survey, as previously described. Specific changes 
made to the National Survey based on feedback from the pilot are described in Chapter 
4. 
The national survey was broken into five sections and totalled 27 items, with 
nine items in the survey included for the purposes of the parent study. This study does 
not report those items, leaving 18 items for the pilot study. These were: 
x A demographics section comprising of six items relating to the 
participant’s name, contact details, state and hospital, years of experience, 
and area of work. 
x An outbreaks section comprising of three items including indication of 
HAI outbreaks, indication of outbreaks from a list of HAIs, and 
identification of the five most serious HAI outbreaks by month and year. 
To identify indication, participants indicated, “Yes” or “No”. If 
participants had experienced less than five serious outbreaks for the third 
outbreak item, they were instructed to indicate “N/A” for not applicable. 
x An outbreaks and epidemics section (where the epidemic section related 
to the parent study only) comprising of two items; one being a seven-point 
scale, with 10 scale items and the other an open comment item.  
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x An interventions section with seven items related to classifications of 
interventions including patient-focused interventions, hand hygiene 
interventions, cleaning and surveillance interventions, intravascular 
devices (BSI interventions), and other interventions. For the four 
classifications of interventions, matrix tables were created to specifically 
ask about interventions relevant to those classifications. Patient focused 
interventions included isolation of colonised patients, cohorting of 
colonised patients with the same strain of HAI, patient dedicated or single 
use equipment, patient bathing solution, contact precautions, droplet 
precautions, and antibiotic stewardship. Hand hygiene focused 
interventions included hand wash solution, alcohol based hand rub, and 
visitor dispensers. Cleaning and surveillance interventions included 
routine environmental cleaning, environmental cleaning of HAI 
contaminated areas, air and water filters, cleaning audits, swabbing of 
contaminated bed areas, and sterilisation procedures. The interventions 
section was amended based on feedback from the pilot survey. These 
changes are outlined in 4.3.6, 
x A HAI surveillance section with one item that asked about surveillance of 
at risk patient populations, including admissions, discharges, inter-hospital 
transfers, intensive care unit, high risk wards, low risk wards, patients with 
a previously identified HAI, and other. 
3.6.5 Procedure 
Following ethical approval, in September 2012, the identified infection control 
CNCs were contacted via email and invited to participate in the survey. The email (see 
Appendix 7) outlined the details of this study and the nesting of this study in the 
NHHIEP, a research project that participants were currently participating in. A brief 
paragraph on key information the researcher sought (such as interventions and the 
dates of their implementation) was included in the email. The email also informed 
participants that a PIS (see Appendix 8) was attached to give further information 
relating to the research and that participants were required to read this prior to 
completing the survey. The PIS indicated that consent was obtained through 
completion of the survey. A web link to the survey (hosted on Key Survey) was 
provided to the participant to enable them to go to the site and complete the survey. 
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Participants were informed they could complete the survey over multiple sessions; 
however, they needed to complete these sessions on the same computer. The email 
provided contact details of the researchers to allow for any queries to be addressed and 
a request date for completion was provided. 
If the infection control CNCs had not responded via email to decline 
participation and they had not entered the survey site, a reminder email (see Appendix 
9) was sent after two weeks and a revised completion date was given. If there was still 
no response after another two weeks, a follow up phone call was made to the infection 
control CNC to determine if the participant still wished to complete the survey and 
needed more time.  
3.6.6 Data Management and Analysis  
Data management strategies for this phase were the same as Phase 2 Part A. 
Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive statistics were generated using SPSS software and included 
percentages, frequencies, means, standard deviations, and ranges in order to answer 
the two research questions.  
Multivariate Analysis 
Poisson regression analysis was used to test the null hypothesis, as this 
quantitative component of the study was longitudinal and involved counts and this 
method was dictated by the parent study. Count variables are often unable to achieve 
a normal distribution, as counts can commonly equal zero. Normal models have no 
bounds, and in situations where the count may equal zero, the model can produce 
negative values. Negative values are not plausible for counts (for example, it is not 
possible to have negative values for rates of infection), additionally, count variance is 
not constant; it rises as “Y” increases. Counts do, however, commonly follow a 
Poisson distribution, and can therefore be used in a Poisson regression (Kirkwood & 
Sterne, 2010).  
The Poisson distribution is the probability of a number of events occurring at a 
fixed interval of time. These events occur at a known average rate and are independent 
of one another (Kirkwood & Sterne, 2010). Poisson regression is the most appropriate 
method for analysing counts; these are general linear models with the logarithm as the 
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link function and the Poisson distribution function as the estimated probability of the 
variable “Y” distribution (Barnett & Dobson, 2008)  
The alternative hypothesis in this study identified that the implementation of an 
intervention changed the monthly rates of infections across hospitals. The hypothesis 
was two tailed and no direction of change was indicated. HAI infection rate data was 
provided by the overarching study and collected from Australian hospitals who 
reported their infection rates to their respective state/territory and national infection 
control governing bodies. Fifty public hospitals were chosen for the overarching study. 
These were the five largest hospitals (by number of acute beds) in New South Wales 
(NSW), Victoria (VIC), Queensland (QLD), Western Australia (WA) and South 
Australia (SA), the three largest hospitals in Tasmania (TAS), and single hospitals in 
the Northern Territory (NT) and Australian Capital Territory (ACT), totalling thirty 
hospitals. The next twenty largest hospitals throughout the nation were also selected 
to bring the total to fifty hospitals (Barnett et al., 2014). 
The infections examined in the study were SAB, defined using the definition 
nationally agreed by the ACSQHC (ACSQHC, 2015) as detailed in Chapter 1, MRSA 
and MSSA, along with specific infection types, including CLABSI and SSI. The 
available infection rate data varied between states. It was important that the supplied 
data provided rates for pre and post intervention.  
The interventions examined in the study to test the null hypothesis included BSI 
intervention, isolation of colonised patients, and environmental cleaning. These three 
interventions were selected based on the number of dates of implementation/change 
available. The individual interventions studied were implemented at different times 
throughout the country, and the date of implementation/change was used for each 
intervention as month and year. This data was extracted from both the pilot survey (for 
the hospitals in the pilot state) and from the national survey (for the hospitals 
throughout the rest of the nation). 
It is possible that changes in infection rates may have different patterns (Barnett 
et al., 2014); therefore, changes in infection rates after the implementation of an 
intervention were run against six models to reflect six possible changes. These changes 
are reflected in Figure 3.6. Models A and D represent the null hypothesis, where the 
impact of the intervention had no effect on infection rate. Models B and E represent 
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step changes, and Models C and F represent linear changes. These models were 
determined and agreed upon a priori by the steering committee. 
 
 
Figure 3.6 The six models tested 
 
The Poisson regression model for the counts of infection in hospital was: 
ci,t ׽Poisson (mi,t), ip1, ..., M, tp1, ..., ni, 
log(mi, t) p log(ni, t /10,000) + dm(t) + ai + changei, t, (1) 
In this model i=hospital; t=month; M=the total number of hospitals; and ni = the 
number of months observed in the hospital. The log (ni , t) divides the mean counts by 
the denominator, which in the above example was 10,000 bed days. The denominators 
did differ for the different infection types. These were:  
x per 10,000 bed days for MRSA, MSSA and SAB, 
x per 1000 line days for CLABSI, 
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x per 100 procedures for SSI. 
The model of best fit was selected for each intervention and infection type. The 
best model was selected according to Akaike’s Information Criteria (AIC) to find 
‘goodness of fit.’ The best model was validated by the lowest AIC (the smaller the 
AIC the better the fit); however, models were considered indifferent if the AICs were 
less than two (Dobson & Barnett, 2008) 
The analysis of the data was conducted nationally and not state by state. This 
decision was made as there may not have been enough dates to run an individual state 
analysis, and by running the analysis nationally the hospitals could act as their own 
controls. Running the analysis nationally enabled the study to give a better indication 
of whether the selected interventions were generally useful.  
3.7 ETHICS 
The ethical issues for Phase 1, Phase 2 Part A, and Phase 2 Part B were the same. 
Ethical considerations for the study included confidentiality and anonymity, consent, 
security of data, and dissemination of findings. Potential participants were informed 
of the potential benefits and risks of participating in the study, and were informed that 
they could withdraw from the study at any time. In Phase 1, participants were able to 
discuss any queries they may have had prior to signing the consent form with the 
researcher. Participants of Phase 2, Parts A and B implied consent through the 
submission of a completed survey, as explained in the invitation email. 
All participants were assured of confidentiality relating both to themselves and 
their respective institutions. All identifying information within the data was deleted 
from the dataset. The researcher did not have a pre-existing relationship with any of 
the participants, the secondary supervisor had worked with some of the participants on 
other surveys as part of the parent study.  
The research data is stored in a locked filing cabinet. Electronic files are stored 
on a password protected computer. The data is checked periodically to ensure integrity. 
Access to the data is limited to the researcher, supervisory team, and statistician to the 
parent study, as this study was part of a larger study. The results of this study will be 
disseminated through conference presentations and publication in peer-reviewed 
journals. 
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This study was a part of a larger, nationally funded study that had already sought 
ethical approval for all states (through QUT and individual state and territory HREC); 
therefore, an amendment to the ethics application was made and approved to include 
this study (see Appendix 1). 
3.8 SUMMARY 
A mixed methods approach using a two-phase exploratory sequential design was 
utilised in this study. This chapter has provided an overview of mixed methods 
research and ethical considerations relevant to the current study. The next chapter 
addresses the results of Phase 1, Phase 2 Part A, and Phase 2 Part B.  
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Chapter 4: Results 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
The results for each phase of this study are detailed below and described 
separately. Section 4.2 contains a brief overview of Phase 1, including participant 
characteristics, followed by the qualitative findings where two themes emerged; “the 
power of outbreaks” and “moving to a solution”. Phase 2 Part A results are presented 
in Section 4.3, while the results of Phase 2 Part B, including the findings of the null 
hypothesis, are described in Section 4.4. 
4.2 PHASE 1 RESULTS 
The results for Phase 1 are presented below and detail the findings in relation to 
the participant characteristics and the exploration of explore infection control CNCs’ 
perceptions of outbreaks of HAIs and consequent infection control practices in order to 
develop a survey tool.  
4.2.1 Participant Characteristics. 
Four participants were invited and all four agreed to participate in face-to-face 
interviews, giving a response rate of 100%. Three participants were female and one 
male, all held the position of infection control CNC in their respective hospitals, in the 
pilot state. The average level of experience in the field of infection control was 14.3 
years (range 10 - 18 years). 
4.2.2 Phase 1 Results 
Data from the four participants related to their perceptions of practices and events in 
their respective hospitals. As such, data reported are for the hospital and not the 
individual participant. To note, the term screening was used interchangeably with 
surveillance by the CNCs in the interviews however, both referred to the surveillance 
of HAIs. Consequently the terms screening and surveillance were used and are referred 
to concurrently in this thesis. 
The four interviews analysed by the researcher using Leximancer produced four 
concept maps, one for each hospital (see Figures 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, 4.4). The concept map 
from each hospital used the program default settings for percentage of visual concepts, 
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percentage of theme size and degree of rotation and not minimised in order to get the 
most amount of coverage. This was possible as “stop words” had previously been 
removed to prevent erroneous themes and concepts. 
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Figure 4.1 Hospital 1 Concept Map     






Figure 4.2 Hospital 2 Concept Map  
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Figure 4.3 Hospital 3 Concept Map  
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Figure 4.4 Hospital Concept Map 4  
  
81 Chapter 4: Results 
As displayed in Figures 4.1, 4.2., 4.3, and 4.4, each concept map displays a 
number of coloured circles, in each circle a theme is indicated and within these 
coloured circles small grey dots indicate different concepts. The themes and 
correlating connectivity scores for each concept map were generated and are indicated 
below in Table 4.1. Results showed that hands was a prominent theme for three of the 
four hospitals, each scoring 100% connectivity. VRE, outbreak/s, and people, were 
also themes that expanded across three of the four hospitals. Report, staff, started, time, 
work, change, and hospital were themes that were found in 2 of the four concept maps 
for each interview. 
Table 4.1 Thematic Summary for Each Interview: Themes and Correlating Connectivity Score % 
Hospital 1 Hospital 2 Hospital 3 Hospital 4  
Theme Connectivity Theme Connectivity Theme Connectivity Theme Connectivity 
Hand 100% Hand 100% Hand 100% VRE 100% 
Clinical 94% MRSA 69% Infection 71% Hygiene 80% 
Areas 86% Staff 59% People 46% CHRISP 54% 
VRE 49% Time 48% VRE 33% People 52% 
Change 45% Hospital 45% Year 21% Program 48% 
Education 20% Started 21% Outbreak 18% Outbreaks 29% 
Month 18% People 21% Nursing 15% Year 20% 
Started 16% Outbreak 18% Changed 13% Time 16% 
Auditing 11% Contact 12% Work 11% Staff 12% 
Issues 08% Wards 05% Report 04% Moments 08% 
Implemented 07% Lifesavers 04%   Work 06% 
Hospital 05%     Reports 05% 
Data  05%       
Surgical 04%       
        
 
The thematic analysis approach was also used to analyse the transcripts from the 
interviews to answer the research question. Key themes were drawn from the data and 
were essential in exploring infection control CNCs’ perceptions of outbreaks of HAIs 
and consequent infection control practices. These themes have been labelled as “the 
power of outbreaks” and “moving to a solution”. Concepts from the two themes do 
overlap, this however provides an understanding of participants’ perceptions. Each 
theme was developed based on the emergence of a number of different codes (see 
Appendix 5) these were: “the power of outbreaks”: outbreak challenges; pathogens 
and outbreaks the nexus; and outbreaks as a constructive influence, and “moving to a 
solution”: impediments to moving forward; empowering solutions; the importance of 
the intervention itself; changing practice; monitoring effectiveness. 
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The power of outbreaks 
This theme was identified based upon participants articulating the large effect 
HAI outbreaks have on infection control clinical practice due to the challenges they 
present, and the properties of particular HAI pathogens. The constructive influence 
outbreaks can have on infection control was also illuminated.  
  It appeared that outbreaks presented a number of challenges to infection control 
CNCs, which extended into many different aspects of healthcare delivery. Outbreaks 
of HAIs appeared to have a significant effect on the workload of infection control. 
 “…certainly that [outbreak] had major impacts on the workload of infection 
control”. P2 
 “...they did contact screening [VRE] here, which meant that we were 
screening and isolating basically hundreds of patients in the midst of it, and it was 
[a] huge, huge amount of work”. P4 
 
Along with increased infection control workload, the power of outbreaks was 
reflected in the challenge of managing resources. Participants described the strain 
outbreaks placed on resources in an area of healthcare that at times was stretched with 
resource allocation to deal with usual practice. 
“In February [during an outbreak] we were starting to get to crisis level for 
single room availability. We have 76 [single rooms] in the hospital.” P2 
 
“But the significant things for that [H1N1] is that a lot of organisations shifted 
the resources for our normal surveillance programs to managing H1NI”. P1 
 
General infection control practice was affected by the development of an 
outbreak. Participants identified that during an outbreak usual practice often did not 
occur, as the focus of infection control was directed towards controlling an outbreak, 
this in turn had an effect on the general running of infection control, which at times 
had repercussions once the outbreak had been controlled or terminated. 
“… but there’s lots of stuff that we just missed; we couldn’t keep up with it. So, lots 
of things didn’t happen that should have happened. Screening wasn’t done that 
should have been done.” P3 
 
“Basically, we stopped education, we stopped auditing, stopped reporting, and all 
the staff just went, ‘Oh, … about that. We were dealing with swine flu.’” P2 
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The stress of outbreaks on staff, patients, and visitors also posed a challenge to 
infection control CNCs during an outbreak. Staff stressors appeared to relate to 
keeping up with workload and even perceived self-preservation. 
 “So, everyone forgot about everything else. Everyone went into self-
preservation mode, ‘Let’s all wear this PPE’, you know concerned about H1N1, not 
thinking, ‘Do they have MRSA’?” P2 
 
“I mean, it either gives the staff a hell of a lot more work and it makes them 
frightened and it makes the visitors frightened; it makes the patients frightened.” P3 
 
Combined with challenges of outbreaks in general, the specific pathogens 
responsible for outbreaks presented their own challenges. With each participant from 
a different hospital, each facility appeared to have a particularly problematic HAI. 
“Basically from May 2009 through to September 2010 – it’s interesting that it 
coincides with the H1NI – the hospital saw a gradual increase in its overall MRSA 
numbers.” P2 
 
“We had a VRE outbreak. So, it’s actually for this great range, basically. We 
are still getting VRE, but we have suppressed it, but we have had about four/five 
waves of an outbreak during that time.” P1  
 
“The first one [VRE] was in August of 2009 and it went to about, oh, 
May/June. It was still going when I came. Oh, it was huge for us. And then we had 
another one about the same time in 2010… Yeah, about the same time in 2010, about 
August/September.” P4 
 
Despite outbreaks and their corresponding pathogens being particularly 
challenging to infection control, participants also observed outbreaks to have a 
constructive influence. Outbreaks of HAI often require prompt control methods that 
can be “ad hoc”, they also highlight the importance of infection control and the 
resources required to respond appropriately. Outbreaks can often lead to “buy in” from 
infection control into ward areas, which allows for education and the ability to increase 
the profile of infection control. 
“So, all of these things leads to us having engagement with the clinical areas.” 
P2 
 
“We find we get a bit of buy-in from getting the person from the area to 
actually engage with us, rather than doing it outside, from the outside perspective.” 
P1 
 Participants identified that staff engagement is a critical aspect of effective 
infection control, when coupled with the execution of effective management strategies 
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to combat HAIs. Infection control CNCs detailed the constructive influence of 
outbreaks based upon the ability to move forward with infection control practice and 
the ability to highlight the need for resources through reporting. 
“Usually, if we have an outbreak, it assists in the intervention. It assists for the 
strategies that we have been trying to put in place, or that should have been there, to 
bring them to the fore, and we get better co-operation.” P3 
 
“It leads to a more robust discussion, because every time we send out a report 
it goes out to the organisation and everybody else sees each other’s data. So, people 
are more interested in improving their indicator, but also talking about it, both 
within the clinical areas and to us.”  P1 
 
The findings highlight that outbreaks had a very powerful influence over 
infection control: however, an interesting point is that while they were challenging, 
they did appear to at times have a constructive influence. In particular, policy 
development is often created in response to an outbreak. 
Moving to a solution 
 The second theme identified related to moving towards solving the issue of 
HAI and associated outbreaks. This theme became evident when participants shared 
perceptions on one element, which led them to discuss other elements. It did appear 
that the concepts of outbreaks and infection control interventions tended to “overlap” 
at times, and they were more often discussed in unison as opposed to two separate 
entities. The theme of moving towards a solution encompassed the codes of 
impediments to moving forward, empowering solutions, the importance of the 
intervention itself, changing practice, and monitoring effectiveness. 
Infection control CNCs described the importance of developing solutions to 
outbreaks, however, they also articulated that this was often quite difficult with 
“barriers” to effectively instituting solutions being a problem that needed to be 
addressed. These impediments often involved the cost, and required resources of 
dealing with and preventing outbreaks. 
 “It costs too much (laughs). We can. We can. They actually have the 
infrastructure in place to do it, but it costs too much.” P1 
 
“…unless [the] executive can give you money and resources, you know, for 
staffing – a lot of the things that they want us to do, we say, ‘We just don’t have the 
manual labour resource. We need more staff.’” P4 
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Participants identified that staffing issues, including culture and resistance to 
change, were an issue when trying to move towards a solution. 
When you are in there and you are saying, ‘Look, your rates have gone up. 
Here, we will swab you, we will do this. We are watching you do this. We are 
watching you clean. We are watching you’ – you know, there’s a lot of tension/focus 
on those rates. When we go away, they go back to old habits.” P2 
 
“Whereas in general areas they rotate staff all the time and people have got [a] 
day off, you get new staff/casuals who don’t work regularly. So, they don’t get that 
ownership”. P1 
 
While the issue of implementing infection control interventions was challenging 
for some at times, the participants acknowledged that many empowering solutions 
(other than hand hygiene) were at the fore front. These solutions involved education, 
training, and communication, screening, cleaning, and protocols. 
 “So, we developed that little booklet, which at first, it was just going to be 
for whoever we did induction for; but then we just take it with us whenever we go 
and do in-service on any ward, and leave a few lying around the place.” P4 
 
“…We screen them on admission and we get 100 percent screening… 
screening inter-hospital transfers.” P2 
  
“We follow all – whenever CHRISP puts out a protocol, we adapt and follow 
that.” P2 
 
While infection control was discussed in general by the participants, it was 
interesting to note that interventions in isolation were raised as being important, and 
hence, the “intervention itself” was vital. Interventions did not just pertain to specific 
tasks, but staffing and policy were also raised as important.  
“…we looked at different timelines that we implemented and it looks like the sodium 
chloride actually made a big difference, and we have a statistical difference with 
that.” P1 
 
“I think a lot of the things that we did with VRE have made a difference, but I 
suppose the biggest thing for us that seems to have made a difference is probably the 
environmental stuff.” P1 
 
It was evident in the interview transcripts that infection control and the 
implementation of interventions was a dynamic process. Moving towards a solution is 
a constantly changing process. 
“… we changed over our procedures to be the I-Care Practices, and you 
know, did a small amount of promotion.” P2 
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“We developed an action plan with them. So, that was looking at identifying 
change agents within the population, up skilling those change agents, and supporting 
them to engage their staff.” P1 
 
Lastly, monitoring the effectiveness of solutions to HAI was vital to the prevention 
and treatment. It appeared that in order to ascertain the effectiveness of strategies a 
formal evaluation process was often necessary. 
“Well, at the end of each intervention, whether it be an outbreak management 
or an actual specific intervention for an increased organism, we go through a review 
period at the end of it.” P2 
 
“Well, we do – formally, we do a three monthly report.” P3 
 
The Leximancer and manual thematic analysis results verified major concepts 
and themes (see Figure 4.5 and Figure 4.6). 
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Figure 4.5 Visual Representation of Leximancer and Thematic Analysis for “The Power of Outbreaks Theme”. 
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Figure 4.6 Visual Representation of Leximancer and Thematic Analysis for “Moving to a Solution”. 
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While these approaches were different, some of the themes and concepts 
produced from Leximancer could be linked with the codes of themes of thematic 
analysis. The “power of outbreaks” theme connected with Leximancer themes of 
“outbreaks”, “infection”, “change”, “staff”, “time”, “change”, “VRE”, and “MRSA”. 
The theme of “moving to a solution” related to themes in Leximancer including 
“change”, “education”, “implemented”, “program”, “hygiene”, “reporting”, and 
“CHRISP”. 
Results from the visual timeline were used in collaboration with the Leximancer 
results to identify potential outbreaks and interventions that needed to be explored in 
the survey. Tables 4.2 and 4.3 detail a list of the outbreaks of HAIs and implemented 
infection control interventions/policies that were identified in the visual timeline for 
each hospital. Data from the timelines are reported collectively (the outbreaks and 
interventions are listed in no particular order).  
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Table 4.3 Collective Interventions Identified from the Four Visual Timelines 
 
Results from the collective timelines (see Tables 4.2 and 4.3) showed that 
identified outbreaks were a combination of pathogens, including multi-resistant 
organisms (MROs) such as VRE, MRSA, ESBL and CRAB. VRE and MRSA were 
collectively identified as the most prevalent and significant outbreaks by participants. 
The interventions identified varied; however, cleaning interventions appeared to be 
prominent, as out of the twenty-one interventions that were collectively identified, 
three specifically related to cleaning the environment. None of the other interventions 
were related to each other. 
4.2.3 Discussion 
Results from the interviews in Phase 1 highlighted the complex field of infection 
control, the varied nature of HAIs and the large scope of interventions being 
implemented to address the issue of HAIs in public hospitals in the pilot state. While 
Leximancer can produce themes that are generated quickly and free of human bias 
(Leximancer, 2015), manual thematic analysis enables the researcher to become closer 
to the data and provide a richness that may otherwise be overlooked with computer 
Interventions 
Screening/surveillance of HAI 
PPE 
Outbreak management plan 
BSI related interventions 
Quarantining  




Environmental cleaning of HAI areas 
Cleaning solution change 
Swabbing contaminated rooms 





CHRISP (State governing body programs) 
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software analyses alone (Braun & Clarke, 2006). The dual qualitative analyses enabled 
the verification of themes and concepts. The thematic analysis revealed that outbreaks 
had a very powerful influence over infection control and healthcare, however, at times 
they could in fact be a constructive influence, this was supported in the review of the 
literature, where a number of studies discussed the implementation of control strategies 
and the development of infection control policy as the result of an outbreak. Despite 
the challenges of outbreaks, moving to a solution appeared to be a major focus of 
infection control, with many empowering solutions reaching the forefront through 
empowering ideas and effective evaluation. Pathogens responsible for HAI outbreaks, 
as indicated in Leximancer and visual timeline findings, varied and included MROs 
(VRE, MRSA, ESBL, and CRAB) and HAIs that may have initially originated from 
the community (Norovirus, influenza A/H1N1, measles, and tuberculosis), as well as 
HAIs that can potentially develop due to treatment; specifically, Clostridium difficile 
from antibiotic use. Interestingly, it appeared that in relation to outbreaks, all 
individual hospitals tended to have difficult HAIs. These included a specific pathogen 
and were all identified as MROs; three hospitals indicated VRE as a major issue, and 
another hospital indicated MRSA. These particular MROs were indicated as themes in 
each the four Leximancer concept maps. Each of these identified MROs overlapped 
their theme bubbles to other themes in the concept maps including month, issues, time, 
nursing, hand, report, and hygiene. These maps also highlighted the interchangeable 
relationship between an identified HAI and interventions in a hospital. For example, 
in Hospital Four (see Figure 4.4) VRE in its own theme bubble was connected to 
outbreak, hospital, change, screening, patients, huge, and infection. These connections 
highlight that VRE was related to an outbreak and a change in screening patients 
emphasised the scope of the problem. The Leximancer and visual timeline results 
underscored the importance of investigating the prevalence of particular HAIs in the 
survey separately, in a section dedicated to outbreaks. As outbreaks are a prominent 
problem, and are varied in regards to pathogens, each hospital tends to have different 
issues, and outbreaks are often linked into specific interventions and practices. 
Furthermore, results showed that specific interventions, although incredibly 
varied and at times broad, were able to be identified as HAI surveillance or patient 
screening, environmental cleaning, environmental surveillance/screening, 
quarantining/isolation, antibiotic stewardship, hand-wash solution, utilisation of 
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alcohol based hand rub, intravascular device care (BSI interventions), and state body 
programs and education. Some interventions, identified through the nexus of 
Leximancer and visual time line analysis, were recognised as requiring more detail in 
the online survey. These included environmental surveillance/screening, HAI 
surveillance/screening, quarantining, and cleaning. Change and time were indicated as 
either themes or connected concepts in the Leximancer output, thus indicating that the 
time of an outbreak, intervention, or change was an important factor for HAIs in 
hospitals. As such, the type of intervention or outbreak, specific dates of outbreaks, 
and implementation of interventions were included in the Phase 2 survey.  
4.2.4 Survey Tool Development 
A review of the literature identified no available survey instrument that would 
enable the researcher to answer the research questions and test the hypothesis of this 
study. As such, the development of an online survey tool, based on the above findings 
from Phase 1, and a review of the current literature, NHMRC infection control 
guidelines, NSQHSS: Standard Three, and findings from the interviews in this phase 
was required. It was recommended by Ritter and Sue (2007) that a three-step process 
be undertaken when developing a survey instrument. The three steps include 
identification of the domains of the content of interest, item generation for the domains 
of interest, and instrument formation. Identification of the content of interest was based 
on information identified in the literature as being important to HAIs, including 
outbreaks and interventions aimed at addressing HAIs, and findings from the 
interviews in this phase. The interviews highlighted the varied nature of outbreaks and 
wide scope of interventions (see Tables 4.2 and 4.3). The survey questions (item 
generation) were developed based on the identified key concepts and themes, 
specifically including the “power of outbreaks” and “moving to a solution” in the 
interviews (as identified in Leximancer and the visual timeline responses) with the aim 
of extracting measureable data in relation to HAI prevention strategies (interventions) 
and outbreaks of HAIs across Australian public hospitals. Consequently, the survey 
was broken into sections relating to two types of events: outbreaks and interventions 
(note: some questions asked in the survey were relevant to the parent study and not to 
the current study). See Appendix 6 for the survey for the pilot state. 
Key Survey Version 8.2 was the online survey software utilised for instrument 
formation and online distribution. The existing template from Key Survey was used as 
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a framework, and adjustments were made in order to facilitate extra information, 
improve usability, aesthetics, and readability.  
4.2.5 Summary 
The findings of Phase 1 provided the researcher with information to enable the 
development of an online survey for Phase 2. Specifically, it identified particular 
outbreaks and interventions that needed to be investigated, and highlighted the 
importance of having separate sections in the survey pertaining to outbreaks and then 
interventions. The content of the survey instrument was informed by a combination of 
literature, NHMRC infection control guidelines, NSQHSS: Standard Three, and the 
results of Phase 1.  
4.3 PHASE 2 PART A RESULTS 
The results for Phase 2 Part A are presented below and detail the findings in 
relation to the participant characteristics and the two overarching research questions 
separately, for the pilot survey in the pilot state.  
4.3.1 Participant Characteristics 
Of the nine participants invited to participate, six completed the survey, giving 
a response rate of 66.7%. Participants recruited were linked to the parent study 
(NHHIEP) in the pilot state (Queensland) and included five females and one male. Of 
the three CNCs who did not participate, one indicated that they felt “too new” to 
infection control, another was time poor, and one did not respond. Participants’ years 
of experience in the field of infection control varied from 2-20 years (mean 11.8 years, 
SD 5.36 years). Excluding data from the scale opinion questions, data generated from 
the six participants related to HAI outbreaks and interventions in their respective 
hospitals.  
4.3.2 What outbreaks of HAI occurred in Australian public hospitals over the 
seven-year period from January 2005–December 2011? 
Results showed that 100% of participants had experienced an outbreak of HAI 
in their hospital within the timeframe from January 2005–August 2012 (amended from 
2011 as dates up to August 2012 were supplied). Of the nine HAIs explored in the 
survey, findings showed that the participants’ respective hospitals had experienced 
outbreaks of four of the nine (see Figure 4.7). These outbreaks included VRE, MRSA, 
ESBL and “other”. VRE was the most prevalent type of outbreak with 83.3% (5/6) of 
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hospitals having experienced an outbreak, followed by “other” 66.6% (4/6), MRSA 
50% (3/6), and ESBL 16.6% (1/6). There were no outbreaks of MSSA, SAB, 
Clostridium difficile (C.Diff), CRAB and CRPA during the timeframes. 
 
 
Figure 4.7 Percentage of hospitals where an outbreak occurred between January 2005–August 2012 
(n=6) 
 
The six participants identified the top five most serious outbreaks of HAIs in 
their hospital; where outbreak one was the most severe and outbreak five was the least 
severe (see Figure 4.8). Results given by participants included outbreaks up to August 
2012 and showed that for outbreak one (the most severe) Norovirus was the most 
frequently reported HAI across the participant’s hospitals (50%; 3/6). This was 
followed by VRE (33.3%; 2/6) and MRSA (16.7%; 1/6). The second most severe 
outbreak was reported as Norovirus and MRSA (33.3%; 2/5). Influenza was also 
identified as an outbreak (16.7 %; 1/6). The third most severe HAI outbreaks identified 
were MRSA, VRE, Norovirus and other (Measles). Each response shared a percentage 
of 16.7% (1/6) each. Missing data accounted for 33.3% (2/6) in total. Results for the 
fourth most severe outbreak indicated Norovirus and VRE as the most frequent HAIs, 
each accounted for 33.3% (2/6) of outbreaks and missing data accounted for 33.3% 
(2/6) in total. The least severe outbreak included MRSA, VRE, and other (Serratia), 
which each accounted for 16.7%. One particular hospital did not experience a fifth 
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(1/6). Missing data accounted for 33.3% (2/6). Outbreaks of a variety of HAIs were 
identified by participants, however, Norovirus and VRE appeared to be quite frequent.  
 
 
Figure 4.8 Responses for the “Five most serious outbreaks in the pilot survey” 
 
The effect of outbreaks and their association with infection control was explored 
through the use of scale items. Responses for each item were averaged for the six 
participants in order to be attributed to a corresponding scale number from 1 – 7 (see 
Table 4.4 for average scores and corresponding scale responses). The higher the score 
the more strongly participants agreed with a statement. Results highlighted that 
participants agreed that the development of infection control policy was affected by 
outbreaks (see Table 4.4). This was evident based on their responses, where they 
somewhat disagreed that there was no relationship between outbreaks and infection 
control policy, somewhat agreed that outbreaks assisted the development of infection 
control policy, and agreed that outbreaks provided a good opportunity to move forward 
with infection control policies.  
The results also highlighted that outbreaks affected the workload of infection 
control. Participants indicated that they disagreed that outbreaks made little difference 
to infection control activities, agreed that outbreaks delayed normal day-to-day 
infection control work, and somewhat agreed that staff worked harder to ensure other 
 96 Chapter 4: Results 
infection control work was done during an outbreak. Despite this, they agreed that their 
hospital was prepared for an outbreak  
Lastly, responses indicated that participants agreed that outbreaks lead to staff 
being more engaged in infection control work. Participants indicated that they 
somewhat agreed that outbreaks led to extra effort to ensure infection control work 
was completed and in general they also agreed that an outbreak raised awareness of 
infection control, despite indicating that they somewhat agreed that outbreaks had a 
negative effect on staff morale. 
Table 4.4 Participants Mean response to scale questions regarding the relationship between outbreaks 
and infection control (n=6) 
Scale Item Mean Score 
(range 1-7, SD) 
There is no relationship between outbreaks and infection 
control policy. 
2.7, 2.3 
Outbreaks assist the development of infection control 
policies. 
5.2, 1.2 
An outbreak provides a good opportunity to move forward 
other infection control policies. 
5.5, 1.8 
During an outbreak staff work harder to ensure other 
infection control work is done. 
5.0, 1.1 
 
Outbreaks delay normal day-to-day infection control work. 6.3, 0.5 
Most outbreaks make little difference to infection control 
activities. 
1.9, 0.8 
My hospital is prepared for an outbreak 5.6, 0.5 
Outbreaks have a negative effect on staff morale. 5.2, 1.7 
When there is an outbreak I make an extra effort to ensure 
infection control work is completed. 
4.5, 2.1 
An outbreak raises the awareness of infection control. 6.7, 0.5 
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4.3.3 What infection control interventions aimed at reducing HAIs, were 
implemented in Australian public hospitals over the seven-year period 
from January 2005–December 2011? 
The top three interventions implemented were patient screening, environmental 
cleaning, and cleaning audits with 100% (6/6) of surveyed hospitals indicating “Yes” 
to implementing the intervention in the relevant timeframe. Hand wash solution, 
isolation of colonised/infected patients, and ABHR followed with 83.3 % (5/6). Visitor 
dispensers and personal protective equipment (PPE) were implemented by 66.7% (4/6) 
of hospitals, environmental surveillance, and sterilisation procedures in 50% (3/6), and 
finally antibiotic stewardship and “other” in 16.7% (1/6) (see Table 4.5). 
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Table 4.5 Infection control interventions implemented in hospitals between January 2005 – August 
2012 (n=6) 
Intervention Frequency  %  
 
Cleaning audits 6 100 
Environmental cleaning  6 100 
Patient screening 6 100 
ABHR 5 83.3 
Hand wash solution 5 83.3 
Isolation of colonised patients 5 83.3 
Personal protective equipment 4 66.7 
Visitor dispensers 4 66.7 
Environmental surveillance 3 50 
Sterilisation procedures 3 50 
Antibiotic stewardship 1 16.7 
Other intervention 1 16.7 
 
An intervention may change somewhat after implementation and this change 
may in turn be responsible for effecting the rate of HAIs. The top interventions 
changed in terms of how they were conducted, between January 2005–August 2012 
(amended from 2011 as dates up to August 2012 were supplied), included patient 
screening, alcoholic based hand rub (ABHR), and environmental cleaning. Almost all 
hospitals changed these interventions (83.3% [5/6]). Change of the type of 
environmental cleaning solution for HAI areas was changed in 66.7% (4/6) of 
hospitals, followed by hand wash solution, visitor dispensers, and change of 
environmental cleaning solution for general areas with 50% (3/6). Intravascular devise 
versus blood stream infection intervention (IVD vs. BSI), cleaning audits, state body 
program, isolation of colonised patients, and quarantining of rooms were changed in 
33.3% (2/6) of hospitals, with personal protective equipment (PPE), HAI specific 
wards, and “other” in 16.7% (1/6). Antibiotic stewardship and sterilisation procedures 
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Table 4.6 Frequency of implemented interventions changed in hospitals between January 2005 – 
August 2012 (n=6) 
Intervention Frequency   
 
%  
Patient screening 5 83.3 
ABHR 5 83.3 
Environmental cleaning  5 83.3 
Change of environmental cleaning 
solution (HAI) 
4 66.7 
Hand wash solution 3 50.0 
Visitor dispensers 3 50.0 
Change of environmental cleaning 
solution (general) 
3 50.0 
BSI intervention 3 50.0 
Cleaning audits 2 33.3 
State body program 2 33.3 
Isolation of Colonised Patients 2 33.3 
Quarantining of rooms contaminated 
with HAI 
2 33.3 
Environmental surveillance 1 16.7 
Swabbing of contaminated bed areas 1 16.7 
Personal protective equipment 1 16.7 
HAI specific wards 1 16.7 
Other intervention 1 16.7 
Antibiotic stewardship 0 0.00 
Sterilisation procedures 0 0.00 
 
With regards to the type of HAIs hospitals surveyed/screened for, results showed 
that MRSA and VRE were the most frequently surveyed/screened HAIs with 100% 
(6/6) of hospitals conducting surveillance/screening (see Figure 4.9). This was 
followed by 33.3% (2/6) of hospitals surveying/screening for MSSA, SAB and ESBL. 
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C.Diff, CRAB, and CRPA were surveyed/screened in 16.6% (1/6) of hospitals. No 
other types of HAIs were identified as surveyed/screened. 
 
 
Figure 4.9 Bar Graph of % of hospitals where surveillance/screening patients for particular HAIs 
occurred 
4.3.4 Validity 
Survey validity was addressed by determining the participants’ perceptions of 
the degree of difficulty in completing the survey. Of the six participants, one indicated 
that the survey was somewhat easy, one indicated that the difficulty was neutral, two 
indicated that it was somewhat difficult and two indicated that it was difficult. 
Participants were also requested to provide feedback on the survey in a “free 
text” item at the end of the survey, by indicating which parts were difficult and why. 
Some key points included: 
x “Finding information” and “time” were “difficult”. 
x “Some of the terminology was off putting” 
x “Finding dates for implementation of the various strategies” and 
“outbreaks” was difficult. 
x “Historical questions” were difficult. 
x Some “wording” needed changing and some questions “required a number 
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x “Remembering the months of the year that programs/outbreaks or 
interventions occurred” was difficult and some answers were not “that 
simplistic to answer”. 
Participants were asked in the survey to supply their phone number in order to 
clarify any issues or feedback. Upon contact with the infection ontrol CNCs, it was 
clarified that the “wording” referred to “colonisation” versus “infection” and questions 
requiring more detail specifically related to surveillance of HAIs, along with the 
indication of some interventions, which had not been asked in the pilot. 
4.3.5 Phase 2 Part A Discussion  
Although the survey sample in this pilot phase was small, the participants had 
experience in the field of infection control and were working in this specialist field, 
and thus, were best positioned to provide accurate responses. Furthermore, historical 
quantitative data (able to be retrieved from records) was required and not specialist in-
depth knowledge on one particular topic.   
The occurrence of an outbreak of HAI was indicated in 100% of the participants’ 
respective hospitals. This highlighted that outbreaks were an important issue in the 
pilot survey hospitals, and therefore, the respective state. The review of the literature 
highlighted that no study had been undertaken in Australia to highlight the overall 
prevalence of outbreaks of HAIs in Australian public hospitals. Although the sample 
in the pilot state was restricted to six hospitals, these six included the major tertiary 
referral hospitals in the state.  
The HAIs specifically identified in the pilot survey were included based on their 
identification as common and/or problematic by the CDC (2012), WHO (2002), and 
CHRISP (2012). Of these, VRE was indicated as the most frequently identified HAI, 
with 83.3 % (5/6) of participants indicating that an outbreak of VRE had occurred, this 
was followed by “other” and MRSA (see Figure 4.5). Interestingly, when participants 
were asked to identify the five most serious outbreaks of HAI in their hospital (listing 
outbreak one as the most serious and outbreak five as the least serious, see Figure 4.6), 
HAIs not specifically identified in the items were reported as being frequent in 100% 
(6/6) of the five most serious outbreaks. While VRE was indicated in 83.3% (5/6) of 
the five most serious outbreaks, it became obvious that Norovirus was also frequently 
responsible for HAI outbreaks. Upon further exploration of the results, it became 
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evident that Norovirus was the most frequently reported outbreak of HAI overall for 
the five most serious outbreaks (see Figure 4.6). In addition to its frequency Norovirus 
was also indicated as the number one most serious outbreak of HAI in the pilot survey, 
with 50% (3/6) of participants indicating that this virus was the most serious HAI 
outbreak between January 2005–December 2012. These results highlighted that not 
only was Norovirus frequently identified as being responsible for outbreaks of HAI in 
the piloted state, it was also considered serious. Consequently, the researcher 
specifically added Norovirus into the list of HAIs asked about in the National Survey, 
as opposed to it being classified to as “other”. Interestingly, Norovirus was not 
highlighted in the literature as being a particularly problematic HAI, perhaps it has 
been overlooked. While there are numerous isolated cases of various HAIs identified 
in the literature, these constitute a plethora of publications addressing single outbreaks. 
No study has addressed what outbreaks of HAIs are actually occurring and 
consequently it is not possible to identify which specific HAIs are a problem in 
Australia. Results from the pilot survey indicate that outbreaks of HAIs frequently 
occur in Australian public hospitals, and VRE and Norovirus are particular pathogens 
that warrant further investigation. 
Participants’ opinions on outbreaks and their effect on infection control were 
explored in scale items. Overall results showed agreement that outbreaks led to the 
development of an infection control policy, increased the workload of infection 
control, and made staff more engaged in infection control work. However, these results 
should be taken with caution as they are representative of a small sample size.  
Three interventions were identified as being most frequently implemented in the 
study timeframe, these were patient surveillance/screening for HAIs, cleaning audits, 
and environmental cleaning. Both environmental cleaning and surveillance/screening 
of patients for HAIs were supported in the literature as being successful interventions 
to reduce the occurrence of HAIs. Environmental cleaning was supported by Rutala 
and Weber (2011) who suggested that the cleaning of HAI contaminated surfaces with 
hypochlorite solutions resulted in a decreased incidence of the spread of HAIs; Dancer 
(2009) who indicated that there was some merit in environmental cleaning strategies 
for reducing HAIs in particular and suggested this intervention was particularly 
important for controlling outbreaks; and Dancer et al. (2007) who indicated that the 
use of environmental cleaning strategies reduced bacterial load; however, the authors 
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found no difference between particular cleaning strategies. HAI surveillance/screening 
was supported by Jefferson et al. (2011) with the authors indicating that compliance 
with surveillance programs was essential for HAI prevention. In contrast, Avicolli et 
al. (2007) indicated that surveillance was important; however, the authors specifically 
stated that the use of other measures, such as droplet and contact precautions, had more 
merit in reducing HAIs. While cleaning audits was not discussed in the review of the 
literature, it was noted to be of importance in the Phase 1 interviews.  
Interestingly, patient surveillance/screening and environmental cleaning were 
supported by Australian governing healthcare organisations, both the NHMRC (2010) 
and ACSQHC (2011); thus, suggesting that the implementation of interventions may 
be strongly influenced by infection control governing bodies. However, while 
antibiotic stewardship was supported by the NHMRC (2010) and ACSQHC (2011), 
this particular intervention was only indicated as having been implemented by one of 
the participants.  
The study also investigated which interventions had been changed in terms of 
how they were conducted after implementation. Interestingly, the top three 
interventions to be changed once implemented were patient surveillance/screening for 
HAIs, environmental cleaning and the use of AHBR all with 83.3% (5/6). This 
suggests that once implemented prominent interventions are dynamic and can be 
altered in terms of how they are conducted. 
The results for implemented interventions indicated that a variety of 
interventions had been implemented with varying frequency. As such, it appeared that 
overall there was no standardised approach to the implementation of interventions 
aimed at reducing HAIs. It appeared in the review of the literature that the 
implementation of infection control interventions were often “ad hoc”, particularly 
after the occurrence of an outbreak of HAI. This may be influenced by the outbreaks 
themselves, as highlighted in the review of the literature, which indicated that often 
interventions are often “targeted” and involve a “clustered approach” where a number 
of interventions are implemented at once in order to deal with an outbreak and then 
prevent it in the future. 
Face validity of the instrument was tested by asking participants to rate the 
difficulty of the survey and to provide feedback. It was noted by the participants that 
it was difficult to remember historical information, which may be why this sort of 
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research had not been conducted before. The problem of recall bias, related to 
obtaining historical data from research participants, was highlighted in the literature 
by Bardsley et al. (2009) who aimed to ascertain what processes and policies employed 
by health service trusts in the UK were associated with a reduction in the rate of HAIs. 
The authors found that the need for participants to recall historical data lead to a large 
amount of missing responses to the survey they employed in order to answer their 
research question. In order to resolve the issue of recall bias in the current study the 
participants were encouraged to access records relating to outbreaks of HAIs and the 
implementation of interventions.   
4.3.6 Survey Amendment 
Results from content validity questions highlighted that some wording in the 
survey needed to be changed and some interventions were more complex in the real 
clinical world than the options in the survey could capture, this specifically related to 
the surveillance/screening of HAIs.  
Based on the pilot survey feedback and due to the poor response to some of the 
intervention questions, the survey was revised and amended. Missing data specifically 
included identification of some outbreaks and dates, and some interventions and dates; 
however, missing data was more frequent in the interventions section. Some items of 
the survey were moved to more appropriate sections of the survey to allow for better 
flow. This included the denominators items (relevant to the overarching study) and the 
“most significant event in infection control” (relevant to the overarching study) item, 
which instead of being at the beginning of the survey were both moved to the end.  The 
scale items relating to outbreaks and their relationship with infection control were 
moved from the end of the survey to just after the outbreaks questions. The outbreaks 
section was generally well answered with less missing data. Excluding the introduction 
of Norovirus as a HAI option (due to its frequency in the five most significant 
outbreaks in the pilot survey) the outbreaks section remained unchanged for the Phase 
2 Part B National Survey,  
Changes to items in the survey specifically related to the interventions section, 
which was changed to provide a clearer question structure, more detailed options and 
the addition of items and the removal of others. It was ensured that the correct 
terminology was used when asking about interventions relating to patients with a HAI 
to include “colonised” and not just “infected” where relevant. It was noted in the pilot 
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that the “matrix” table questions, which were a cluster of a number of questions in one 
table, were better responded to rather than individual questions. As such, the 
interventions section of the national survey was amended to include four major matrix 
tables instead of two. The matrix tables were broken into four major categories 
including patient-focused interventions, hand hygiene interventions, cleaning and 
surveillance interventions, and HAI surveillance. The matrix tables had the advantage 
of making the survey appear smaller in size, despite asking about a larger number of 
interventions in the national survey. Interventions added into the national survey 
included patient dedicated or single-use equipment, patient bathing solution, contact 
precautions, droplet precautions, air and water filters, and more specific environmental 
cleaning questions. The state body program item was omitted from the national survey, 
as this was too broad.   
The surveillance/screening of HAIs item was changed from asking about 
specific MROs to asking about the surveillance/screening of specific at risk patient 
populations; this was indicated as being more relevant based on the feedback from the 
infection control CNCs. The demographics section remained unchanged and the 
feedback section relating to ease/difficulty of the survey to complete was removed. 
The revised survey, known as the “National Infection Control Survey” (see 
Appendix 10), was not sent back to the pilot state. This decision was made by the 
researcher and supervisory team because of the time already provided by the 
participants in completing the detailed survey in this phase. The survey proved to be 
time consuming, as it required detailed and time-specific information. In addition to 
this, participants from Phase 2 Part A of this study were still recruited to complete 
other surveys for the parent study and may have experienced “survey fatigue” (Polit 
& Beck, 2010), as such there was concern about over-surveying an expert but small 
group of clinicians. 
4.3.7 Summary 
The purpose of Phase 2 Part A was to distribute the survey developed from Phase 
1 to the pilot state in order to explore outbreaks of HAIs and infection control 
interventions aimed at reducing HAIs. Six infection control CNCs, each from a 
separate hospital in the pilot state, completed the survey. The results obtained reflected 
the issue of HAIs in the participants’ respective hospitals, along with their opinion on 
the relationship between outbreaks and infection control. Results showed that hospitals 
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in the pilot state had all experienced outbreaks; the pathogens responsible included 
MROs, particularly VRE and MRSA. Other types of HAIs including Influenza, 
Measles, Serratia and Norovirus were also indicated. Norovirus in particular was very 
prevalent and often scored as the most severe in the top five outbreaks, making it an 
HAI to be specifically explored in the National Survey. The interventions implemented 
were varied; however, the most prevalent proved to be patient surveillance/screening, 
environmental cleaning, and cleaning audits. Results also highlighted that once 
implemented interventions were often changed in terms of how they were conducted. 
Feedback from the participants indicated that the survey was generally somewhat 
difficult to complete. Responses to the interventions section were often poor and as 
such, the survey instrument was amended. Modification to the interventions section 
was undertaken and it was determined that to re-pilot the amended survey to the pilot 
state would be inappropriate due to survey fatigue and difficulty relating to 
participants’ ability to provide retrospective information and dates. Overall, the survey 
instrument was satisfactory in obtaining the relevant information for outbreaks, but 
required some adjustments to the interventions section before it could be rolled out 
nationally. 
4.4 PHASE 2 PART B RESULTS 
The results for Phase 2 Part B are presented below and detail the findings in 
relation to the participant characteristics, the two overarching research questions, and 
testing of the null hypothesis.  
4.4.1 Participant Characteristics 
Of the 41 participants invited to participate, 29 completed the survey, giving a 
response rate of 70.7%. Of the 41 recruited hospitals, 12 declined to participate. Three 
participants indicated they were time poor and therefore unable to complete the survey 
(one specifically related this to hospital accreditation). One participant did not have 
access to the data required to complete the survey, two commenced the survey but did 
not complete it, and one requested an extension of time to complete but did not 
commence the survey. Another participant indicated that they felt the survey was “too 
similar” to other surveys they had recently completed for the overarching parent study 
and one participant indicated to research staff that despite being the infection control 
CNC they did not feel they were the “right” person to complete the study. Three 
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participants were still completing other surveys for the overarching parent study and 
were therefore unable to complete the survey relevant to this study.  
The sample was comprised of 29 females and zero males. Participants’ years of 
experience in the field of infection control varied from one to 35 years (mean 13.17 
years, SD 9.02 years). Excluding data from the scale opinion questions, data generated 
from the 41 participants relates to HAI outbreaks and interventions in their respective 
hospitals.  
4.4.2 What outbreaks of HAI occurred in Australian public hospitals over the 
seven-year period from January 2005–December 2011? 
Results showed that 96.6% (28) of the 29 participants indicated that an outbreak 
of HAI had occurred in their hospital in the timeframe frame of January 2005–
December 2012 (amended from 2011 as dates up to December 2012 were supplied). 
Of the ten HAIs explored in the survey, findings showed that the participants’ 
respective hospitals had outbreaks of nine of the ten HAIs (see Figure 4.10). These 
outbreaks included Norovirus, VRE, Other, MRSA ESBL, SAB, CRPA, CRAB and 
C.Diff.  Norovirus was the most prevalent type of outbreak with 89.7% (26/29) of 
participants’ hospitals having an outbreak, followed by VRE 55.2 (16/29), other 44.8 
(13/29), MRSA 34.5% (10/29), ESBL 13.8% (2/29), SAB 3.4% (1/29), CRPA 3.4% 
(1/29), CRAB 3.4% (1/29) and C.Diff 3.4 (1/29). There were no outbreaks of MSSA. 
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Figure 4.10 Percentage of hospitals where an outbreak occurred between January 2005–December 
2012 (n=29) 
 
Participants identified the top five most serious outbreaks of HAIs in their 
hospital; with outbreak one the most severe and outbreak five the least severe (see 
Figure 4.11). If participants indicated N/A this meant that an outbreak had not 
occurred. Results included outbreaks up to December 2012 and showed that for 
outbreak one, Norovirus was the most frequently reported HAI across the participants’ 
hospitals (41.1%; 12/29). This was followed by VRE (24.1%; 7/29), other (10.3%; 
3/29) and ESBL (6.9%; 2/29). Five hospitals indicated N/A for an outbreak (17.2%, 
5/29).  
Figure 4.11 summarises the five most serious HAIs identified during the period 
2005-2012. From this data, it is evident the most frequent HAI outbreak in the hospitals 
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Figure 4.11 Responses for the “Five most serious outbreaks in the National survey” 
 
The effect of outbreaks and their association with infection control was explored 
through the use of scale items. Participants’ responses were averaged in order to be 
attributed to a corresponding scale number from 1 – 7 (see Table 4.7 for average scores 
and corresponding scale responses). The higher the score, the more strongly 
participants agreed with a statement, ranging from 1 strongly disagree to 7 strongly 
agree. Results highlighted that participants agreed that the development of an infection 
control policy was affected by outbreaks (see Table 4.7). This was evident based on 
their responses to the policy domain questions, where they somewhat disagreed that 
there was no relationship between outbreaks and infection control policy. They agreed 
that outbreaks assisted the development of an infection control policy and somewhat 
agreed that outbreaks provided a good opportunity to move forward with infection 
control policies.  
It was also highlighted that outbreaks affected the workload of infection control. 
Participants indicated that they disagreed that outbreaks made little difference to 
infection control activities and agreed that outbreaks delayed normal day-to-day 
infection control work. They somewhat agreed that staff worked harder to ensure other 
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infection control work was done during an outbreak. Despite this, they agreed that their 
hospital was prepared for an outbreak  
Lastly, responses indicate that participants agreed that outbreaks led to staff 
being more engaged in infection control work. Participants indicated that they 
somewhat agreed that outbreaks led to extra effort to ensure infection control work 
was completed and in general they also agreed that an outbreak raised awareness of 
infection control, despite indicating that they agreed that outbreaks had a negative 
effect on staff morale. 
Table 4.7 Participants mean response to scale questions regarding the relationship between outbreaks 
and infection control (n=29) 
Scale Item Domain Mean Score 
(range 1-7, SD) 
There is no relationship between outbreaks and 
infection control policies. 
Policy 2.8, 2.03 
Outbreaks assist the development of infection 
control policies. 
Policy 5.6, 1.2 
An outbreak provides a good opportunity to 
move forward other infection control policies. 
Policy 5.1, 1.5 
During an outbreak staff work harder to ensure 
other infection control work is done. 
Workload 5.4, 1.7 
 
Outbreaks delay normal day-to-day infection 
control work. 
Workload 6.3, 1.4 
Most outbreaks make little difference to 
infection control activities. 
Workload 1.9, 1.4 
My hospital is prepared for an outbreak Workload 5.6, 1.1 
Outbreaks have a negative effect on staff 
morale. 
Staff 5.6, 1.3 
When there is an outbreak I make an extra effort 
to ensure infection control work is completed. 
Staff 4.8, 1.7 
An outbreak raises the awareness of infection 
control. 
Staff 6.4, 0.7 
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4.4.3 What infection control interventions aimed at reducing HAIs were 
implemented in Australian public hospitals over a seven-year period 
from January 2005–December 2011? 
Results for interventions implemented or changed between January 2005– 
December 2012 (amended from 2011 as dates up to December 2012 were supplied) 
did have some missing data. The top implemented/changed intervention was visitor 
dispensers, with 93.1% of participants indicating “Yes” to implementation or change 
in the time frame. IVD vs BSI intervention was implemented or changed in 82.2% of 
hospitals, ABHR in 75.9%, antibiotic stewardship in 62.1%, isolation of colonised 
patients and environmental cleaning of HAI area in 58.6%, routine environmental 
cleaning in 55.2%, “other” interventions and patient bathing solution in 48.3%, 
cleaning audits in 44.8%, cohorting of colonised patients with the same strain of HAI 
37.9%, contact precautions and hand wash solution in 31%, droplet precautions in 
27.6%, swabbing of contaminated bed areas in 13.8%, sterilisation procedures in 
10.3%, and air and water filters in 9.5% (see Table 4.8 for intervention frequencies 
and percentages ). 
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Table 4.8 Infection control interventions implemented/changed in hospitals between January 2005 – 
August 2012 (n=29) 




Visitor dispensers 27 93.1 
IVD vs BSI intervention 25 86.2 
ABHR 22 75.9 
Antibiotic stewardship 18 62.1 
Isolation of colonised patients 17 58.6 
Environmental cleaning of HAI area 17 58.6 
Routine environmental cleaning  16 55.2 
Other intervention 15 48.3 
Patient bathing solution  14 48.3 
Cleaning audits 13 44.8 
Cohorting of colonised patients with the 
same strain of HAI. 
11 37.9 
Patient dedicated/single use equipment 11 37.9 
Contact precautions 9 31.0 
Hand wash solution 9 31.0 
Droplet precautions 8 27.6 
Swabbing of contaminated bed areas 4 13.8 
Sterilisation procedures 3  10.3 
Air and water Filters 2  9.5 
 
Results relating to the routine surveillance/screening of HAIs investigated the 
surveillance/screening of high-risk patient populations for colonisation. Results 
showed that 79% (23/29) of the participant’s hospitals surveyed/screened patients in 
the intensive care unit, 72% (21/29) surveyed/screened patients from high-risk wards, 
62% (18/29) of patients previously diagnosed as being colonised with a HAI were 
surveyed/screened, 52% (15/29) of inter hospital transfers were surveyed/screened, 
surveying/screening patients on admission occurred in 45% (13/29) of hospitals, 
surveying/screening patients on discharge occurred in 17% (5/29) of hospitals, 10% 
(3/29) of patients were surveyed/screened in low risk wards, and lastly some 
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participants indicated that “other” types of surveillance/screening not mentioned in the 
survey occurred in 31% (9/29) of the hospitals (see Figure 4.12). One participant 
indicated that no form of HAI surveillance was conducted in their hospital.  
 
 
Figure 4.12 Surveillance/Screening measures for at risk patient groups. (n=29) 
 
4.4.4 Null Hypothesis: Rates of HAIs are not affected by the implementation 
of an intervention aimed at reducing rates of HAIs. 
It is evident from the results of Phase 1 and Phase 2 that the scope of 
“interventions” is large and it would not have been possible to examine the effect of 
every identified intervention on the rate of HAIs. As such, the study identified three 
“interventions” and their impact on the rate of HAIs. The interventions selected were 
based on the data available, which specifically related to the date of the intervention 
implementation, and or change in the relevant timeframe, and available infection rate 
data.  
The three interventions identified to be tested against the rate of HAIs for the 
null hypothesis were:  
1. Isolation of colonised patients 
2. Environmental cleaning 
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To test the null hypothesis, data for the interventions was sourced from both the 
pilot and national survey, totalling data from 35 surveys. Infection rate data for HAIs 
was supplied via a national database from the overarching parent study. Monthly rates 
were collected from the individual hospitals studied in each state.  
A regression model was run to test changes in rates of infection after the 
implementation of the “intervention”. Infection rates were tested against six models, 
which examined six possible changes of infection rates over time. This is displayed in 
Figure 4.13. “Infection rates” represent the dependent variable and “Time post 
implementation/change of intervention” (Years since intervention) represents the 
independent variable. The model of best fit was selected using AIC as adjusted R2 did 
not perform well due to the number of hospitals. When the appropriate model was 
found for each intervention and infection type, an analysis was conducted for a 
significant change in the slope. This is indicated as mean change in infection rates with 
significance indicated by 95% confidence intervals and p. values. Data was collected 
for specific HAI infection types including: CLABSI, MRSA, MSSA, SAB, BSI & SSI. 
Analysis was conducted separately for each intervention and infection type.  
Figure 4.13 displays the plots run from the Poisson regression analysis of the 
estimated changes in mean infection rates over time for the three interventions: BSI 
(IVD vs BSI), cleaning (environmental cleaning), and isolation (isolation of colonised 
patients). No estimates were available for BSI and isolation combined with MSSA due 
to insufficient data. Denominators for infection types included 100 procedures for 
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Figure 4.13 Estimated changes in rates of infection against selected interventions. 
 
Table 4.9 displays estimated changes in infection rates and the model of best fit. 
The model letter of the best fitting model (see Figure 3.6, in Chapter 3) and then the 
mean change in rates and 95% confidence intervals are presented. No changes are 
presented in Model D, as the rates did not change. No estimates were available for BSI 
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and isolation combined with MSSA. Table 4.10 indicates p. values for mean change 
in infection rate for each intervention. 
Table 4.9 Model selection, mean infection rate and confidence intervals for each intervention and 
infection type. 
  BSI  Cleaning Isolation
CLABSI E: 2.55 [0.52, 6.70] F: 0.66 [0.05, 2.03] D 
MRSA D D D 
MSSA – C: –0.71 [–1.07, –
0.16] 
– 
SAB F: –0.19 [–0.29, –
0.09] 
E: –0.43 [–0.69, –
0.10] 
F: –0.14 [–0.20, 
–0.08] 
SSI E: –0.72 [–1.12, –
0.12] 
F: 1.19 [0.27, 2.45] D 
 
Table 4.10 Significance for change in mean infection rates 
HAI infection 
type 
BSI p.value Cleaning p.value Isolation 
p.value
CLABSI 0.005 0.027 D
MRSA D D D
MSSA  - 0.017 - 
SAB <0.001 0.014 <0.001
SSI 0.022 0.007  D
 
Results from the Poisson regression analysis suggest that: 
x CLABSI infection rates increased for both the BSI (mean 2.55; CI 0.52, 
6.70; p. = 0.005) and cleaning (mean 0.66; CI 0.05, 2.03; p=0.027) 
interventions with statistically significant results. The isolation 
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intervention produced no effect on infection rates; Model D indicated no 
change, as rates were already on a steady decline. 
x The cleaning intervention significantly reduced MSSA infection rates 
(mean–0.71; CI –1.07, –0.16; p= 0.017). Analysis was not possible for the 
BSI and isolation intervention with MSSA, as there were not enough dates 
of implementation/change available. 
x SAB infection rates were significantly reduced with all three tested 
interventions: BSI (mean–0.19; CI –0.29, –0.09; p= <0.001), cleaning 
(mean–0.43; CI–0.69, –0.10; p= 0.014), and isolation (mean–0.14; CI–
0.20, –0.08; p= <0.001). 
x SSIs infection rates reduced with the BSI intervention (mean–0.72; CI–
1.12, –0.12 p= 0.022), but increased with cleaning (mean 1.19; CI 0.27, 
2.45; p.=0.007), and there was no change to SSI infection rates with the 
isolation intervention.  
4.4.5 Summary 
The National Survey implemented in Phase 2 Part B of this study was a revised 
version of the pilot survey. The survey was distributed to participating hospitals across 
states and territories throughout Australia, excluding the state from which participants 
were recruited for Phase 2 Part A: Pilot. Results showed that between January 2005-
December 2012 outbreaks were prevalent in the majority of hospitals, particularly 
Norovirus. Infection control interventions implemented in this timeframe were also 
varied; however, visitor dispensers, the utilisation of a BSI prevention strategy, and 
the use of ABHR were most prevalent in this timeframe. Surveillance was a prominent 
intervention, with all but one hospital engaging in some sort of surveillance of HAIs. 
The three selected interventions appeared to have some effect on the rates of various 
HAIs, either by reducing them, or in some instances by potentially increasing the rate 
of HAIs. However, these results need to be taken with caution and have produced some 
unusual results, in particular with CLABSI. This may have been attributed to the 
missing data, not producing truly reflective results. The quality of the data may also 
have been questionable; as there was no way to check the validity of the data given, in 
relation to the date of implementation/change of the three tested interventions. The 
results from Phase 2 Part B will be discussed in Chapter 5. 
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Chapter 5: Discussion 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
The findings of this study have highlighted the occurrence of outbreaks of HAIs, 
the specific pathogens responsible across Australia, the interventions implemented in 
an overall effort to control HAIs, and the effect that three of these interventions have 
had on the rates of SAB, MSSA, MRSA, CLABSI, and SSI. Importantly, the study 
captured what occurred in relation to HAIs across Australia during the study 
timeframe, a picture not previously addressed in the literature. This chapter discusses 
the key findings of Phase 2 of this study in relation to the research questions and 
conceptual framework informing this study. The chapter concludes with a discussion 
of the strengths and limitations of the study. 
5.2 PARTICIPANTS  
The ACSQHC (2008) identified that infection control policy and practices are 
usually managed by infection control professionals (ICPs), and most often these 
personnel have a nursing background. The ICP is usually identified as a clinical nurse 
consultant (CNC) in infection control. Sometimes, particularly in more regional 
hospitals, the ICP may have multiple roles, such as managing an infectious diseases 
ward. Generally speaking, the ICP is involved in core infection control activities (the 
day to day running of infection control), surveillance, staff education, outbreak 
management, consultation, information management and policy and procedure 
development, implementation and evaluation (ACSQHC, 2008; Mitchell, Hall, 
Halton, Macbeth & Gardner, 2015). Therefore, as the infection control CNC (ICP) is 
exposed to the overall running of infection control (as described above) these 
individuals were deemed to be the most appropriate sample participants to provide 
information for this study regarding HAIs, outbreaks and interventions, and 
policy/guidelines aimed at reducing HAIs in Queensland public hospitals. Of note 
however, is that despite ICPs being pivotal to infection control program development 
in Australia, it has been identified that there is currently no minimum education 
standard required to practice (Mitchell et al., 2015). 
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The response rate for survey completion was satisfactory, with 66.6% (6/9) of 
invited participants completing the pilot survey, and 70.7% (29/31) completing the 
national survey. For the 50 participants invited, this gave an overall response rate of 
70% (35/50). The survey did require the participants to provide data on historical 
information in relation to outbreaks and infection control interventions, which may 
have been difficult to retrieve and been a barrier to participants agreeing to participate 
in the survey. However, the overall response rate of 70% was identical to a longitudinal 
survey by Hofer et al. (2011), who examined the use of infection preventions practices 
in US hospitals in order to prevent HAIs. Hofer and colleagues’ (2011) study also 
required participants (infection preventionists) to supply historical data relating to the 
implementation of infection control interventions. Thus, the current study’s response 
rate of 70% is therefore a reasonable figure for the nature of the investigation and the 
depth of information requested. 
5.3 WHAT OUTBREAKS OF HAIS OCCURRED IN AUSTRALIAN 
PUBLIC HOSPITALS OVER THE SEVEN YEAR PERIOD FROM 
JANUARY 2005-DECEMBER 2011. 
Results showed that within the timeframe, the majority of participants reported 
a HAI outbreak in their facility (98%, 28/29). This is congruent with the pilot study 
findings, where all participants reported at least one HAI outbreak in their facility 
during the time period; thus supporting this study’s conceptual frame work (Figure 
2.3), which highlights an interlinked connection between outbreaks and prevalence.  
Interestingly, however, one hospital from the national survey indicated that they did 
not conduct any type of routine surveillance for colonisation/infection of HAI in their 
patients. Hence, this begs the question: If you are not looking for it, will you find it? 
Consequently, as highlighted in the conceptual framework, transmission of a HAI is 
directly identified via surveillance/audits, which thereby identifies outbreaks and 
general the occurrence of HAI. 
A review of the literature emphasised that the transmission of HAIs is complex, 
yet easily transmittable, as they are spread via various routes, including air, droplets, 
hands, bodily fluids, and common vehicle means (Eames et al., 2009; Engelhart et al., 
2002; WHO, 2002). Along with potential spread from various routes, transmission is 
also influenced by the identifying source, which may originate from a variety of 
potential transmission points, including a single patient, visitor, healthcare worker, 
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equipment, or even the surrounding environment (surfaces and pathogen reservoirs 
such as taps) (Engelhart et al., 2002; Gastmeier & Vonberg, 2006). These factors 
highlight that transmission of a HAI is achievable through simple and multiple means, 
which may indicate that without covering all potential transmission points, the 
development of an outbreak may not be an unlikely occurrence. Hence, the findings of 
this study emphasise that the commonness of an occurrence of an outbreak is not 
unexpected and supports the connection between the transmission of HAIs and 
outbreaks identified in the conceptual framework, which links prevalence, 
transmission, outbreaks, and scope together, taking upon an almost “ripple effect”, 
with HAI as the central construct. Furthermore, it suggests that outbreaks are 
potentially difficult to avoid, given that it takes only one of these transmission means 
to achieve contamination; a view that was supported by the review of the literature 
(Eames et al., 2009; Engelhart et al., 2002; WHO, 2002).  
The review of the literature exposed that no previous study had attempted to 
identify the overall national occurrence of outbreaks of HAIs in Australia, or any other 
developed nation. This study therefore presents the first report of the frequency of HAI 
outbreaks, and importantly, the associated pathogens, across Australia. Findings from 
this study brought to light that Norovirus and VRE were the two most frequently 
identified pathogens responsible for an outbreak of HAI between January 2005–
December 2011. 
Norovirus was the most frequently reported outbreak (89.7% 26/29), followed 
by VRE (55.2% 16/29), and other (44.8%; 13/29). MRSA was reported as the fourth 
most frequent HAI with 34.5% (10/29). Similar to the results from Phase 1: the pilot 
survey, Norovirus was listed as the most frequent and severe outbreak in outbreak item 
two, followed by VRE. These results from both the pilot and national survey highlight 
that Norovirus and VRE are two HAIs that appear to be problematic and are regarded 
as more severe than other pathogens in terms of their effect across Australia. It was 
not feasible to cover every pathogen in the literature review; therefore this discussion 
will address contemporary literature specific to the findings of this research. The 
findings of this study indicated that Norovirus and VRE were the most frequently 
identified pathogens contributing to HAI outbreaks in Australia, and this is supported 
by existing literature (Kambhampati, Koopmans, & Lopman, 2015; MacIntyre et al., 
 122 Chapter 5: Discussion 
2001; Pearman, 2004; Wilkinson, McLean, & Wise, 1998; Ong, 2013; Tu et al., 2007; 
Lyon et al., 2005; AGDH & CDNA, 2010; CDC, 2012) 
Norovirus was identified in two studies by F. Chan et al. (2011) and Conway et 
al., (2005) who both investigated infection control interventions through the 
implementation of control measures to prevent the further spread of a Norovirus in an 
outbreak. However, the prevalence and effect of Norovirus on patients’ outcomes was 
not explored in these studies. As a consequence of the results of the current study, it 
was determined appropriate to return to the literature to ascertain if both Norovirus and 
VRE were considered serious HAI pathogens responsible for multiple outbreaks in 
healthcare facilities on a national level in the UK, US, and Australia. 
A review of the literature by Kambhampati et al., (2015) detailed Norovirus in 
terms of its prevalence and effect on both patients and institutions. The review covered 
information from the UK and US and described Norovirus as one of the most frequent 
causes of outbreaks in healthcare settings, affecting both long-term care facilities and 
acute hospitals. The authors described Norovirus as being responsible for 18% of all 
cases of gastroenteritis globally, with 19-21 million cases and 800 attributable deaths 
each year in the US. The high prevalence of Norovirus in the community makes it very 
difficult to prevent the transmission of this pathogen into the hospital setting 
(Kambhampati et al., 2015).  
Congruent with this study’s findings, surveillance data from high income 
countries indicated that outbreaks were occurring in hospitals; from 1992-2000, 40% 
of 1,877 cases in England and Wales occurred in hospitals (Kambhampati et al., 2015). 
While Norovirus is often considered mild in terms of its effect on people, it has been 
highlighted that this type of HAI can severely effect vulnerable populations, 
specifically patients in the hospital setting, and result in death and major disruption of 
healthcare services (Kambhampati et al., 2015). In particular, recent data described in 
the review demonstrated excess mortality during outbreak periods of Norovirus in 
hospitals, along with large economic costs. Kambhampati et al. (2015) described 
Norovirus as easily spread, being transmittable via direct contact, faecal and oral 
routes, contaminated food and water, as well as aerosol means. Aerosol particles can 
inevitably settle on fomites, and thus, the environment becomes colonised with 
Norovirus. This virus is able to survive on surfaces for long periods of time, and is 
even resistant to low doses of chlorine. In summary, Kambhampati et al. (2015) 
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highlighted Norovirus outbreaks as a frequent and serious problem, which is similar 
to the findings of this study, where it was the leading pathogen responsible for 
outbreaks of HAIs across Australia.   
Literature surrounding Norovirus in Australia abounds in public health; with 
many studies, specifically in Australia, describing outbreaks in the community, aged-
care facilities, childcare centres, and food contamination (Tu et al., 2007;  Hall et al., 
2005; Sinclair et al., 2005; Webby et al., 2007; Angulo et al. 2008; Ferson, Ressler 
Mclver, Issacs & Rawlinson, 2000; Lyon & Smith, 2005) however, it appears scant in 
the hospital setting. The Australian Government Department of Health (AGDH) and 
Communicable Diseases Network Australia (CDNA) published “Guidelines for the 
public health management of gastroenteritis outbreaks due to Norovirus or suspected 
viral agents in Australia” in (2010). The guideline outlines that in 2002, outbreaks of 
norovirus on cruise ships, aged care facilities, and hospitals increased dramatically in 
the US and Europe, which also correlated with an increase in outbreaks in Australia, 
although no overall figure was described. It has been suggested that the emerging issue 
of Norovirus (since 2002) may have been due to a new GII.4 strain (Tu et al., 2007; 
Lyon et al., 2005; AGDH & CDNA, 2010).  Historically, Norovirus has been 
predominantly caused by G1 and GII noroviruses; however, it has been noted that most 
outbreaks are the result of the GII.4 strain, which has been evolving into new G11.4 
strains every 2-3 years since 2002, replacing older G11.4 strains (CDC, 2012). In 
particular, a GII.4 strain originating from Sydney was a dominant strain responsible 
for outbreaks that inadvertently spread to the US. In 2012 the GII.4 strain was 
responsible for 53% of Norovirus outbreaks in the US during September – December 
2012, with long term facilities and restaurants being the most frequently reported 
settings (CDC, 2012). This highlights not only how easily Norovirus can transmit, but 
also its virulence and ability to spread over vast distances (CDC, 2012). This supports 
this study’s surprising result of 26/29 hospitals reporting Norovirus as the most 
prevalent pathogen responsible for outbreaks of HAI. 
In Australia, it is estimated that 1.8 million cases of Norovirus occur per annum 
in both the community and healthcare setting, often leading to outbreaks, and thus 
resulting in major health and financial implications (Ong, 2013). In healthcare settings, 
Norovirus appears to be a major culprit for HAI outbreaks historically; with 77 of 126 
outbreaks in Victorian healthcare institutions being attributed to Norovirus between 
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July to December 2002. This figure supports the findings of Norovirus being a highly 
prevalent outbreak pathogen across Australia (Cooper & Blarney, 2005). It has been 
noted that Norovirus is a particularly challenging pathogen due to multiple routes of 
transmission, a low threshold for infection, prolonged virus shredding, and 
environmental survival (Ong, 2013; Kambhampati et al., 2015). This makes Norovirus 
a problematic public health issue (AGDH & CDNA, 2010). Furthermore, the 
Australian Department of Health addresses the need to manage outbreaks of Norovirus 
in aged-care facilities by outlining “Guidance for managing suspected Norovirus 
outbreaks in aged-care facilities” in Appendix 5.2 (AGDH & CDNA, 2010). 
Subsequently Norovirus is identified as a “public health” issue, however, there appears 
to be lack of standardised policy direction for the hospital setting. The CDC (2012) 
described surveillance, hand hygiene, environmental cleaning, and isolation of 
colonised people to be pivotal to Norovirus prevention (CDC, 2012; Ong, 2013), thus 
supporting the fundamental relationship between outbreaks and infection control 
interventions demonstrated in this study’s conceptual framework; whereby outbreaks 
are directly linked to the implementation of interventions required to control them, and 
thus flows onto prevalence and the central construct, HAI (CDC, 2012). 
Chapter 2, the literature review, highlighted VRE outbreaks where an 
intervention strategy was used to reduce colonisation of VRE through the use of 
chlorhexidine gluconate impregnated wipes for the patients bed-bath (Blom et al., 
2011; Jefferson et al., 2011). While these authors discussed the reduction of VRE using 
a targeted strategy, they did not discuss the pathogen’s prevalence or effect on patient 
outcomes. The experience of outbreaks of VRE in Australia was detailed in three 
studies. Pearman (2004) described an outbreak of VRE in nephrology and dialysis 
units in a tertiary referral hospital in Western Australia. Two months after the source 
patient was identified the VRE strain had spread to a total of 22 wards, units, and 
outpatient departments. The outbreak was terminated five months after the 
implementation of infection control preventions strategies and cost the State 2.7 
million dollars. MacIntyre et al. (2001) also described an outbreak of VRE in a tertiary 
referral hospital in Melbourne and conducted a case-control study to identify risk 
factors to contracting the HAI. The authors described VRE as being a problematic 
HAI, with the first identified isolate in Australia occurring in 1994 and multiple 
isolates having been confirmed since 1996. Lastly, Wilkinson et al. (1998) detailed the 
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cost associated with a VRE outbreak in an Australian hospital. The authors stated that 
a large cost to the institution was attributed to the requirement of additional nursing 
staff, the need for supplies for additional precautions, screening, time for policy 
development, and staff education. In summary, these studies highlight that outbreaks 
of VRE have been problematic in Australia since the 1990s, and the pathogen has the 
capacity to affect multiple patients and result in a large financial burden for 
institutions. It is therefore not surprising that VRE was identified by participants in 
this current study as the second most frequent pathogen responsible for outbreaks of 
HAIs in Australia. 
Participants in this study agreed that infection control policy development was 
affected by outbreaks. This finding is supported in the study’s conceptual framework, 
where outbreaks are directly linked to interventions and is also supported in the 
literature. In particular, Astruc et al. (2013) and Patterson (2009) described the 
development of specific infection control strategies as the result of an MRSA outbreak 
and found that outbreaks affected the workload of infection control personnel, which 
supports the finding of participants identifying that outbreaks effect workload. This is 
further reinforced by Wilkinson et al. (1998) who described the need for increased 
nursing numbers to deal with the increased workload from a VRE outbreak. Lastly, 
they agreed that outbreaks led to staff being more engaged in infection control work; 
however, the topic of staff engagement was not prevalent in the literature. 
5.4 WHAT INFECTION CONTROL INTERVENTIONS AIMED AT 
REDUCING HAIS WERE IMPLEMENTED IN AUSTRALIAN PUBLIC 
HOSPITALS OVER THE SEVEN YEAR PERIOD FROM JANUARY 
2005–DECEMBER 2011 
The review of the literature focused on identification of studies relating to the 
implementation of infection control practices as a whole; it was not possible to explore 
the literature relating to every single possible infection control intervention, and as 
such, the findings of some of the results warranted re-exploration into the literature 
once particular interventions had been identified as prevalent in the participants’ 
results.  
Results from Phase 2 Part B: the national survey, showed that in the study 
timeframe the number one intervention implemented or changed across Australia was 
the use of visitor dispensers, with 93.1% (27/29) of participants having implemented 
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or changed this intervention. Interestingly, the use of visitor dispensers as a key 
strategy to directly reduce HAIs has not been identified in the literature. However, this 
strategy was also identified by infection control CNC participants in Phase 1 of this 
study. 
Intra-venous device (IVD) verses blood stream infection (BSI) intervention was 
the second most frequently implemented or changed intervention as indicated by the 
participants. This is a very broad intervention, which relates to any 
practice/intervention aimed at reducing the incidence of HAIs as a result of BSI from 
an indwelling device placed in hospital. It is noted that central line-associated BSI was 
one of the five major categories of HAIs internationally (CDC, 2012; WHO, 2002). In 
addition to this, the effects on patient outcomes from BSI can be severe and may 
include death (Hofer et al., 2011). The use of infection control interventions aimed at 
reducing HAI associated BSI was supported in the literature by Hofer et al. (2011) 
who examined the use of BSI prevention interventions, including specific practices, 
such as the use of chlorhexidine impregnated dressings and the use of chlorhexidine 
during line insertion in the US. However, unlike Hofer et al. (2011) the use of an 
intervention to prevent BSI explored in the current study was generalised and not split 
into sub categories. Zingg, Wadler, and Pittet (2011) highlighted that prevention 
strategies for HAI BSI (also known as CLABSI) involve bundled approaches and 
changes in technology; further emphasising the breadth of IVD vs BSI interventions, 
with more specific questions surrounding the intervention required. The prevention of 
BSI HAIs is also supported by the ACSQHC (2011) through the introduction of an 
aseptic technique.  
The third most frequently implemented/changed intervention across Australia 
was the use of ABHR. While this is a hand hygiene related intervention, it does not 
relate to the compliance or practice of hand hygiene itself. It was decided to examine 
this intervention as it related to use of “alcohol gel” itself, which may be effective in 
reducing HAIs. This rationale was also applied to the intervention or change of hand 
wash solution. The use of ABHR was highlighted in participant interviews in Phase 1 
of this study and also supported by the NHMRC guideline (2010). 
As guided by the conceptual framework, antibiotic stewardship was investigated 
in Phase 2 of this study, the national survey. Results demonstrated that 62.1% (18/29) 
of participants indicated that this intervention had been implemented or changed in the 
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study timeframe. In addition to this, the ACSQHC (2011) made antibiotic stewardship 
a key criterion in Standard Three: Preventing and Controlling Healthcare Associated 
Infections. As this national document was published in 2011 and the data collection 
timeframe of this study finished in December 2011, it is conceivable that the concept 
and principles of antibiotic stewardship were still in the early stages of national 
implementation; hence, the low result of the implementation of antimicrobial 
stewardship for this study may not be unexpected given the study timeframe. 
Exploration of Australian literature (post the study timeframe) identified research 
pertaining to practices, attitudes, and barriers to antibiotic stewardship. One study, 
however, identified that since the implementation of the ACSQHCS standards, and 
specifically, the Antimicrobial Resistance Strategy, antimicrobial stewardship 
intervention has significantly evolved with formal governance. Interestingly though, 
the authors acknowledged that outcome measurements for antimicrobial stewardship 
are not standardised (Cairns, Roberts, Cotta & Cheng, 2015). Furthermore, it appears 
that there is no requirement for healthcare institutions to report on outcome measures 
relating to resistance and MROs externally (Cairns, Roberts, Cotta & Cheng, 2015). 
Since the introduction of the NSHSS, the issue of antimicrobial stewardship has 
appeared to come to the forefront of healthcare, making this an evolving intervention 
to help prevent HAI. 
Results from this study showed that routine environmental cleaning was changed 
or implemented by 55% of participants, and environmental cleaning of HAI areas was 
implemented or changed by 58% of participants. The implementation of 
environmental cleaning methods has been supported by Rutala et al. (2009), who 
suggested that the cleaning and disinfection of contaminated surfaces resulted in a 
decreased incidence of HAIs. Dancer (2009) stressed the importance of environmental 
cleaning; however, found that while environmental cleaning was an effective 
intervention to reduce microbial load, there was no difference in effectiveness based 
on different techniques, such as daily mop and vacuum, and spray clean methods. It 
would be expected that all hospitals conduct some type of cleaning, so the participants 
who did not indicate any implementation or change to environmental cleaning in this 
study may have had cleaning methods that were established prior to the study time 
frame (pre December 2005) with no changes made since the original implementation.  
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Other infection prevention and control strategies (as guided by the conceptual 
framework) investigated in the interventions section included sterilisation procedures, 
cleaning audits, air and water filters, and hand wash solution. Participants in this 
current study identified that sterilisation procedures were only implemented or 
changed in 10.3% (3/29) of hospitals. It would be highly unlikely that no sterilisation 
procedures were implemented in the participants’ hospitals. It is more probable that 
this intervention was established and remained unchanged during the study timeframe. 
As proof of this assumption, sterilisation as an intervention was supported by the 
NHMRC (2010) and ACSQHC (2011), and was identified by participants in interviews 
from Phase 1 of this study. Cleaning audits were implemented or changed in 44.8% 
(13/29) of participants’ hospitals; again this intervention was highlighted in the 
interviews from Phase 1, but not identified in the literature. The implementation or 
change of air and water filters was identified by 9.5% (2/29) of participants in this 
current study. This intervention is supported by Curtis (2008) who advocated for the 
use of filters based on the findings of the literature. The low rating of this intervention 
by participants in this current study may be attributed to the fact that the installation of 
these devices is undertaken during the construction and maintenance of a hospital, and 
may be information the participants were not privy to.  
Another intervention identified in this current study was hand wash solution. 
This was implemented or changed in 31% (9/29) of participants’ hospitals. The 
NHMRC guidelines (2010) indicate that the choice of product for routine hand hygiene 
practices should contain between 60%-80% ethanol or equivalent. Based on this 
information it is possible that as new products arrive on the market, hand hygiene 
solution options may change regularly. Hence, the above results may be indicative of 
a change of product only, not a new intervention implementation. It is highly unlikely 
that any hospital does not provide a hand wash solution, as the National Hand Hygiene 
Initiative was implemented and mandated across Australia during this current study’s 
timeframe (Hand Hygiene Australia, 2011). 
The management of patients with infection or colonisation of a HAI infection 
included cohorting of colonised patients with the same strain of HAI, isolation of HAI 
colonised patients, patient dedicated/single use equipment, patient bathing solution, 
contact precautions, droplet precautions, and swabbing of contaminated bed areas. 
Cohorting of colonised patients with the same strain of HAI was implemented or 
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changed in 37.9% (11/29) of participants’ hospitals. This intervention was supported 
by Arndt et al. (2011) who highlighted that contaminated patient rooms play an 
important role in reducing transmission. In the current study isolation of colonised 
patients was implemented or changed in 58.6% (17/29) of participants’ hospitals. This 
intervention was highlighted and supported in the literature by Bardsley et al.’s (2000) 
descriptive quantitative study, which examined the implementation of infection 
control interventions, thus supporting the finding in this study of isolation being a 
frequently employed intervention to help reduce HAI. Furthermore, the NHMRC 
guidelines (2010) recommend allocating a single room with a closing door in order to 
isolate patients with a suspected or confirmed HAI colonisation/infection. In the 
current study, patient dedicated/single use equipment was implemented or changed in 
37.9% (11/29) of participants’ hospitals. This strategy is supported by Gould et al. 
(2010) and Brennan et al. (2009) who noted that this intervention is singularly effective 
in reducing HAIs. Furthermore, the use of dedicated patient equipment is 
recommended in the NHMRC guidelines (2010) and the ACSQHC standards (2011).  
In the current study, patient bathing practices were implemented or changed in 
48.3% (15/29) of participant’s hospitals. This finding is supported by a number of 
studies that support the use of chlorhexidine gluconate bathing practices to reduce HAI 
colonisation (Blom et al., 2006; Jefferson et al., 2011; Popovich et al., 2009; Dixon 
and Carver, 2010; Sievert et al., 2011). The implementation or change of contact 
precautions was implemented or changed in 31% (9/29) of participant’s hospitals. 
Droplet precautions were implemented or changed in 27.6% (8/29) of participant’s 
hospitals. The use of contact and droplet precautions is supported by the NHMRC’s 
(2010) Prevention and Control of Infection in Healthcare, Australian Guide. These 
precautions are specifically recommended for transmission prevention strategies and 
support this study’s finding. Lastly, the swabbing of contaminated areas was 
implemented or changed in 13.8% (4/29) of participants’ hospitals. This intervention 
was highlighted in the interviews in Phase 1, but not highlighted in the literature. 
Findings from this study have highlighted key infection control interventions 
implemented across Australian hospitals. Investigation into the implementation of 
infection control interventions aimed at reducing HAIs has not been previously 
undertaken in Australia. A study from the UK, however, attempted to scope the 
implementation of infection control interventions and processes on a national level. 
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Bardsley et al. (2009) indicated relevant infection control interventions; however, 
these were heavily modelled on general management strategies.  
The Hofer et al. (2011) study focused on infection control interventions; 
however, it was restricted to interventions relating to particular HAI infection types, 
as opposed to the overall issue of HAIs, which was the focus of the current study. 
Similar to this current study, Hofer et al. (2011) identified that “change” was an 
important factor. Findings from this current study concluded that it is not only 
significant to identify whether an intervention had been implemented, it is also 
important to identify if the intervention had changed in some way post its 
implementation. This could potentially affect the effectiveness of the intervention, and 
thus, its impact on HAIs.  
While this study highlighted the implementation of individual interventions, the 
review of the literature did emphasise that the use of multiple interventions and 
outbreak target interventions were favourable in institutions. Many authors 
recommended that a number of interventions should be used in combination in order 
to have an impact on HAIs (Aboelela et al., 2007; Charlett et al., 2012; Curtis, 2008). 
Patient screening results specifically looked at “routine patient surveillance” for 
HAIs. In this study, all hospitals, with the exception of one, had various screening of 
patient groups in place. The one exemption may have had screening in place, however, 
it may not have been implemented or changed in the timeframe; it would be highly 
unusual for a hospital not to conduct routine screening. The use of screening and 
surveillance of patients for HAIs is consistently supported in the literature. Mintjes-de 
Groot et al. (2000) indicated that surveillance did not just identify colonisation of 
HAIs, it allowed for the development of targeted interventions to be put in place. 
Arroliga et al. (2010) specifically conducted a quasi-experimental study that looked at 
the surveillance of MRSA and a decolonisation program. The surveillance of MRSA 
enabled the researchers to identify who was colonised upon admission, and therefore 
implement prevention strategies. This surveillance program enabled patients to be 
treated and subsequently decreased MRSA colonisation rates from 6.28 cases per 100 
patient days to 3.32 
 Jefferson et al. (2011) also advocated for the importance of surveillance of HAIs 
and believed that compliance was essential for HAI prevention; however, Avicolli et 
al. (2007) suggested that while it was paramount for prevention it was not as successful 
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in reducing the incidence of HAIs compared to other interventions, which suggests 
that the identification of HAIs is the first step in prevention and then other infection 
control interventions need to be implemented in order to decrease the incidence of 
spread. Surveillance was also strongly supported by the NHMRC (2010) and 
ACSQHC (2011), as well a systematic review by Curtis (2008) who indicated a 
number of classes of interventions as being successful in reducing HAIs, including 
surveillance. In Australia, surveillance of HAIs has historically been problematic, 
particularly due to discrepancies relating to definitions, implementation of surveillance 
practices and evaluation of programs, which may explain the variance in screening 
practices in this study’s results (Bennett et al., 2007; Worth et al., 2009; McBryde et 
al., 2009). The governance surrounding the implementation of the ACSQHC 
Healthcare standards: Standard Three (2011) enables for a more cohesive approach to 
surveillance. Since the implantation of the ACSQHC Healthcare Standards: Standard 
Three, Australian publications have reinforced the use of surveillance as a fundamental 
component in the battle against HAI; as HAI infection prevention requires a 
sustainable HAI surveillance program (Mitchell & Russo, 2015). Recent literature also 
highlights the need for a standardised National Australian surveillance program to 
ensure reliable HAI data enabling robust performance monitoring and specifically 
targeted HAI prevention strategies, which supports the identified link in the conceptual 
framework between interventions, surveillance, scope, and ultimately the occurrence 
of HAI (Russo, Cheng, Richards, Graves, Hall, 2015). The current study emphasises 
the need for a national approach to surveillance due to the large variance in 
surveillance practices, particularly relating to “who hospitals screen for HAID 
surveillance”. 
The lack of investigation into the implementation of various infection control 
practices across Australia was highlighted in the review of the literature, consequently 
making this study the first of its kind on a national level in Australia. The literature 
surrounding the implementation of interventions was often limited to single study sites, 
and single interventions often relating to studies conducted in other nations. Post the 
completion of the current study, contemporary literature by Mitchell, Hall, MacBeth, 
Gardner, and Halton (2015) highlighted that there is limited information surrounding 
the overall structure of infection control programs within facilities, along with 
evaluation of their success and ability to sustain overtime. This current study has 
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highlighted the wide range of infection control practices implemented across the 
country; however, it did not assess the effectiveness of each intervention, 
sustainability, and access to resources to run infection control programs. In order for 
infection control to maintain momentum and generate successful outcomes, specialists 
in the field have highlighted a number of infection control priorities across Australia. 
These priorities include access to information technology solutions, training DVD 
packages, online education for hospital staff and access to infection disease physicians 
and microbiologist for regional hospitals (Mitchell et al., 2015). It is therefore 
necessary that for each infection control intervention to be successful, an overarching, 
sustainable infection control program and team that is adequately resourced, is 
essential for implementing and sustaining each individual infection control 
intervention. 
The results from this study emphasise that a variety of infection control 
interventions were implemented or changed in order to reduce the rate of HAIs across 
Australia. These interventions were varied, and this study is the first to identify which 
interventions, other than hand hygiene interventions, are being implemented in order 
to help prevent and control HAIs in Australian public hospitals. 
The three interventions chosen to model and test the null hypothesis were BSI 
intervention, cleaning, and isolation.  The use of cleaning interventions, isolation of 
colonised patients, and interventions to reduce BSI were all supported positively in the 
literature (ACSQHC, 2011; Bardsley et al., 2000; Curtis, 2008; Dancer, 2009; Dancer 
et al., 2007; Hofer et al., 2011; NHMRC, 2010; Rutala et al., 2011) 
Interestingly, all three interventions reduced rates of SAB, and cleaning reduced 
MSSA; however, no effect was evident on rates of MRSA. The model of best fit for 
all three interventions, tested against MRSA was model D, which reflected the null 
hypothesis. This result for isolation in this current study is similar to findings in 
Bardsley et al. (2011). The authors findings initially discovered lower rates of MRSA 
were correlated to isolation of colonised patients (r0.324, p=<0.034). However, 
Bardsley and colleagues (2011) found after running a false detection rate procedure to 
address the issue of possible type one error, isolation, and MRSA no longer met 
significance levels. In addition, when the authors conducted analysis for “cleanliness”, 
which reflected cleaning, there was no reduction for MRSA; however, there was for 
  
133 Chapter 5: Discussion 
Clostridium difficile. Therefore, the results of Bardsley et al. (2011) support the 
findings of isolation and cleaning having no effect on MRSA. 
Interestingly, in this current study, rates of CLABSI increased for BSI 
intervention (mean 2.55 95% CI 0.52, 6.7, p=0.005). This result is surprising and 
counter intuitive, as one would expect the BSI interventions to reduce CLABSI, as 
interventions are specifically tailored for this type of HAI (Hofer et al., 2011). The 
cleaning intervention also increased rates of CLABSI (mean 0.66 95% CI 0.05, 2.03, 
p=0.027). Only one other study has examined occurrences similar to this. Hofer et al. 
(2011) studied the use of infection prevention practices in US hospitals to prevent 
HAIs, including CLABSI. The study aimed to explore practices to reduce CLABSI; 
however, it did not test whether the interventions implemented were effective; 
therefore, comparisons with the current study are not able to be made.  
The association between the increase in CLABSI from both interventions in the 
current study is concerning, and brings into question the quality of the data, 
specifically, the intervention dates recalled by the participants. It is possible that the 
data supplied for the intervention dates is subject to recall bias (Gordis, 2009) and thus, 
this result may not be a true indication of the effect these interventions have on 
infection rates of CLABSI. To ensure consistency, a definition of “outbreak” by the 
WHO (2002) was provided to participants to ensure that there was no discrepancy on 
how “outbreak” was interpreted by different participants. Furthermore, in an effort to 
reduce the risk of recall bias for the identification of outbreaks and interventions, 
participants were notified of the type of information required in advance via the 
invitation email for the survey and encouraged to refer to existing records and 
databases. 
An increase in rates was evident for SSI and cleaning with a mean increase of 
1.19 (95% CI 0.27, 2.45, p=0.007), this again is a surprising result. More surprising is 
the effect the BSI intervention had on SSI, with a reduction in rates (mean -0.72 95% 
CI -1.12, -0.12, p=0.22), as SSI is unlikely to originate from a BSI. The use of the 
isolation intervention had no effect on rates of SSI, with the model of best fit reflecting 
the null hypotheses.  
The increase of rates of CLABSI from the BSI intervention in particular, and the 
decrease in SSI rates from the BSI intervention are concerning, and question the 
accuracy of some of the data. However, given the concern of recall bias and the 
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inability of the survey to identify confounders to these three interventions, these results 
must be treated with caution. 
5.5 STRENGTHS AND LIMITATIONS 
There are some important strengths and limitations of the study that should be 
noted. The current study addressed the challenge of the broad topic of HAIs; 
specifically, what outbreaks had occurred and what infection control interventions had 
been implemented in an effort to reduce HAIs in Australian public hospitals. The 
utilisation of interviews to elicit important information from experts in the field of 
infection control allowed for a rich and through exploration into which outbreaks and 
interventions required examination in the survey, in combination with supporting 
literature guided by the study’s conceptual framework. The conceptual framework was 
developed using two key documents from infection control governing bodies in 
Australia, the NHMRC (2010), and ACSQHC (2011). This provided strong evidence 
for the components that made up the conceptual framework. 
The utilisation of a descriptive survey allowed for recruitment of participants 
from thirty-five public hospitals in Australia. This provided the first national 
perspective on outbreaks and infection control interventions to reduce HAIs. 
A strength of this study is the identification of outbreaks on a national level. 
Many studies report singular occurrences of outbreaks, which does not allow for a 
nationally targeted approach for problematic pathogens responsible for outbreaks of 
HAIs. This study not only described the outbreaks of HAIs that occurred in the study 
timeframe, but also identified the key pathogens responsible. In addition, asking the 
participants to list the five most serious outbreaks in their respective hospitals allowed 
participants to rank outbreak severity in their professional opinion; again this study is 
the first to report this in Australia. 
This study was conducted with some limitations. The study collected data within 
a given timeframe, and as such, gives only a snapshot of outbreaks and interventions. 
The use of a survey design to gather retrospective data raises the issue of recall bias 
for the provision of the information in the survey. Historical data can be difficult for 
participants to retrieve or remember (Gordis, 2009). The interventions section had the 
most missing data of all of the sections of the survey (both for the pilot and national 
survey), specifically the date of implementation or change. In order to run the most 
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effective analyses, interventions with the most complete data warranted, which 
extended across both of the surveys, were chosen. While participants were encouraged 
to access records, if these were unavailable participants needed to rely upon their own 
memory to identify dates of outbreaks and interventions; this resulted in self-reported 
data that could not be independently verified, which may have resulted in inaccurate 
information. Despite recall bias being a limitation of this study, it was reported by 
participants that participation in this study highlighted the need for accurate recording 
of data relating to outbreaks and infection control interventions. In addition, the use of 
the visual timeline in the interviews attempted to help overcome recall bias. Another 
form of bias that the study may have been subject to is reporting bias, as participants 
may have been reluctant to report on sensitive topics, such as the outbreaks of HAIs, 
resulting in under-reporting (Gordis, 2009). The study was also unable to adjust for 
confounders for the three tested interventions. As a result, other factors may have 
influenced the rates of infection and not the intervention. 
Exploration into participant’s collective opinions on outbreaks and how they 
affected different aspects of infection control were explored via scale questions in the 
pilot and national survey. The results were presented in Chapter 4: Phase 2 Part A and 
Phase 2 Part B.  The scale results are limited due to small sample size of n=6 in Phase 
2 Part A (pilot survey) and n=29 in Phase 2 Part B (the national survey). The small 
sample size prevents the findings from being an accurate representation of infection 
control CNCs opinions across the country and also limited the ability to test for internal 
consistency. Therefore, it is not plausible to draw overall conclusions relating to the 
collective beliefs or attitudes of participants to these questions. However, despite the 
small sample size, the study was able to establish how strongly the participants rated 
scale items. Overall, participants agreed that the development of infection control 
policy was affected by outbreaks, and this statement is supported in the literature by 
Astruc et al. (2013) and Patterson (2009), who described the development of specific 
infection control strategies as the result of an MRSA outbreak. Participants agreed that 
outbreaks affected the workload of infection control practitioners, again this is 
highlighted in the literature by Wilkinson et al. (1998) who described the need for 
increased nursing numbers to deal with the increased workload from a VRE outbreak. 
Lastly, they agreed that outbreaks led to staff being more engaged in infection control 
work; however, the topic of staff engagement was not prevalent in the literature. 
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The study period guided the timeframe for the review of the literature from 2002-
2013. A limitation to this study is the considerable number of publications in relation 
to infection control in the Australian context, produced post the literature review and 
study timeframe, and implementation of the ACSQHC safety standards. The review of 
the literature did not identify any publications that supported the implementation of 
the ACSQHC standards and the NHRMC guidelines, with very limited studies 
highlighting outbreaks and infection control interventions relating to Australia. Recent 
literature in the Australian context has addressed a number of infection control 
prevention and control topics, relating to environmental cleaning, antibiotic 
stewardship, antimicrobial resistance, and HAI surveillance. 
5.6 SUMMARY 
The identification of outbreaks of HAIs in Australian hospitals has highlighted 
outbreaks as a common occurrence. While various pathogens are responsible for the 
occurrence of an outbreak, Norovirus and VRE are two pathogens that are most 
commonly responsible, and are often considered severe in terms of their effect.  
A variety of infection control interventions were implemented and changed 
throughout hospitals in Australia during the study timeframe, with no apparent 
standardised approach. Visitor dispensers were the most frequently implemented or 
changed intervention in the study timeframe. Surveillance was an important HAI 
prevention strategy, with all hospitals excluding one indicating that they conducted 
screening for HAIs. While the review of the literature did not appear to adequately 
support the ACSQHC Standards: Standard Three and the NHMRC guidelines, the 
results of this study reinforce their implementation on a national level due to the large 
variance in implemented infection control interventions and surveillance practices. 
It is possible that the implementation of BSI interventions, cleaning 
interventions, and isolation of colonised patients are able to affect rate of HAIs, either 
by reducing or increasing them; however, it is difficult to ascertain the validity of the 
results due to possible recall bias and an inability to adjust for confounding variables.  
The next chapter presents the conclusion for this study, with recommendations 
for clinical practice, education, and further research.  
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Chapter 6: Conclusions and 
Recommendations 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
The findings of this two-phase, exploratory, sequential, mixed methods study 
have informed the development of a number of recommendations for practice, 
education, and further research in the understanding of HAI outbreaks and HAI 
interventions implemented with the aim of reducing rates. This can ultimately lead to 
the improvement of patient care by assisting in the prevention of the development of 
HAIs. Overall, the findings of this study provide insight into which outbreaks of HAIs 
occurred during the study’s historical timeframe, along with the implementation of 
infection control interventions aimed at reducing HAIs. The study has also been able 
to test whether the implementation of three interventions had an effect on the rate of 
HAIs nationally. 
6.2 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PRACTICE 
The study identified the occurrence of outbreaks across Australian public 
hospitals by identifying the five most serious outbreaks of HAIs in each participants’ 
respective hospitals. Some hospitals had less than five outbreaks; however, many 
appeared to have had five outbreaks in the study timeframe. In particular, the study 
highlighted that Norovirus and VRE are two particular HAIs that appear to be 
problematic in terms of their frequency and severity in many hospitals. The 
identification of problematic HAIs allows for a targeted approach to be taken in order 
to deal with HAIs, an approach supported in the literature (Mintjes-de Groot et al., 
2000). 
It is recommended that Norovirus be highlighted as a HAI that requires particular 
attention in Australian hospitals, and warrants a targeted approach given its frequency 
and perceived severity as the most frequent pathogen responsible for the most severe 
outbreak in participants’ hospitals. It appears that Norovirus may “fly under the radar”, 
as it is not flagged as a particular HAI requiring attention. Strong focus on MROs, 
however, is also warranted (CHRISP, 2012; WHO, 2002) as the transmission of an 
MRO, such as VRE, is particularly problematic as there are limitations to effective 
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treatment if the effected patient becomes unwell due to colonisation (Jarrat & Miller, 
2013). VRE appears to have been identified in the literature as a problematic MRO, 
first appearing in 1994, and it is recommended that surveillance and targeted 
approaches to VRE continue (MacIntyre et al., 2001). It is also recommended that 
antibiotic stewardship is undertaken and reinforced to help reduce the incidence of 
MRO development. At the time of this study, antibiotic stewardship had not been 
implemented in all hospitals; however, the ACSQHC has made antibiotic stewardship 
a priority strategy. The results of this study support this intervention. 
Patient risk factors for HAI transmission have been identified in the literature 
(Abarca-Gomez et al., 2012; Cristina et al., 2011; Jarret & Miller, 2013) and given that 
outbreaks could be considered a common occurrence, understanding patient risk 
factors is important. It is recommended that “at risk patients” are identified on 
admission to hospital so that measures can be taken to mitigate the risk, and 
furthermore, prevent the transmission of HAIs to high risk patients. 
Routine surveillance is paramount in order to identify HAI colonisation, and 
thus, ensure appropriate infection control measures are implemented to prevent 
transmission and potential outbreaks. The identification of the specific pathogen 
responsible for a HAI outbreak, through surveillance, enables a targeted intervention 
to be implemented (Mintjes-de Groot et al., 2000). The results of this study identified 
that all but one hospital conducted routine surveillance; however, the surveillance of 
at risk patient populations (for various HAIs) varied considerably. The findings of this 
study strongly support the continued use of routine surveillance, not only to identify 
colonisation of HAIs, but also to identify potential outbreaks, as it is imperative to 
source and control spread, and thus, terminate an outbreak (Barret et al., 2009). The 
findings also support the use of the ACSQHC (2011) national standards that provide 
criteria for the governance and systems for infection prevention, control, and 
surveillance by highlighting that compliance with these criteria will be achieved in 
hospitals by undertaking surveillance of HAI, allowing for a more standardised 
approach across the nation. It is also recommended that a regular review of which 
outbreaks have been particularly problematic for individual institutions and nationally 
is undertaken, while identifying the frequency of particular pathogens to allow for 
targeted approaches and appropriate control. 
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This study found that interventions implemented across the nation revealed a 
wide variety of strategies with no particular standardised approach. This study in 
particular highlighted the implementation/change of a number of different 
interventions in both the pilot and national surveys. It is recommended that a more 
standardised approach is taken, as supported by the ACSQHC (2011), with a focus on 
the implementation of standardised practices to help prevent HAIs, and the 
implementation of “clustered” and targeted interventions to control outbreaks and 
patients colonised with HAIs. 
Lastly, it is highly recommended that individual institutions maintain 
records/data on the implementation of infection control interventions and their date of 
implementation. Feedback from Phase 1:  the pilot study, identified that accessing 
historical information (particularly dates) was difficult for participants, with one 
indicating that “it was hard to remember” historical information and dates. 
Consequently one hospital changed their record keeping practice as a result of the 
survey. 
6.3 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR EDUCATION 
It is recommended that the results of this study lead to the education of healthcare 
staff on the complexity of HAI transmission, the frequency of outbreaks, and 
problematic HAIs across the nation. 
It is also suggested that clinical education continues to focus on hand hygiene 
strategies to reduce direct contact transmission, but also focuses just as strongly on 
potential transmission of HAIs through other means, including droplets, air, common 
vehicles, bodily fluid, and environment. Understanding various modes of transmission 
will enable staff to understand the importance of the implementation of various other 
infection control interventions (other than the practice of hand hygiene), which are 
implemented to help prevent HAIs and control outbreaks. It is also recommended that 
clinical staff be educated on the need for a variety of interventions, and at times, 
pathogen target approaches to reduce outbreaks. 
Education for health professionals on the importance of undertaking routine 
surveillance of HAIs and identification of patient groups at risk of HAIs is 
recommended in order to highlight problem HAIs and reduce the risk of HAI 
transmission and outbreaks. 
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Lastly, it is recommended that community based education is implemented to 
address HAIs and outbreaks and how it is possible to be colonised with a HAI in the 
community and not be aware. The general public can be a potential source of HAI 
transmission if they visit friends and relatives in hospital. Additionally, it is important 
for visitors to understand that if they exhibit any signs of gastroenteritis that they 
should refrain from visiting, as Norovirus can be quite prevalent in the community 
(Kambhampati et al., 2015). 
6.4 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR RESEARCH 
From this study, future research recommended to explore outbreaks of Norovirus 
includes: 
1. The identification of the frequency of incidences of hospital acquired 
Norovirus post the study timeframe. 
2. Exploration into the severity of Norovirus outbreaks on patient 
morbidity, mortality, the infection rate of staff, and the impact upon 
institutional efficiencies and cost.  
3. Undertaking a case control study, adequately powered to identify 
patient risk factors associated with the development of hospital 
acquired Norovirus. 
4. Exploration into the identification of infection control interventions 
successful in the prevention and control of an outbreak of Norovirus. 
The exploration of infection control CNCs opinions on outbreaks and their effect 
on infection control was explored in the survey; however, due to small sample size, 
the study was unable to draw any conclusions on opinion on this topic. It is 
recommended that further research into the opinions of infection control CNCs on the 
topic of outbreaks and infection control is investigated, in order to have an 
understanding of how these specialists in infection control perceive the relationship 
between outbreaks and infection control. It is recommended that a much larger sample 
size is undertaken, with scale items with strong internal consistency. 
It is also suggested that individual studies into the merit of the three identified 
interventions is undertaken. A before and after study could be conducted, able to 
account for various confounders and confirm the validity of the dates and infection 
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rate data supplied, by sourcing infection control records and national surveillance data. 
It is recommended that the individual studies for each intervention conduct a Poisson 
regression analysis that can account for multiple confounders in the model. 
6.5 SUMMARY 
This was the first study to investigate the occurrence of outbreaks of HAIs and 
the implementation of infection control interventions across Australian public 
hospitals. 
Mixed methods was applied to answer the study’s research questions and null 
hypothesis, which were derived from the study’s research aims. Due to the complexity 
of HAI outbreaks and interventions, a conceptual framework was developed to guide 
the search for theoretical and empirical literature. The conceptual framework, and 
theoretical and empirical literature also informed the selection of items to be explored 
in the pilot and national survey in order to answer the research questions and the null 
hypothesis. 
An exploratory sequential mixed methods design allowed for the collection of 
data, and hence, occurrence of outbreaks and interventions. The findings of this study 
were analysed through descriptive statistics in order to answer the research questions 
and the null hypothesis was then tested through Poisson regression analysis. The 
literature surrounding outbreaks of HAIs and infection control interventions was 
broad; the results from this study were compared with empirical literature specific to 
the broad topic of outbreaks and interventions. 
Outcomes from this study demonstrated that a number of outbreaks of HAIs 
occurred in the study timeframe, with Norovirus and VRE being the most frequent and 
severe. The implementation of infection control interventions was vast and varied, 
with no standardised approach in the timeframe. This study suggests that the null 
hypothesis: “The implementation of infection control interventions have no effect on 
rate of HAIs” be rejected. It appears that some of the interventions had an effect on 
some rates of HAI, either increasing or decreasing rates, with the exception of MRSA, 
which displayed no effect on the rate of HAIs. However, due to the risk of recall bias 
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Appendix BAppendix 2: Phase 1 Email Invitation for Interview with Infection 
Control Clinical Nurse Consultant.  
Dear (Infection Control Clinical Nurse Consultant), 
Thank you very much for agreeing to take the time to participate in an interview 
looking at the implementation of various infection control interventions and hospital 
acquired infection outbreaks between Jan 2005 until Dec 2011. 
The research project being conducted is a Queensland University of Technology 
Applied Science Research Masters that is nested in a larger study, which aims to 
evaluate the impact of the National Hand Hygiene initiative. The purpose of the 
interview is to illicit information that will guide the development of a survey. The 
survey will aim to explore infection control interventions that are being implemented 
within intuitions, with the intention to reduce hospital acquired infection. 
As per our discussion on the phone on (date of phone call) the interview is scheduled 
for (date of interview) at  (respective hospital). 
Dr Katie Page and myself will be attending the interview. Dr Page is my research 
supervisor from the Queensland University of Technology and is also working on the 
Evaluation of the Hand Hygiene Initiative. 
During the interview there are two key types of information we seek. First, we would 
like you to identify any infection control interventions or policies (aimed at reducing 
hospital acquired infection) that have been implemented in your hospital from Jan 
2005 – Dec 2011. Second, we would like to identify any significant hospital acquired 
infection outbreaks from Jan 2005 – Dec 2011. We would like to record this 
information in the form of a timeline and therefore require dates of intervention/policy 
implementation and outbreaks, as well as where these occurred (wards, hospital wide 
etc.). We understand that it may be very hard to recall this information on the spot so 
we wanted to give you the opportunity to source this information before we arrive on 
Thursday. 
If you have any concerns please feel free to contact me. My email is 
r.rashleighrolls@student.qut.edu.au and my mobile phone is 0438 632 837. 





Student Researcher/Chief Investigator 
Queensland University of Technology, School of Nursing and Midwifery 
National Hand Hygiene Initiative - Evaluation Project 
IHBI, Queensland University of Technology 
























































understandingabouttheeffectof infectioncontrolquality improvement interventionson
nosocomialinfectionrates.Theknowledgegainedfromthisstudywillbeusedtoevaluate
theeffectoftheidentifiedqualityimprovementinterventionsonnosocomialinfectionrates





There are unlikely to be risks beyond normal dayͲtoͲday living associated with your
participation in this project. However, it may be that the topic of nosocomial infection
outbreaksandinfectioncontrolqualityimprovementinterventionsproducesdiscomfortfor
someparticipantsbasedontheirownorothers’experiences. Ifparticipation inthestudy
causes you discomfort or distress, QUT provides limited free counselling for research
participantsofQUTprojectswhomayexperiencediscomfortordistressasaresultoftheir
participationintheresearch.ShouldyouwishtoaccessthisservicepleasecontacttheClinic




All commentsand responseswillbe treated confidentiallyandwillbemadeanonymous
whentranscribed.Pleasenotethattherewillbeanaudiorecordingmadeofthisfocusgroup.
Thisrecordingistoensuretheaccuracyofthetranscriptioncreatedandtherecordingwill
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Appendix EAppendix 5: Phase One Thematic Analysis Table 
2) Theme Code Data 





“…certainly that had major impacts on workload with infection control. “P2 
 
“We are all managing H1NI, plus what public health wanted us to do in regards to border nurses, public 
vaccination clinics all those sorts of things. So my staff were just stressed to the absolute extreme.” P2 
 
“…. required a lot of contact tracing.” P2 
 
 
“May 2009 we had swine flu, worst case of swine flu in hospital.” P2  
 
 
“Basically, we stopped education, we stopped auditing, stopped reporting, and all the staff just went, “Oh, … 
about that. We were dealing with swine flu” P2 
 
 
“…everything else within infection control just took a backward step and hand hygiene was one of them.” P2 
 
“In February we were starting to get to crisis level for single room availability. We have 76 in the hospital.” P2 
 
“When you have Norovirus in an area, you stop all transfers in and out.” P2 
 
“So everyone forgot about everything else. Everyone went into self preservation mode, “Let’s all wear this 
PPE”, you know concerned about H1N1, not thinking, “Do they have MRSA”? P2 
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“We found them coming up from other areas as well. So you couldn’t say that it was this unit because they all 
have different receptors. ICU has their receptors, renal has theirs, haematology/oncology does.” P1 
 
 
“So we did a bit of work practice review, looked at our practices and identifying our isolates, and we went back 
and looked at all of these people and identified that these were the ones that actually weren’t associated to the 
XX Hospital; they were inter-hospital transfers.” P1 
 
“But the significant things for that (H1N1) is that a lot of organisations shifted the resources for our normal 
surveillance programs to managing H1NI”. P1 
 
“Oh, greatly. Absolutely. It was terrible. “ P3 (H1N1) 
 
“While H1N1 was happening we did have a small little increase in MRSA and one of our cycles of VRE 
actually happened just afterwards and we wonder whether it was because we were being vigilant with this 
(H1N1) and not vigilant with something else.” P1 
 
“..the attitude to towards infection control practitioner is that they are an outsider coming in and there’s a lot of 
anger at the fact that there.” P1 
 
“We can’t close beds. It costs money. Don’t close beds”. P3 
 
“Whereas VRE is mainly colonisaton it’s having an overarching effect because the protocols for VRE are quite 
strict, quite demanding.”P3 
 
“Yeah, because we didn’t have time to keep on top of it. And the place was being overrun by query flu cases. So 





“..they did contact screening (VRE) here, which meant that we were screening and isolating basically hundreds 
of patients in the midst of it and it was , huge, huge amount of work.” P4 
 
 
“In our medical wards, you know, at some stage we would have 12 patients who are under contact precaution. 
So they had to have all of their PPE- you know, all of those bathrooms were locked off. It’s a nightmare”. P4 
 
“Heaps of things were thrown out… but a lot of things would have been stopped. Like, education certainly 
would have stopped. A lot of the surgical site surveillance go way behind.” P4 
 
“My department had a lot of staffing issues and management in issues in that year plus H1N1.” P2 
 
“My staff went into management role for H1N1 and then recovery phase.” P2 
 
 
“In March this year we had TB. Remembering we are a respiratory hospital, so you know, with TB. So nobody 
acquired TB but we had to contact/trace staff” P2 
 
 “I mean, it either gives the staff a hell of a lot more work and it makes them frightened and it makes the visitors 
frightened; it makes the patients frightened.”P3 
 
“Where we see most of our VRE is on inter-hospital transfers.” P2 
 
“…we found them (+VRE) coming up from all other areas as well. So you couldn’t say that it was this unit 
because they all have different receptors. ICU has their receptors, renal has theirs, haematology/oncology 
does”P1 
 
“So one of the things that we have seen, I suppose in 2010 is a large increase of inter-hospital transfers that 
came to us with multi-resistant organisms like VRE” P1 
 162 Appendices 
 
“… but there’s lots of stuff that we just missed; we couldn’t keep up with it. So lots of things didn’t happen that 
should have happened. Screening wasn’t done that should have been done. “ P3 H1N1. 
 
“We find that we have a lot from ICU. That is mainly because ICU, even when we are not in the midst of an 
outbreak, we do weekly VRE screening. You will find that a lot of hospitals do that because they have the co-
morbidities and people who are in ICU. They are exposed to a lot of antibiotics.” P4 
 
“Most of them come in from the community, other hospitals probably.” P4 
 Pathogens and 
outbreaks-the 
nexus. 
We have had years when we have had no MRSA in our orthopaedic unit and we saw an increase in 
numbers…..That send us into, “oh, my God, we have to do something” P2 
 
“Oct/Nov we had an outbreak of MRSA in our surgical unit.”P2 
 
“Basically from May 2009 through to September 2010 – it’s interesting that it coincides with the H1NI – the 
hospital saw a gradual increase in its overall MRSA numbers.”P2 
 
 
“We had a VRE outbreak. So it’s actually for this great range, basically. We are still getting VRE but we have 
suppressed it but we have had about four/five waves of an outbreak during that time” P1  
 
“We also have co-dependent resistant acinectobacter in ICU, which was an issue.” P1 
 
“There are issues with MRSA but they are fairly constant with MRSA.” P1 
 
“I think one of the significant things that’s happening now is the VRE outbreaks that we are having throughout 
the State and the increase in the number of non-multi MRSAs coming in.”P3 
 




“Swine flu, 2009.” P3 
 
“..the VRE has been huge…” P4 
 
“Yes, we have had two at least – we say two – significant VRE outbreaks.” P4 
 
“…extensive norovirus outbreak in 2B and IC.” P4 
 
“…we had the 2009 H1N1 outbreak which was huge.” P4 
 
“So this is basically the VRE epi curve, starting back when we started to see some isolates and, as I said in 
October/November is when we started to really identify that we had a problem.” P2 
 
“September 2009 we had norovirus “P2… 
 
“January 2008 we had norovirus again”P2 
 
“May 2007 we had multi-resistant acinetobacter”P2 
 
“In July 2007 we had Norovirus” P2 
 
“September 2007 we had influenza A” P2 
 
From February to April 2005…. They were also dealing with an outbreak of MRSA and H – VISA” P2 
 
“…in October/November ’07 was when we had our first outbreak peak and then from July to December 2008  is 
when we had some issues, VRE.” P1 
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“I think you will find for this later date range, like for 2011 period, there is a lot of other hospitals around the 
State that have been having issues around the VRE. And even going back to 2010/09.” P1 
 
“We actually did see a pattern with acinectobacter and it was in winter.”P1 
 
“2007, we had lost of noro” P3 
 
“In 2008 we had two small outbreaks in the orthopaedic wards in February and May and that was VRE.” P3 
 
The first one (VRE) was in August of 2009 and it went to about, oh, May/June. It was till going when I came. 
Oh, it was huge for us. And then we had another one about the same time in 2010…Yea about the same time in 
2010, about August/September.” P4 
 
“So over two years, the highest we ever got was 8 in a couple of months.” P4 (MRSA) 
 
“You know, the staph aureus bacteraemias are supposed to go down. Unfortunately, ours hasn’t. But it’s over a 
ten year period. We have only been collecting data for two/three years.”P4 
 
“H1N1 cost us no end of grief, yeah.” P3 
 
 Outbreaks as a 
constructive 
influence  
…when it gets bad enough that we go in and we do an intervention, that’s when the ward starts to go, “Oh gees, 
the MRSA must be bad. All of a sudden infection control is up there.” P2 
 
So most recalcitrant staff members who really don’t care about anything or anyone, they are just coming in and 
doing their work and going home, they suddenly pipe up and go, What?” P2 
 




“…we also take the opportunity to talk to them and infection prevention practices, if they are not doing the right 
personal protective equipment, if they are not doing the right additional precautions such as contact, droplet or 
airborne.”P1 
 
“You know, we talk – rather than “issues”. We try and talk about “challenges”. So, you know “We have some 
challenges cleaning equipment – we have to clean between them. We are not doing it” P1 
 
“We find we get a bit of buy-in from getting the person from the area to actually engage with us rather than 
doing it outside, from the outside perspective.”P1 
 
“Once we get past that hurdle, we get a lot of buy-in and we start to see change. So it’s about making it personal 
for them” P1 
 
“I think staff are beginning to catch on “there’s lots of this about” and that in itself is helping to increase hand 
hygiene, and the hand hygiene awareness.”P3 
 
“Usually, if we have an outbreak, it assists in the intervention. It assists for the strategies that we have been 
trying to put in place, or that should have been there, to bring them to the fore and we get better co-operation.” 
P3 
 
“.. and because we keep closing beds, it opens up the eyes of finance people downstairs who don’t want beds 
closed.” P3 
 
“In think it probably did fuel the CRISP protocol coming out; because we kept saying, “We need some guidance 
from you guys.” You know, they are our overriding body. “P4 
 
“We were granted 0.7 of an FTE in January 2007” P1 
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  “ We did education, we did hand hygiene auditing we did screening of staff for MRSA colonization. We did 
review of infection cases for a common denominator and we did environmental cleaning review.”P2 
 
“In February 2010 they put together an action plan talking to all the different services about what they could 
actually put in place and address.” P2 
 
“We have an outbreak management plan for Norovirus” P2 
 
“There was cleaning and environmental issues” P2 
 
“We have an ICMP the whole time I have been here an, infection control management plan.” P2 
 
“Pandemic planning, we started that- it would have been 2006…”P2 
 
“October/November 2010 we had an outbreak of MRSA in our cardiac surgical unit we did our intervention in, 
January, February, March of 2011” P2 
 
“ So we are doing an increase in education, we are doing PPE training, making sure people are putting on their 
personal protective equipment appropriately, and taking it off appropriately.” P1 
 
“We started an outbreak management group” P1 
 
“…than we want to call an outbreak committee.” P3. 
 
“...so we do a briefing note to them, say, “This is what’s happened and we want to call an outbreak management 
meeting”. So we usually have that meeting within a few hours.” P3 
 
“Then we put out an email to different areas to inform them that “this ward is closed, closed to admissions. This 




“We have actually gone a step further than the CHRISP guidelines.” P4 
 
“For every VRE patient. So they would have the full clean of the room and then wait 20 minutes and it all over 
again.” P4 
 
“Now we are trying to be proactive and look at how we can get plans in place and education in place so that we 
can just kick into some kind of a protocol; which we have got the CRISP protocol now which was sent and 
educated people.” P4 
 
“Then we started to implement extra cleaning in November 2007” P1 
 
“So they commenced a huge intervention at that time” P2 
 
“It leads to a more robust discussion because every time we send out a report it goes out to the organisation and 
every body else sees each other’s data. So people are more interested in improving their indicator but also 
talking about it, both within the clinical areas and to us.”P1 
 
“In July 2006, so I suppose the later part of 2006 or 2007 we started to have to report them (bundles) on our 
activities.” P1 
 
“And then they have got a certain set of standards that we have to meet and that we have to report on and if we 
fall below what they believe their targets are, then they well come in and investigate. They will discuss to 
“please explain” as well.” P1 
 
 
“These patients – they came from nursing homes and spread it. So we had a big campaign after that to have 
nursing homes recognised on admission.” P3 
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“ So we have a daily meeting and a daily report usually and then a final report.” P3 
 
“There is a report that we can make to CHRSP.” P3 
 
“We do a quarterly report.”P3 
 
We closed that outbreak down at about May which I have got a really good report that I can pull out.” P4 
 
“This is our VRE. Now, this is per ward. So you can see that this is – oh, we have got his one here that is per 
month. So this is per month.” P4 
 
“We do report all of our MROs and surgical sites and all those sorts of things through CHRISP, so up through 
Queensland Health; and we are compared with other facilities our size with what we are doing.”P4 
 
“ …we have the District Infection Control Committee which meets monthly and we have a monthly report on 
MROs and VRE. We have three-monthly report on bacteremias and six monthly reports on surgical site 
surveillance. All of those reports each month go out to everybody. They go through the nursing directors down, 
through the medical directors, who look after patient safety and quality.” P4 
 




Previously, we were also screening for ESBL, but we dropped that off as of 1 January this year because we 
reviewed 12 months of screening data found –we only found and ESBL in 0.1 per cent of those screens. So it 
was actually costing the hospital a lot of money to do and it wasn’t picking up a large number.” P2 
 
“- it probably cost this hospital a good $100.00  with all the work that we had to put in..”P2 
 





The laboratory staff, because they have to do so many extra rectal screens, they cost them so much – I think it’s 
$ 30 per screen and they are doing hundreds.” P4 
 
When you are in there and you are saying, “Look, your rates have gone up. Here, we will swab you, we will do 
this. We are watching you do this. We are watching you clean. We are watching you” – you know, there’s a lot 
of tension/focus on those rates. When we go away, they go back to old habits.” P2 
 
“The only real issues we had was during H1N1 we didn’t do surveillance. So we couldn’t give them bacteremia 
rates, the staphlo stuff.” We couldn’t give them the improvement for hand hygiene and the surgical site 
prophylactic stuff. After H1N1 settled we went back and recollected all the data.”P1 
 
“And so it made it very hard to identify  whether it was a sodium hypochlorite that made the difference or the 
cleaning team.”P1 
 
“But we have never really gotten the resources for standardised cleaning team for MROS..”P1 
 
“Whereas in general areas they rotate staff all the time and people have got day off, you get new staff/casuals 
who don’t work regularly. So they don’t’ get that ownership.”P1 
 
We have got a staffing population of 7,400 on this campus. Trying to educate everybody and keeping that 
education fresh in their mind- so doing it on a regular basis is very diffiuclt.”P1 
 
“I suppose it’s very hard balancing organisation need against the things that you know that need to happen to 
control a situation.” P1 
 
“-quite a bit of resistance to the change..” P3 
 
“So there’s much more we could do but we just don’t have the time.” P4 
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“…unless executive can give you money and resources, you know for staffing – a lot of the things that they 






…We did education, we did hand hygiene auditing, we did screening of staff for MRSA colonistion… and we 
did an environmental cleaning review. P2 
 
“Yes, we run a monthly resource group.” P2 
 
“You have to talk to all the program areas and see what they are going to do, and they put together a plan.”P2 
“…they see us come onto the ward and they think we are auditing hand hygiene.” P1  
 
“They had to do two theoretical education sessions with their colleagues and they had to do six practical session 
with individuals and they had to attend education sessions”.P1 
 
“We gave them support. We helped them identify how many continuing professional education points that all of 
these strategies and interventions that we are doing go towards, the professional registration each year.” P1 
 
“We have a monthly IDLE meeting.”P1 
 
“…until we did some training with the PSOs, we didn’t see a decrease.”P1 
 
“…we did extra training with them.” P1 
 
“Yes we do orientation training with all the (PSOs) when they come in.”P1 
 
“So every staff member who PSO- patient support officers, medical officers, nursing officers, and allied 




“..trying to set up an actual simulation of an environment”P1. 
 
“So we implemented that with an education program and a leaflet..” P3 
 
“We didn’t have the staff to do it. It was a resource issue”P2 
 
“In general. It went to nursing staff. So mainly went there but then we also developed one for wardies.” P3 (self-
directed learning package) 
 
“Education is one of the biggest strategies.” P1 
 
We did some education pamphlets and stuff for visitors and patients as well…”P3 
 
“Everybody gets annual education.” P3 
 
“So we developed that little booklet which at first it was just going to be for whoever we did induction for; but 
then we just take it with us whenever we go and do in-service on any ward and leave a few lying around the 
place. P4 
 
“The operation staff did a lot of educating of their cleaners.” P4 
 
…We screen them on admission  and we get 100 percent screening…screening inter-hospital transfers P2 
 
“So anyone from another hospital or an aged care facility gets screened upon arrival. It is nurse initiated 
screening and it is very much part of the culture.” P2 
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“That comes back to the fact that we are a very large referral hospital – because you know, for that ten years, we 
have been a specialized cardio thoracic hospital. So most of our patients prior to being generalized, were 
transfers from other facilities.” P2 
 
“Where we see most of our VRE is coming in on inter-hospital transfers.” P2 
 
“So we are looking at our heath acquired MRO rate, and this all of them at the moment, but we are going to take 
non-multi resistant MRSA out of it, just because most micro-biologists and infectious diseases physicians 
believe that NMRSAs are community associated.” P1 
 
“Not all of them. Some Inter-hospital transfers we do. And, of course, the nursing home patients now as well. 
Anyone who has been in hospital within the last six months, we do routine screening of them.” P3 
 
“I don’t think we are actually spreading it. We are detecting it more.” P3 
 
“..if the medical ward has got someone here that is for 30 days or something, they will screen. And then high 
risk areas, ICU and renal, they have routine screening programs.”P3 
 
We now get an inter-hospital transfer list every day that tells us who has been transferred into our hospitals. And 
we make sure that those people are screened.” P4 
 
“ICU have always done screening for MROs and, as I say, it has always been a loose policy that inter-hospital 
patients are screened.”P4 
 
“Also, our renal patients, renal/dialysis patients, they have regular screening which is sort of mandated by their 
head bodies.” P4 
 




“We screen for MRSA, VRE, multi-resistant acinectobacter.” P2 
 
“Some of them (outbreaks) do get picked up through our surveillance module” P2 
 
“ We have always had a needless system” P2 
 
“Neutral detergent and water, yeah, for everything at the moment” P2 
 
“Yes, for MRSA we do. We screen our ICU patients weekly” P2 
 
“We follow all – whenever CHRISP puts out a protocol, we adapt and follow that.” P2 
 
P1One of our general strategies all the time is moving the patients out of the clinical setting into an area like 
Wattlebrae.” P1 
 
“Yes standard hand hygiene, use of PPE, handling and management of sharps and waste, occupational exposure 
management…processing of usable equipment… and management.” P3 
 
“2006 we changed from using a soap to the Johnson hand hygiene range.” P3 
 
“It allowed us to take away all the chlorhexidine. So we removed chlorhexidine from everywhere, put soap in 
and then when we needed chlorhexidine we left the soap out and popped chlorhexidine in.” P3 
 
We have the same policy (screening)…We have actually gone a step further than the CRISP guidelines.”P4 
 
“..we have quite a number of protocols…”P4 
 The importance 
of the 
“So we were averaging on any given day 50 or above patients isolated. So we were getting to the stage where 
we were having to cohort, which is not ideal.” P2 
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intervention 
itself. 
“You need to put in action plans you need to show improvement next time” P2 
 
 
“So we got the extra .5 for environmental auditing in August ‘06” P1 
 
“we also have got another member of staff through renal, so we get another CN that came because of the 
expansion of renal…..but they actually did was keep the money and keep her under them but she still works up 
here; but does lots of renal infection control.” P3 
 
“It is a huge network, infection management service. We had two people, when we were in the midst of an 
outbreak, totally working on this for eight hours a day.” P4 
 
“So not only their time and manpower, but also just the screening process.” 
 
“…you have to do a full clean which takes 45 minutes; then leave it for 20 minutes and then do another. It is sort 
of like two and a half hours that a bed is out of action, while people are waiting.” P4 
 
“Over the district we have got 3.4 (staff) equivalence.” P4  
 
“Oh yeah, we got an extra point 8 (staff) when we opened this new block, which was 12 months ago. It was part 
of accreditation…” P4 
 
“…we did get extra resource which were grateful.” P4 
 
“Individually (hand hygiene), from infection control point of view, it has gained us the most recognition. 




“But we also go to the ward to do education, we also go to the ward to do bacteraemia surveillance, significant 
surveillance, to mark charts talk to the CNCs, so every single time they see our faces, it’s an automatic kick-in 
for them to improve their practices” P1 
 
 
“We are in there doing these focused interventions, yes they work. They bring down those rates and they bring 
them down for a period of time afterwards” P2 
 
“…we looked at different timelines that we implemented and it looks like the sodium chloride actually made a 
big difference and we have a statistical difference with that.” P1 
 
“So we changed to Diva Cleanse and we still see that we have got a lower rate of environmental positives.”P1 
 
“It was all about the surface disinfectant (CRAB), whereas for VRE it’s actually been about all the thoroughness 
of cleaning.”P1 
 
“I think a lot of the things that we did with VRE have made a difference, but I suppose the biggest thing for us 
that seems to have made a difference is probably the environmental stuff”P1 
 
“So we changed it to rectal and nasal swab at the beginning of this year and we are finding more VRE for sure.” 
P3 
 
“Yes I do (think intervention successful). Although we don’t have much data to back it up unfortunately.” P4 
 
“I thing probably the most important one for infection control was the I-Care because intravenous care is so 
important.”P4 
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“Other bundles are just the bundles that we get off all – CDC, they have go bundles and World Health 
Organisation, they have bundles. And we tend to take out the parts of them that are applicable to the 
organisation that you are working in and implement.” P1 
 
“…that was in collaboration with CHRISP.” P1 
 
“That’s in line with the outbreak management plan from Queensland Health.” P3 
 
“But they do have a policy, an outbreak policy from Queensland Health. Basically, that follows that policy.” P3 
 
“Yeah, integrated plan. It was a Queensland Health project.” P3 (pandemic plan). 
 
“We follow the CHRISP protocol pretty much down the line…”P4 
 
“…we report that all down to CRISP and we don’t really have an issue with that.”P4 
 
“I think CHRISP drive a lot of things.” P4 
 
“It use to be Statewide standards but they have just gone to National standards. So to meet these National 
standards there are certain things that we just have to do. Antibiotics stewardship is certainly one of those.” P4 
 Changing 
practice 
“… we changed over our procedures to be the I-Care Practices and, you know did a small amount of 
promotion.” P2 
 
“We introduced hand gels with the Clean Hands are Lifesavers program”P2 
 
“December 2008, xxx introduced general medical, general surgical  and went to a genera ED department. So 
that changed the culture of this hospital dramatically” P2 
 




We just had somebody come back from the conference in Melbourne and that discussion about whether we 
should be doing other things instead of hand hygiene, it was very much there”P1 
 
“So they (HQCC) are a monitoring board  and they look at hand hygiene compliance and also the surgical site 
with quality improvement activities and how many people get prophylactic antibiotics. So it’s actually re-
focused some of the older strategies that we had in place  in the organization and made people pick up their 
socks a little bit.”P1 
 
“ And then we have obviously had in the national arena Hand Hygiene Australia and Australian Council of 
Health Quality Standards bringing out their different packages and bundles and all the different indicators that 
they are looking at which is staph bacteraemias.” P1 
 
“Once again it is just re-focusing old strategies but it is highlighting infection control.” P1  
 
“So Bio-Patch has been started to be used in oncology and haematology units this year (2011). “ P1 
 
“We developed an action plan with them. So that was looking at identifying change agents within the 
population, up skilling those change agents and supporting them to engage their staff.” P1 
 
So what we did was, we would go into a person who has been discharged into a transferred room has got VRE 
and we swab the light switches, the door handles, any horizontal spaces, the bed, the mattress and the 
bathroom.” P1 
 
“We have cleaned with neutral detergent. It didn’t remove it. We swabbed it again after we cleaned. We then 
cleaned with neutral detergent and alcohol. It didn’t remove it. It was still there. And then we cleaned again with 
a double alcohol clean and we got rid of it. That’s why we started to look at environments.” P1 
 
“We looked at two alcohols again, didn’t remove the VRE, and we moved to sodium hypochlorite.” P1 
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“We also at that time started a VRE cleaning team over the Christmas break, just to try and decontaminate areas 
that were affected at that time.”P1 
 
“…we instituted Virkon, which is … used as a disinfectant in ICU because we found that mobile pieces of 
equipment were contaminated with acinetobacter.”P1 
 
“..we did in 2005, we introduced an interactive dressing over our caesarean sections…” P3 
 
“That was the first year that we implemented infection control management plan.” P3 
 
“Yes, 2006 we brought in Interlink.”P3 
 
“…in November we changed our cleaning protocol. We use Diver Cleanse or Virkon….”P4 
 
“Now, that year as well we also started doing a project from the beginning of that year, 2006, because we 
worked up to it in 2005; a project for a bundle for caesarean sections.”P3 
 
“The other thing that happened was Fit testing”. P3 
 
“That’s when the swine flue eventually hit us and we started to do all the protocols, policies education on it and 
immunisation and the cooperation with the community.”P3 
 
“In 2009 they introduced the Tuffie five wipes.” P3 
 





“…the implementation of the hand hygiene alcohol-based hand rub at the end of the beds….we have it at the 
entrance to the wards and the entrance to the hospitals.” P4 
 
“….that was a hug thing (I-Care guidelines) So here we implemented it when it came out in 2007.”P4 
 
“..we have just had our antibiotics stewardship policy printed in the last couple of weeks.” P4 
 
“It was probably actually here. April, May, June I think it was that we had three months where we had a 
cleaning team….”P1 
 
“..having the time to get around and educate people and have the discussions and engage.”P1 
 
“I-Care came on 14 February. Valentine’s Day. It is easy. The I-Care was easy because that was a set date that 
was put in for the I-Care program.” P3 
 
“It’s made us think. We decided we are now going to have a live register. Every time, once a month or 
something, we will put stuff into it, so that we have got a timeline for everything.” P3 (the interview) 
 
It was around the actual time of H1N1, Right in the middle of that. So it wasn’t the best time to do it, really,” P1 
 
“We changed our definition for the bacteraemias.” P1 
 
 Monitoring the 
effectiveness 
Well, at the end of each intervention, whether it be an outbreak management or an actual specific intervention 
for an increased organism we go through a review period at the end of it.” P2 
 
We are in the process of doing that now (evaluating). Internal. Internal as in looking at the bacteremia data and 
looking at what they are doing”. P1 
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“…in 2005, we decided that we needed to have feedback to the surgeons and the medicos, if they had a surgical 
site would infection, if they had a bacteremia.”P3 
 
“If you do a literature search, the UK just mandated it and said, that’s what you will do.” P3 
 
“Well, we do –formally, we do a three monthly report.” P3 
 
“ Things that are new for us are education and evaluation of standard precautions.” P4 
 
“So I-Care is evaluated.” P4 
 
“Internally. So they send out a report. This is the IV cannulation result/report. This all goes to the units, telling 
them how they have done. The have to get 90 percent….then they have got an action plan.” P4 
 
“…The antibiotics stewardship goes through the District infection Control Committee. Our health management 
protocols, they all go the Infection Control Committee. So I guess they are all internally evaluated. 
 
“And we also try and aim to educate them annually; from general infection control but also hand hygiene and 
any other health promotional thing that we are doing at the time.”P1 
 
“The indictor for cleaning that we use in ICU, that we do on a monthly basis, that quality assurance check..”P1 
 
“So once a month we look at one patient who has left the ICU environment. They clean everything out of the 
room but they don’t clean the room. We go in and we put a UV filter into the room and we go back after it’s 
been cleaned….” P1 
 
“All of our auditing is pretty much done by the three of us”. P3 
 




“We have monthly IV cannulation audits.” P4 
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Appendix GAppendix 7: Invitation Email for Phase 2 Part A and B Survey 
 
Dear (Infection Control Clinical Nurse Consultant), 
 
We invite you to complete the Outbreaks and Infection Control Interventions (2005-2011) 
timeline survey for the National Evaluation of the Hand Hygiene Initiative (NHHI). 
 
We greatly appreciate your participation, as this survey is vital to the overall evaluation of the 
NHHI.  The survey will allow us to explore other factors in infection control that could 
potentially influence rates of hospital-acquired infection (other than hand hygiene). 
 
The aim of this survey is to build a timeline of events that have occurred in infection control 
in your hospital in the 7 years from January 2005 to December 2011. The key information we 
seek is the dates (month & year) when events occurred so that we can explore the reasons for 
the changes in infection rates over time. If you are unsure of the dates then please check your 
records or ask someone. We only require the month and year where possible. 
 
We are asking about two types of events: outbreaks and interventions. We are not interested 
in every small change, rather we prefer you to focus on the large and significant changes. 
 
The survey may require you to consult your records and documents, or talk to colleagues.  The 
advantage, however, is that you do not have to complete the survey in one session. You can 
come back to it as many times as you wish, and your previous work will be saved. However, 
you must use the same computer to finish the survey. 
 
If we could have the survey completed by Wednesday the 19th of September 2012 we would 
be sincerely grateful. As an expert in the field of infection control we greatly value your 
opinion. If you have any questions or concerns please contact Rebecca Rashleigh-Rolls on 
0438 632 837 or by email: r.rashleigh-rolls@student.qut.edu.au 
 
A participant information sheet is attached for your perusal. Please read this before starting 
the survey. The link to the survey is: https://survey.qut.edu.au/survey/174921/1915/ 
 






Student Researcher/Chief Investigator 
Queensland University of Technology, School of Nursing and Midwifery 
National Hand Hygiene Initiative - Evaluation Project 
IHBI, Queensland University of Technology 















infection control quality improvement interventions/policies and any hospital acquired
infection outbreaks from January 2005 untilDecember 2011. The research also aims to
examinetheeffectquality improvement interventionshaveonhospitalacquired infection
rates and the effect hospital acquired infection outbreaks have on staff, policy and the
hospital.Theresearchteamrequestsyourassistanceasanursecurrentlyworkingininfection









in noway impact upon your current or future relationshipwithQUT or your employer.
Completingwillbeacceptedasconfirmationofyourconsenttoparticipate.Allresponseswill
be treated confidentially. Data results will be blinded therefore; no individual name or
hospitalwillbeidentified.Thedataresultswillbeusedforresearchpurposesonly.
YourparticipationwillinvolveparticipationinanonͲlinesurvey.Youwillbeaskedtoprovide
information about implemented quality improvement interventions/policies relating to







understanding about the effect of infection control quality improvement
interventions/policiesonhospitalacquiredinfectionrates.Theknowledgegainedfromthis
studywillbeusedtoevaluatetheeffectoftheidentifiedqualityimprovementinterventions
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onhospitalacquiredinfectionrates,byestablishingatimelineoftheirimplementationand
correlatingthistoratesofhospitalacquiredinfection.
There are unlikely to be risks beyond normal dayͲtoͲday living associated with your
participationinthisproject.However,itmaybethatthetopicofhospitalacquiredinfection
outbreaks and infection control quality improvement interventions/polices produces
discomfortforsomeparticipantsbasedontheirownorothers’experiences.Ifparticipation







All responses will be treated confidentially and will only be seen by the QUT project
researchers.Datacollectedwillonlybeusedforresearchpurposesandwillnotbeavailable











































Appendix IAppendix 9: Reminder Email for Phase 2 Part A and B Survey 
 
Dear (Infection Control Clinical Nurse Consultant), 
  
On the 5th of September 2012 we invited you to complete the Outbreaks and Infection 
Control Interventions (2005-2011) timeline survey for the National Evaluation of the Hand 
Hygiene Initiative (NHHI). 
  
We would greatly appreciate your participation, as this survey is vital to the overall 
evaluation of the NHHI.  The survey will allow us to explore other factors in infection 
control that could potentially influence rates of hospital acquired infection (other than hand 
hygiene). 
  
The aim of this survey is to build a timeline of events that have occurred in infection control 
in your hospital in the 7 years from January 2005 to December 2011.  The key information 
we seek is the dates (month & year) when events occurred so that we can explore the reasons 
for the changes in infection rates over time. If you are unsure of the dates then please check 
your records or ask someone. We only require the month and year where possible. 
  
We are asking about two types of events: outbreaks and interventions. We are not interested 
in every small change, rather we prefer you to focus on the large and significant changes. 
  
The survey may require you to consult your records and documents, or talk to 
colleagues.  The advantage, however, is that you do not have to complete the survey in one 
session.    You can simply select the button at the bottom of the page “Save & Finish Later” 
to  come back to it as many times as you wish, and your previous work will be saved. 
However, you must use the same computer to finish the survey. 
  
We understand that you are incredibly busy and as such we have extended the completion 
date to: FRIDAY 28TH SEPTEMBER 2012. If you could complete the survey by this date 
we would be sincerely grateful.  As an expert in the field of infection control we greatly 
value your opinion. If you have any questions or concerns please contact Rebecca Rashleigh-
Rolls on 0438 632 837 or by email: r.rashleigh-rolls@student.qut.edu.au 
  
A participant information sheet is attached for your perusal. Please read this before starting 










Student Researcher/Chief Investigator 
Queensland University of Technology, School of Nursing and Midwifery 
National Hand Hygiene Initiative – Evaluation Project 
IHBI, Queensland University of Technology 
P: 0438 632 837   
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Email: r.rashleigh-rolls@student.qut.edu.au 
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